Theoretical limits of scaling-down internal combustion engines

Small-scale energy conversion devices are being developed for a variety of applications; these include propulsion units for micro aerial vehicles (MAV). The high specific energy of hydrocarbon and hydrogen fuels, as compared to other energy storing means, like batteries, elastic elements, flywheels and pneumatics, appears to be an important advantage, and favors the ICE as a candidate. In addition, the specific power (power per mass of unit) of the ICE seems to be much higher than that of other candidates. However, micro ICE engines are not simply smaller versions of full-size engines. Physical processes such as combustion and gas exchange, are performed in regimes different from those that occur in full-size engines. Consequently, engine design principles are different at a fundamental level and have to be re-considered before they are applied to micro-engines. When a spark-ignition (SI) cycle is considered, part of the energy that is released during combustion is used to heat up the mixture in the quenching volume, and therefore the flame-zone temperature is lower and in some cases can theoretically fall below the self-sustained combustion temperature. Flame quenching thus seems to limit the minimum dimensions of a SI engine. This limit becomes irrelevant when a homogeneous-charge compression-ignition (HCCI) cycle is considered. In this case friction losses and charge leakage through the cylinder-piston gap become dominant, constrain the engine size and impose minimum engine speed limits. In the present work a phenomenological model has been developed to consider the relevant processes inside the cylinder of a homogeneous-charge compression-ignition (HCCI) engine. An approximated analytical solution is proposed to yield the lower possible limits of scaling-down HCCI cycle engines. We present a simple algebraic equation that shows the inter-relationships between the pertinent parameters and constitutes the lower possible miniaturization limits of IC engines

Vacuum Stability Bounds in the Two-Higgs Doublet Model

In the standard model, the requirements of vacuum stability and the validity of perturbation theory up to the unification scale force the mass of the Higgs boson to be approximately between 130 GeV and 180 GeV. We re-examine these requirements in the (non-supersymmetric) two-Higgs doublet model, in the light of the large top quark mass, and constrain the masses of the Higgs bosons in this model. It is found that the mass of the charged Higgs boson must be lighter than 150 GeV. This bound is below the lower bound in the popular model-II two-Higgs doublet model, and thus we conclude that this model cannot be valid up to the unification scale. The bounds on the neutral Higgs scalars are also discussed.Comment: 8 pages, 4 figure

Invariance and Logicality in Perspective

Although the invariance criterion of logicality first emerged as a criterion of a purely mathematical interest, it has developed into a criterion of considerable linguistic and philosophical interest. In this paper I compare two different perspectives on this criterion. The first is the perspective of natural language. Here, the invariance criterion is measured by its success in capturing our linguistic intuitions about logicality and explaining our logical behavior in natural-linguistic settings. The second perspective is more theoretical. Here, the invariance criterion is used as a tool for developing a theoretical foundation of logic, focused on a critical examination, explanation, and justification of its veridicality and modal force

Invariance and Necessity

Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of properties/relations have a stronger degree of invariance than others. In this paper I will show how the degrees of invariance of different types of properties are associated with, and explain, the modal force of the laws governing them. This explains differences in the modal force of laws/principles of different disciplines, starting with logic and mathematics and proceeding to physics and biology

Substantivism about truth

Substantivism is a general philosophical methodology advocating a substantive approach to philosophical theorizing. In this article, I present an overview of this methodology with a special emphasis on the field of truth. I begin with a framework for understanding what is at stake in the substantivist–deflationist debate and describe the substantivist critique of deflationism. I then proceed to discuss contemporary substantivism as a positive methodology, present examples of recent substantivist theories of truth, delineate several principles of philosophical substantivism, and connect it to contemporary thought about the nature and methods of philosophy. Due to limitations of space, I am unable to discuss all the forms contemporary substantivism has taken. But I try to give a clear sense of the central principles, challenges, and promise of this methodology