Is mindfulness buddhist? (and why it matters)

Modern exponents of mindfulness meditation promote the therapeutic effects of “bare attention”—a sort of non-judgmental, non-discursive attending to the moment-to-moment flow of consciousness. This approach is arguably at odds with more traditional Theravada Buddhist doctrine and meditative practice, but the cultivation of present-centered awareness is not without precedent in Buddhist history; similar innovations arose in medieval Chinese Zen (Chan) and Tibetan Dzogchen. These movements have several things in common. In each case the reforms were, in part, attempts to render Buddhist practice and insight accessible to laypeople unfamiliar with Buddhist philosophy and/or unwilling to adopt a renunciatory lifestyle. They also promised quick results. And finally, the innovations were met with suspicion and criticism from traditional Buddhist quarters. Those interested in the therapeutic effects of mindfulness and bare attention are often not aware of the existence, much less the content, of the controversies surrounding these practices in Asian Buddhist history

Is Yogācāra Phenomenology? Some Evidence from the Cheng weishi lun

There have been several attempts of late to read Yogācāra through the lens of Western phenomenology. I approach the issue through a reading of the Cheng weishi lun (Treatise on the Perfection of Consciousness Only), a seventh-century Chinese compilation that preserves the voices of multiple Indian commentators on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā (Thirty Verses on Consciousness). Specifically, I focus on the “five omnipresent mental factors” (pañcasarvatraga, Chin. wu bianxing xinsuo) and the “four aspects” (Chin. sifen) of cognition. These two topics seem ripe, at least on the surface, for phenomenological analysis, particularly as the latter topic includes a discussion of “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti, Chin. zizheng). Yet we find that the Cheng weishi lun account has little in common with the tradition associated with Husserl and his heirs. The categories and modes of analysis in the Cheng weishi lun do not emerge from or aver to a systematic reflection on the nature of “lived experience” so much as they are focused on subliminal processes and metaphysical entities that belong to the domain of the noumenal. In my conclusion I suggest that the later pramāṇa tradition associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—a tradition that profoundly influenced later Yogācāra exegesis in Tibet—did indeed take a “phenomenological turn.” But my comparison shows that both traditions falter when it comes to relating conceptual content to non-conceptual experience, and thus there is reason to be skeptical about claims that phenomenology is epistemologically grounded in how the world presents itself first-personally

Network Identification for Diffusively-Coupled Systems with Minimal Time Complexity

The theory of network identification, namely identifying the (weighted) interaction topology among a known number of agents, has been widely developed for linear agents. However, the theory for nonlinear agents using probing inputs is less developed and relies on dynamics linearization. We use global convergence properties of the network, which can be assured using passivity theory, to present a network identification method for nonlinear agents. We do so by linearizing the steady-state equations rather than the dynamics, achieving a sub-cubic time algorithm for network identification. We also study the problem of network identification from a complexity theory standpoint, showing that the presented algorithms are optimal in terms of time complexity. We also demonstrate the presented algorithm in two case studies.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figure