QUICK - RELEASE END EFFECTOR TOOL INTERFACE

The various embodiments herein relate to a coupling apparatus for a medical device having a coupler body, a cavity defined in the coupler body, a rotatable drive component disposed within the cavity and having at least two pin receiving openings, and an actuable locking ring disposed around the cavity

Patterns of patch rejection in size-structured populations: beyond the ideal free distribution and size segregation

Journal ArticleWe examine optimal patch allocation strategies in a population structured by size or some other characteristic. By treating size-specific differences among patches as limiting factors, we create a single framework to analyse foraging for two resources, foraging in the presence of predators and foraging in the presence of competition. The ideal free distribution or size segregation are optimal only in restricted circumstances, among a range of other intermediate patterns of patch rejection. The predicted pattern can shift from an ideal free distribution to various forms of size segregation as resource renewal rates in patches become more different

METHODS , SYSTEMS , AND DEVICES RELATING TO SURGICAL END EFFECTORS

The embodiments disclosed herein relate to various medical device components , including components that can be incorporated into robotic and / or in vivo medical devices, and more specifically including end effectors that can be incorporated into such devices. Certain end effector embodiments include various vessel cautery devices that have rotational movement as well as cautery and cutting functions while maintaining a relatively compact structure. Other end effector embodiments include various end effector devices that have more than one end effector

LOCAL CONTROL ROBOTIC SURGICAL DEVICES AND RELATED METHODS

The various robotic medical devices include robotic devices that are disposed within a body cavity and positioned using a support component disposed through an orifice or opening in the body cavity. Additional embodiments relate to devices having arms coupled to a device body wherein the device has a minimal profile such that the device can be easily inserted through smaller incisions in comparison to other devices without such a small profile. Further embodiments relate to methods of operating the above devices

SINGLE SITE ROBOTC DEVICE AND RELATED SYSTEMS AND METHODS

The embodiments disclosed herein relate to various medical device components, including components that can be incor porated into robotic and/or in vivo medical devices. Certain embodiments include various medical devices for in vivo medical procedures

A Reference Price Theory of the Endowment Effect Ray Weaver

ABSTRACT Acquiring a good seems to increase its value to the owner, as consumers show reluctance to trade away their possessions for similarly valuable money or other goods. The established explanation for this endowment effect is that consumers evaluate potential trades with respect to their current holdings. From this perspective, selling prices exceed buying prices because owners of a good regard its potential loss to be more significant than non-owners regard its potential acquisition. In contrast to this "pain-of-losing" account, we propose a reference price theory which characterizes the endowment effect as the reluctance to trade on unfavorable terms. In this view, consumers evaluate potential trades with respect to salient reference prices, and selling prices (or trading demands) are elevated whenever the most common reference prices -typically market prices -exceed personal valuations. In seven experiments (and eight more summarized in appendices), we show that manipulations which reduce the gap between valuations and reference prices tend to reduce or eliminate the endowment effect. These results support our theory and suggest that the endowment effect is often best construed as an aversion to bad deals, rather than an aversion to losing possessions. Keywords: Endowment effect, evaluation disparities, reference prices, loss aversion, transaction utility. 2 Buying and selling have a deep symmetry. When an apple is traded for an orange, there is no basis for even distinguishing the "buyer" from the "seller" -these labels can be uniquely assigned only when money is one of the "goods" being exchanged. Since economic theory treats buying and selling symmetrically 1 In practice, they don't. In their review of 59 studies involving ordinary market goods, Horowitz and McConnell (2002) report that selling prices are nearly three times higher than buying prices. In contrast to this "pain-of-losing" account, we propose that the endowment effect is often better understood as the reluctance to trade on unfavorable terms. Consumers evaluate potential trades with respect to salient reference prices, and selling prices (or trading demands) are elevated because the most common reference prices (market prices) typically exceed valuations. In seven experiments, we show that manipulations which reduce the gap between valuations and reference prices tend to reduce or eliminate the endowment effect. These results suggest that the endowment effect is often best construed as an aversion to bad deals, rather than an aversion to losing possessions. VALUATIONS, REFERENCE PRICES AND TRANSACTION DISUTILITY Thaler (1985) proposed that consumers consider not only the benefits from the good they might buy or sell, but also the perceived merits of the deal: whether the actual price is higher or lower than they expect. In one study, participants imagined sitting on a beach with a friend who had just offered to bring them back a bottle of their favorite beer. On average, participants authorized their companion to spend $2.65 when told that beer would be purchased from a fancy hotel, but just$1.50 when it came from a run-down grocery store. In other words, the expectation to pay less became a willingness to pay less. Analogously, participants who contemplated selling tickets to a hockey game they could no longer attend demanded more if the original purchase price was higher. These examples are supported by other research We propose that the endowment effect is due in large part to transaction disutility, which typically acts to increase selling prices (though sometimes acts to reduce buying prices). A simple model will help us state our claim more precisely. Assume that a consumer's desire for any given good can be expressed in monetary terms as his valuation v, which indicates his expected benefits from using the good: his "consumption utility" Although transaction disutility can create price gaps by inflating selling prices or by depressing buying prices, the influence on selling prices is far more common in practice. The reason for this is that market prices, and therefore reference prices, tend to substantially exceed 5 valuations for an arbitrarily selected product (such as a coffee mug).). In other words, most people are typically unwilling to buy most products at their retail prices. 3 As a consequence, transaction disutility tends to distort selling prices upward, while buying prices tend to faithfully reflect valuations. The pain-of-losing account presumes that selling and buying have fundamentally different psychologies: owners are thought to experience the act of selling as "losing" the item being sold, whereas buyers are not seen as experiencing an analogous loss. Tversky and Kahneman (1991, p. 1055), for example, suggest that "the buyers in these transactions do not appear to value the money they give up in a transaction as a loss." By contrast, we propose that there is no inherent difference in the psychology of selling versus buying. Though we also attribute most price gaps to sellers, we believe this is "only" because reference prices tend to exceed valuations. Although both theories explain the endowment effect in terms of loss aversion, they differ with respect to the reference point from which prospective gains and losses are evaluated. According to the pain-of-losing account, the relevant referent is endowment status (whether one currently possesses the good), whereas by our account it is the good's reference price. The idea that reference price comparisons might be involved in the endowment effect has some support in recent research. When studying how consumers justify disparities between buying and selling prices, EXPERIMENTAL TESTS THAT MANIPULATE REFERENCE PRICES Most previous studies on the endowment effect cannot differentiate pain-of-losing and reference price accounts because they involve goods whose reference prices considerably exceed most consumers' valuations. This confounds the effect of endowment (sellers are endowed whereas buyers are not) with the effect of transaction disutility (which in such circumstances affects sellers but not buyers). To differentiate the two accounts, we manipulate both endowment status and reference prices. If the endowment effect is caused primarily by differences in ownership status, reference prices shouldn't matter. But if it is caused primarily by owners' aversion to making bad deals, the effect should shrink when the reference price is reduced to a level closer to typical valuations. Thus, our model makes two predictions: that the gap between buying and selling prices will diminish as a good's reference price is reduced from high to moderate, and that this convergence will be driven by lower selling prices. Manipulations of r over this range should have comparatively little effect on buyers. It is important to clarify that our characterizations of reference prices as "low", "moderate," or "high" are made with respect to the typical consumer's valuation. Although valuations cannot be observed directly, we do observe buying and selling prices and from these can infer the relation between r and v. This inference can be made at the individual level, but we assign general characterizations by using average buying prices across all respondents in a given treatment, as shown below: We stress that although these characterizations are post hoc, as we must observe buying or selling prices to conclusively label r, they are not ad hoc, because the data do not permit arbitrary labels. So while pretests can help verify that a particular reference price has the presumed relation to valuations, they are not required because the experimental data perform the same function. Note also that as long as there is some heterogeneity in consumers' valuations, r ≠ v for some people, indicating the potential for (and expectation of) a gap between buying and selling prices. Thus, we do not generally expect the gap to disappear at any reference price, but if valuations are clustered near a widely adopted reference price, the disparity should be small. Study 1: Candy Method. Participants (N=125) were recruited for laboratory sessions from two universities. The good was a large box of candy of the kind sold at theater concession stands. All our participants first examined four candy options (Raisinets, Milk Duds, Goobers, and Jelly Belly Sours) and indicated their favorite. Then, using a 2×2 between-subjects design, we manipulated whether respondents were endowed with a box of their preferred candy (yes or no), and the reference price we suggested (high or moderate). For the high r condition, which reflected the good's typical consumption context, respondents were told: "As a point of reference, the Harvard Square Theater sells this candy for 4.00 per box." For the moderate r condition, they were told: "As a point of reference, the Target store in Watertown sells this candy for 1.49 per box." Both statements were true. 8 Next we elicited minimum acceptable selling prices from candy owners and maximum buying prices from non-owners, using an incentive-compatible procedure to discourage under-or overbidding Results. As predicted, reducing the reference price reduced the endowment effect. In the high r condition, the average selling price significantly exceeded the average buying price (S = $2.88 vs. B =$1.54, t 62 = 4.05, p = .0001 by a two-tailed test), but in the moderate r condition, the gap was not significant (S = $1.58 vs. B =$1.20, t 59 = 1.53, p > .13); see between subjects design. Here, following a reviewer's suggestion, we manipulated r by varying the sticker price attached to the product, which we affixed with the kind of "pricing gun" commonly used by retailers. For the high r condition, we specified the pencil's actual retail price of 2.29; for moderate r we used 79¢ -much lower, but still a plausible retail price. In the endowed sessions, all participants received pencils which they were told they could keep. In sessions in which participants were not endowed, we passed around samples for inspection which were then collected. This procedure both familiarized participants with the product and exposed them to its reference price. Subjects then privately recorded their reservation prices. After these were collected, we publicly drew a price at random using a "bingo ball" cage which contained balls representing prices from 30¢ to 3.00 in 30¢ increments. (As in the candy study, this range was not revealed.) This "BDM price" determined the actual transaction price for all participants in the session. The full instructions, which borrow in part from 10 Results. The results, summarized i

METHODS, SYSTEMS, AND DEVICES RELATING TO FORCE CONTROL SURGICAL SYSTEMS

The various embodiments herein relate to robotic surgical systems and devices that use force and/or torque sensors to measure forces applied at various components of the system or device. Certain implementations include robotic surgical devices having one or more force/torque sensors that detect or measure one or more forces applied at or on one or more arms. Other embodiments relate to systems having a robotic surgical device that has one or more sensors and an external controller that has one or more motors such that the sensors transmit information that is used at the controller to actuate the motors to provide haptic feedback to a user

METHODS, SYSTEMS, AND DEVICES FOR SURGICAL ACCESS AND INSERTON

The various embodiments herein relate to systems, devices, and/or methods relating to Surgical procedures, and more specifically for accessing an insufflated cavity of a patient and/or positioning Surgical systems or devices into the cavity

A Framework for Virtual Training in Crisis Context and a Focus on the Animation Component: The Gamemaster Workshop

Critical infrastructures, historical places, and sensitive buildings are vulnerable to crises, from natural to man-made disasters. Public institutions and practitioners have to train, before the occurrence of a major event, to be prepared to respond to the crisis. These sites are difficult to vacate just to perform exercises. To propose training adapted to the needs the trainer have to create an exercise dedicated to the aimed skills. Stakeholders responding to high-risk situations are asking for new ways to train and compensate for the weaknesses of existing training approaches. The research work presented in this paper concerns the design of immersive environments that can be used to create, implement and simulate crisis scenarios to improve collaborative training