The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism

We take a garden-variety instance of distributive politics-- a divide-the-cake stage game -- and explore dynamic extensions in different institutional settings: (i) repeated play of the stage game in a simultaneous-term unicameral legislature; (ii) repeated play in a staggered-term unicameral legislature; and (iii)repeated play in a bicameral setting of one staggered-term and one simultaneous-term legislative chamber. We are then able to entertain decisions taken at "the constitutional moment" regarding which institutional forms to employ.institutions; distributive politics; repeated divide-the-cake games; bicameralism

Nominations for sale

Models of nomination politics in the US often find "gridlock" in equilibrium because of the super-majority requirement in the Senate for the confirmation of presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers to defeat any nominee. Yet empirically nominations are successful. In the present paper we explore the possibility that senators can be induced to vote contrary to their nominal (gridlock-producing) preferences through contributions from the president and/or lobbyists, thus breaking the gridlock and confirming the nominee. We model contributions by the president and lobbyists according to whether payment schedules are conditioned on the entire voting profile, the vote of a senator, or the outcome. We analyze several extensions to our baseline approach, including the possibility that lobbyists may find it more productive to offer inducements to the president in order to affect his proposal behavior, rather than trying to induce senators to vote for or against a given nominee.lobbying; supermajority institutions

A Comment on the Positive Canons Project

Using the machinery of positive political theory in order to make some sense of legislative intent contains a number of provocative possibilities. Issues that require attention in this theory are addressed

Agenda Setting Power in Organizations with Overlapping Generations of Players

This paper presents an analysis of the allocation of agenda-setting (or bargaining) power in organizations with overlapping generations of players. Such powers are typically institutionalized within an organization’s structure, and, given the focus of this paper, we identify the former with the latter. Our analysis concerns organizations (such as the US Senate) in which the number of periods each player participates is endogenously determined by his or her past performance. We derive several results and insights concerning (i) optimal organizational structure and (ii) conditions under which the unique, dynamically optimal outcome can be sustained (in equilibrium) in organizations with suboptimal structures. For example, we show that under a broad set of conditions, the optimal organizational structure should involve a seniority system, in which most of the agenda-setting power is allocated to the oldest generation of players

Congressional Careers, Committee Assignments, and Seniority Randomization in the US House of Representatives

This paper estimates the effects of initial committee seniority on the career histories of Democratic members of the House of Representatives from 1949 to 2006. When more than one freshman representative is assigned to a committee, positions in the seniority queue are established by lottery. Randomization ensures that queue positions are uncorrelated in expectation with other legislator characteristics within these groups. This natural experiment allows us to estimate the causal effect of seniority on a variety of career outcomes. Lower-ranked committee members areless likely to serve as subcommittee chairs on their initial committee; are more likely to transfer to other committees; and have fewer sponsored bills passed in the jurisdiction of their initial committee. On the other hand, there is little evidence that the seniority randomization has a net effect on reelection outcomes or noncommittee bills passed.GovernmentOther Research Uni

Executive Absolutism: A Model

Separated powers cannot permanently constrain individual ambitions. Concerns about a government's ability to respond to contemporary and future crises, we show, invariably compromise the principled commitments one branch of government has in limiting the authority of another. We study a dynamic model in which a politician (most commonly an executive) makes authority claims that are subject to a hard constraint (administered, typically, by a court). At any period, the court is free to rule against the executive and thereby permanently halt her efforts to acquire more power. Because it appropriately cares about the executive's ability to address real-world disruptions, however, the court is always willing to affirm more authority. Neither robust electoral competition nor alternative characterizations of judicial rule fundamentally alters this state of affairs. The result, we show, is a persistent accumulation of executive authority

Executive Absolutism: A Model

Separated powers cannot permanently constrain individual ambitions. Concerns about a government's ability to respond to contemporary and future crises, we show, invariably compromise the principled commitments one branch of government has in limiting the authority of another. We study a dynamic model in which a politician (most commonly an executive) makes authority claims that are subject to a hard constraint (administered, typically, by a court). At any period, the court is free to rule against the executive and thereby permanently halt her efforts to acquire more power. Because it appropriately cares about the executive's ability to address real-world disruptions, however, the court is always willing to affirm more authority. Neither robust electoral competition nor alternative characterizations of judicial rule fundamentally alters this state of affairs. The result, we show, is a persistent accumulation of executive authority

Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics

In recent years important theoretical contributions have shown that majority rule is a very badly behaved collective choice mechanism. In the absence of artificial restraints on preferences majority rule processes are almost always in disequilibrium. Moreover, the extent of the disequilibrium is pervasive, as captured by the observation that "anything can happen". What are the implications of such nihilistic results for the study of democratic political processes? Some authors believe that the implications are major, that they in fact preclude the development of a science of politics. Other authors take a more sanguine view. This essay argues that equilibrium notions, as presently formulated, are neither necessary nor sufficient for the development of a scientific study of politics. The newly proved disequilibrium results do suggest a change in the research agenda facing political scientists. The broad outlines of that agenda, and a general strategy for proceeding are discussed

Estudiando las instituciones : algunas lecciones del enfoque de la elección racional

Artículo originalEste artículo examina los desarrollos recientes en la literatura referida como “neo-institucionalismo”. Luego de revisar algunas de las consecuencias para el estudio de las instituciones producidas por la revolución conductista y las teorías sobre la elección social influenciadas por Kenneth Arrow, el autor desarrolla la teoría del equilibrio estructuralmente inducido y explora las dos caras de la moneda institucional, esto es, una explicación del desarrollo de la estructura institucional y un examen de sus consecuencia

Nominations for sale

Models of nomination politics in the US often find "gridlock" in equilibrium because of the super-majority requirement in the Senate for the confirmation of presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers to defeat any nominee. Yet empirically nominations are successful. In the present paper we explore the possibility that senators can be induced to vote contrary to their nominal (gridlock-producing) preferences through contributions from the president and/or lobbyists, thus breaking the gridlock and confirming the nominee. We model contributions by the president and lobbyists according to whether payment schedules are conditioned on the entire voting profile, the vote of a senator, or the outcome. We analyze several extensions to our baseline approach, including the possibility that lobbyists may find it more productive to offer inducements to the president in order to affect his proposal behavior, rather than trying to induce senators to vote for or against a given nominee