株主総会の機能と限界

1. 序　2.　二つの株式会社本質観　3. 株主総会の現状紹介　4. 考察の視角　5. 株主総会の現状の考察　6. 機能と限界に関する総括　7. おわり

Divestment of commonwealth public enterprises in Australia: the cupboard is bare

Public enterprises have played a major role in the national development of Australia since the early years of European settlement. More recently, especially since the 1980s, Australian governments at national and state levels, involving political parties of both the left and right, have undertaken a program of major reform of their public sectors. The relentless pace of reform has been driven by a variety of motives from pragmatic through to ideological, within a broad consensus that private delivery of services should be privileged over public. As a result, discourse about public enterprises in Australia has tended to focus on divestment and windfall revenues to assist governments to balance their budgets. The analysis in this paper will detail the major players at the national level, their governance arrangements and some consideration of how these enterprises have performed. We will also outline how the public mission of public enterprises has transformed in recent decades from a role as nation builder to one as enabler of services. In conclusion we will consider the long-term outlook including the loss of public value with declining standards of service and the reduced opportunities for further divestments with pressure on governments to seek alternative savings and revenue arrangements

The responsibilities of institutional shareholders in the UK

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:99/14386 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Report

Mode of access: Internet

After the OFR: Can UK shareholder value still be enlightened?

This article examines the likely impact of the United Kingdom's Company Law Review (CLR) on its system of corporate governance. The CLR recommended that company law should be amended to require companies to pursue ‘enlightened shareholder value’. This would be ensured primarily through a requirement on listed companies to produce an Operating and Financial Review (OFR). The OFR was introduced into law but was recently unexpectedly abolished by the Chancellor. The article examines the theoretical approach taken to corporate governance by the CLR and the way in which the OFR was expected to affect corporate governance. It then asks whether shareholder value would in fact have been enlightened by the OFR, given the institutional context in which it would have operated. While there are considerable grounds for scepticism about whether the OFR would have worked as the CLR expected, it is unfortunate that it was withdrawn because it was an important experiment in disclosure of qualitative information about intangible assets. The article concludes with some thoughts about whether shareholder value could still be enlightened in the absence of a mandatory OFR