THE EFFECT OF FEEDGRAIN PROGRAM PARTICIPATION ON CHEMICAL USE

Economic incentives created by the commodity programs are hypothesized to cause program participants to apply agrichemicals at greater rates than nonparticipants. Corn producers who participate in the USDA feedgrain program are shown to apply nitrogen, herbicides, and insecticides at statistically greater rates than those who do not participate.Crop Production/Industries,

AGRICULTURE IN AN ECOSYSTEMS FRAMEWORK

By broadening the definition of an ecosystem to include economic activities, can we better characterize the interactions and relationships among agricultural activities and important indicators of ecological system health? This paper addresses research approaches for assessing the role of agriculture in an ecosystems context. Environmental regulation and resource management policies have heightened the interest in understanding interactions among agricultural activities and the natural resource base, including the impacts of agriculture on environmental quality and the impacts on agriculture of ecosystem restoration efforts. What are the most meaningful indicators of environmental quality? Which agricultural practices and policies should be considered, along with which nonagricultural resource uses? Finally, does the evolving thinking about ecosystems permit us to link agricultural practices and policies more directly and meaningfully to conceptions of sustainability, of both natural and socioeconomic systems? This paper presents a brief synopsis of ecosystem management, drawing from several recent governmental initiatives. It then provides an overview of the economics of ecosystem management from the perspective of the role of agriculture; discusses two specific cases, the Pacific Northwest and South Florida; and concludes with a discussion of promising economic approaches, data needs, and caveats to those engaged in policy analysis involving ecosystem restoration.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Model of Participation in U.S. Farm Programs

Voluntary participation in U.S. farm programs significantly influences the economic consequences of these programs. The voluntary nature of these programs produces two important considerations for policy analysis. First, program provisions designed to induce participation create distortions in farm production. Second, commodity and factor mark:~t equilibriums depend crucially on the actual level of participation. U.S. farm programs are designed to provide income transfers and affect market prices through supply control. The effectiveness of supply control depends on the level of farmer participation, which, in tum, depends on the expected benefits to participants. Therefore, to estimate the effectiveness and economic consequences of farm policy options, it is important to model program participation. This report presents a general equilibrium model of the U.S. farm and nonfarm sectors. The main features of the model include the depiction of participation by farmers in the programs, explicit modeling of agricultural program instruments, and capital investment

THE EFFECT OF FEEDGRAIN PROGRAM PARTICIPATION ON CHEMICAL USE

Economic incentives created by the commodity programs are hypothesized to cause program participants to apply agrichemicals at greater rates than nonparticipants. Corn producers who participate in the USDA feedgrain program are shown to apply nitrogen, herbicides, and insecticides at statistically greater rates than those who do not participate

Equilibrium Effects of Agricultural Technology Adoption: The Case of Induced Output Price Changes

Pollution from agricultural activity depends on the agricultural practices or technologies that farmers employ. Adoption of less polluting practices can be induced by a variety of policy instruments. Cost-$haring by the government to reduce the costs of technology adoption and/or implementation for producers is an instrument widely used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This report examines the problem of designing economically efficient cost-sharing programs. The adoption decision for a farm is based on a comparison of the relative profitability of the existing technology and a new, less polluting one where the profitability of each technology depends on land quality. The problem for government is to determine the optimal subsidy rates that will induce a level of adoption sufficient to achieve some exogenous pollution goal. A benchmark (or first best) solution to the pollution problem serves as a reference against which to compare the optima! cost-sharing policy with imperfect targeting of land. The authors also examine the importance of specifying the land on which a technology should be u~ed and of varying subsidy rates across inputs

Optimal Cost-Sharing Programs to Reduce Agricultural Pollution

Pollution from agriculture depends on the agricultural practices or technologies farmers use. Policy instruments, such as government cost-sharing programs, can reduce the costs of adopting less-polluting practices. This report examines the problem of designing economically efficient cost-sbaring programs. Farmers' decisions to adopt less-polluting technologies are based on the profitability of their farms' adjusting technology, compared with new technologies. A benchmark solution to the pollution problem serves as a reference against which to compare the optimal cost-Sharing policy with imperfect targeting of land. The optimal input subsidy scheme depends on the pollution being managed, costs associated with the participation constraint, and the social cost of public funds