Diplomacy, development, and security in the information age

The information revolution is permanently changing the face of international relations. Wired, networked protestors help power and publicize the Arab Spring, leading to the downfall of authoritarian regimes long believed unshakable. Secret cables published by Wikileaks expose the mechanics of U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking to a global public. Chinese Internet users spread photo evidence to expose corrupt local officials. Israelis and Palestinians use video and social media to add another dimension to real-time conflict.But what do these disparate events really tell us? The popular narrative generally holds that time and distance are collapsing, everything and everyone is scrutinized, filters are nonexistent, and nonstate actors hold disproportionate and ever-increasing power. While powerful, and containing some elements of truth, this narrative is rarely re-examined in the context of policy discourse or the decisions that arise from it.There is far more to understand about international relations in what is commonly termed the information age. Changes in the speed, volume diversity, nature and accessibility of information, as well as the ways in which it is exchanged, have contributed to a variety of emerging and evolving phenomena. These include the rise of nontraditional security threats (cyber and otherwise), networked forms of organization, asymmetrical conflict, decentralization, recentralization, altered global governance structures, multicentrism, information asymmetry, new development models, contested global norms, and much more. All of these present challenges and opportunities for states and nonstate actors and require a substantial rethink of the lens through which we view international affairs.Yet fresh thinking on these issues, while taken up by specialized academics, rarely makes it onto the public agenda. Such research tends to get tucked away into the vibrant but often impenetrable (to outsiders) fiefdom of communications research, such that followers of international affairs do not tend to encounter it on a regular basis, if at all. Thus, the initial analysis of events hardens into an accepted truth, and it becomes increasingly difficult to pose alternate narratives or even further explore the dominant one.This working paper series intends to illuminate this narrative by delving further into the trends in international affairs that have been accelerated or otherwise augmented by the information revolution. Because this task could easily prove unmanageable, the series will examine in particular two separate but linked phenomena enhanced by the information age: heightened transparency and increased volatility

Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Chapter 1 The Conventional Wisdom: What Lies Beneath?)

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Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Forward)

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Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Chapter 2 Wired for Modernization in China)

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Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Table of Contents)

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The Internet and state control in authoritarian regimes: China, Cuba and the counterrevolution

It is widely believed that the Internet poses an insurmountable threat to authoritarian rule. But political science scholarship has provided little support for this conventional wisdom, and a number of case studies from around the world show that authoritarian regimes are finding ways to control and counter the political impact of Internet use. While the long-term political impact of the Internet remains an open question, we argue that these strategies for control may continue to be viable in the short to medium term. Many authoritarian regimes translate a long and successful history of control over other information and communication technologies into strong control of Internet development within their borders. Potential challenges to the state may arise from Internet use in several areas: the mass public, civil society, the economy, and the international community. Authoritarian states will likely respond to these challenges with a variety of reactive measures: restricting Internet access, filtering content, monitoring online behavior, or even prohibiting Internet use entirely. In addition, such states seek to extend central control through proactive strategies, guiding the development of the medium to promote their own interests and priorities. Through a combination of reactive and proactive strategies, an authoritarian regime can counter the challenge posed by Internet use and even utilize the Internet to extend its reach and authority. In this paper we illustrate how two authoritarian regimes, China and Cuba, are maintainng control over the Internet's political impact through different combinations of reactive and proactive strategies. These cases illustrate that, contrary to assumptions, different types of authoritarian regimes may be able to control and profit from the Internet. Examining the experiences of these two countries may help to shed light on other authoritarian regimes' strategies for Internet development, as well as help to develop generalizable conclusions about the impact of the Internet on authoritarian rule

The Internet and state control in authoritarian regimes: China, Cuba and the counterrevolution (originally published in August 2001)

It is widely believed that the Internet poses an insurmountable threat to authoritarian rule. But political science scholarship has provided little support for this conventional wisdom, and a number of case studies from around the world show that authoritarian regimes are finding ways to control and counter the political impact of Internet use. While the long-term political impact of the Internet remains an open question, we argue that these strategies for control may continue to be viable in the short to medium term. Many authoritarian regimes translate a long and successful history of control over other information and communication technologies into strong control of Internet development within their borders. Potential challenges to the state may arise from Internet use in several areas: the mass public, civil society, the economy, and the international community. Authoritarian states will likely respond to these challenges with a variety of reactive measures: restricting Internet access, filtering content, monitoring online behavior, or even prohibiting Internet use entirely. In addition, such states seek to extend central control through proactive strategies, guiding the development of the medium to promote their own interests and priorities. Through a combination of reactive and proactive strategies, an authoritarian regime can counter the challenge posed by Internet use and even utilize the Internet to extend its reach and authority. In this paper we illustrate how two authoritarian regimes, China and Cuba, are maintainng control over the Internet's political impact through different combinations of reactive and proactive strategies. These cases illustrate that, contrary to assumptions, different types of authoritarian regimes may be able to control and profit from the Internet. Examining the experiences of these two countries may help to shed light on other authoritarian regimes' strategies for Internet development, as well as help to develop generalizable conclusions about the impact of the Internet on authoritarian rule