Toyota dans l'histoire

At the end of the 20th century, the Japanese automobile industry is suffering from the long depression of Japanese economy to such an extent that sorne of Japanese carmakers were not able to survive without cooperating with foreign powerful carmakers. Nissan has been in restructuring under the French managers dispatched by Renault. Suzuki and Isuzu began to reinforce their cooperation with GM, whereas Fuji Heavy Industry (Subaru) and Mitsubishi are searching for their Western partners. It is only Toyota and Honda that seem to be able to compete by themselves on globalized automobile markets. Irony of the history, because until the end of the 1980s all Japanese carmakers were regarded as the most competitive companies of the world by incarnating the 'Lean Production' model whose basic model is the Toyota Production System. This stereotype has to be dismissed, because they have been having neither the same management nor the same strategy. This paper then tries to show the history of Japanese automobile industry from its very beginning to mid-1990 when the majority of carmakers are facing a crisis. In doing so, it presents the specifie characteristics of Toyota by placing it in the historical perspective

Reorienting Kaizen Activities at Toyota : Kaizen, Production Efficiency, and Humanization of Work

One of the widely held opinions about Japanese firms’ high performance suggests that Japanese employees, organized in teams, are making kaizen (continuous improvements) in their own jobs through quality circles or other initiatives such as a suggestion system. But who are these employees? They would have to be blue−collar workers in the Western perception, but the part of their contribution in improving productivity and price cost does not seem exceed 10% of all improvements obtained. Who then brings about the major part of these improvements? Are the kaizen activities carried out without having relation to the company’s profit strategy? If the employees have an objective in their kaizen activities, who provides the objectives? What do these objectives consist of? How are their activities managed? These questions invite us to inquire about a whole management system of kaizen at Toyota Production System, considered as the basic model of “Lean Production”. But Toyota reoriented its organized kaizen activities toward the construction of more humanized production system during 1990s. This paper then shows this reorientation and the new direction by showing the case of Tahara No.1 plant. Through these discussions, I want to emphasize the importance of organized kaizen activities that group leaders, chief leaders and engineers are carrying out, and also the fact that their activities are now centered not only upon productivity increase but also upon the humanization of work

Morphology control of zinc electrodeposition by surfactant addition for alkaline-based rechargeable batteries

ArticlePhysical Chemistry Chemical Physics. 21(13): 7045-7052 (2019)journal articl

Genealogy of Toyota Production System Evolution : Focusing cost & productivity management

TPS（ Toyota Production System） is the well-known system which is one of the strong points in Toyota. Nowadays lots of books are published about TPS as thesis and know-how books. It is said in Toyota internal, TPS is the management system and know-how of Kaizen for cost reduction activities based on two pillars such as Autonomy（Jidoka） and“ Just in time”. 　However I think it is not enough paying attention about on a management system, than the know-how of Kaizen by the ₃rd party. 　In this paper, focusing particularly on the management system such as wages linked on productivity measurements which Mr. Taichi Ohno, the founder of TPS, developed as well. Also focusing on the evolution, how does this system pursue the circumstance change including Toyota employee interview. 　Utilizing this wage linked productivity measurement system Mr. Ohno stimulated his coworkers to get good results applying TPS know-how. It is very complicated but well considered system

35 HoursWork a Week in the French Automobile Industry

The legal weekly working hours in France have been reduced to 35 hours from 2000 by the so called "Aubry’s law" of 1998. After the victory of conservatives in the legislative election in 2002, the conservative government is trying to moderate the regulation of overtime work, stipulated by the Aubry's laws of 1998 and of 2002, in order to make it a dead letter. However, the 35 hours work is not only supported by the public, but also positively accepted by big companies. In this paper, I show the real feature of 35 hours work at the company level, based on my interviews with French carmakers, Renault, Peugeot SA, and Toyota Motor Manufacturing France (TMMF), and on their unions−management agreement about the application of 35 hours law of 1998. The main results of this analysis are as follows. Firstly, the negotiations between unions and management for fixing their agreement were the occasion to revise their industrial relations, because the problem of working hours was the central issue influencing entire life of employees, and have served to stabilize their relations. Secondly, the carmakers positively evaluate the 35 hours law, because the law has allowed the flexibility of work organization, by which they can realize considerable economy of scale. Thirdly, they are receiving the government’s financial aide given to the companies, which have applied 35 hours régime and increased their employment. For these last two reasons, the carmakers are able to lower their unit labor cost in spite of the increase in the hourly wage. At the last analysis, they surely profit from the 35 hours law, and have no reason to object to it

Unemployment in France

フランスを含むEU の労働市場は全体として日米に比較して高い失業率で知られている。ユーロスタット（Eurostat）の失業率統計によって１９９５年までのEU 加盟国（１５カ国）の失業率をみると，１９９５年に平均失業率１０％，２５歳未満の若者の平均失業率は２１．３％であり，２００６年の失業率はそれぞれ７．４％と１６．１％であった。同時期についてアメリカ合衆国の失業率は，１９９５年の平均失業率が５．６％，２５歳未満の若者の失業率が１２．１％であり，２００６年ではそれぞれ４．６％と１０．５％であった。１９９０年代以降のアメリカ合衆国の失業率は，EU 諸国以上の高失業率に苦しんだ１９８０年代と比較すれば大きく低下しているが，１９９０年代中頃以降は４～６％の範囲で循環的に変動し，この水準で安定している。これに対して，EU１５カ国の平均失業率は１９９０年代の後半から低下傾向を示し，かつて「ヨーロッパの動脈硬化（eurosclérose）」を象徴する現象とみなされていた高失業率は解消されつつあるように思われ る。ところがフランスに注目すれば，平均失業率は１９９５年の１１．１％から２００６年の９．４％へと低下傾向を示しているものの，全期間を通じてEU１５カ国平均よりも高く，しかも２５歳未満の若者の失業率は１９９５年に２８．４％と４人に１人が失業し，２００６年においてもなお２３.３％と５人に１人が失業している。かつてフランス以上の高失業率国家であったスペインの場合，１９９５年には平均失業率が１８．４％，２５歳未満の若者の平均失業率にいたっては３９．７％と高率であったが，２００６年の平均失業率は８．５％，また２５歳未満の若者の失業率も１７．６％と失業問題は大きく改善されている。これに対して，フランスは今や西欧のなかで最も失業率の高い国となり，若者の失業問題は憂慮すべき問題であり続けている。このフランスの第２次世界大戦後の平均失業率の推移については３つの局面を区別することができる。第１の局面は１９５５年から１９７３年までのいわゆる「栄光の３０年」であり，この時期の失業率は１９６５年まで１～２％で変動し，１９６０年代後半からやや上昇して２％台で変動するようになったが，フランス経済は完全雇用経済であったといえる。第２の局面は第１次石油ショックの影響が労働市場に影響を及ぼすようになった１９７４年末から１９８７年までの時期である。この間，１９７４年の第４四半期に失業率が３％を越え，その後は１９８７年の第４四半期の１０．７％まで，失業率は年々上昇し続け，１９７０年代末より失業が重要な社会経済問題になっていく。第３の局面は，１９８７年以降の局面であり，失業率は景気変動に合わせて変動するようになった。この時期は，平均失業率が１１％を越えていた１９９３－１９９８年の期間と，１９９８年の３５時間労働法によって雇用創出政策が行なわれ，また経済成長率の上昇の効果もあって失業率が低下傾向を示し始めた１９９９年以降の時期を区別することができる。以下，本稿はフランスにおける諸研究にもとづいて，この第２期における失業率上昇の原因（第１節），第３期の１９９０年代の高失業率の原因（第２節），そしてフランスにおける失業の構造的特徴（第３節）を説明することにする