Bursting the selfishness bubble

Milton Friedman, probably the most influential economist of the 20th century, wrote “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits”. I propose that striving for profit at all costs leads people, including business executives, to think in a selfishness bubble. That is, people’s interests shape the way they both perceive and choose information, informing their decisions. Thinking in a selfishness bubble is dangerous as it can lead to shortsighted decisions and poor-quality products. For example, when safety is sacrificed for profit. To burst the selfishness bubble, behavioral science and in particular, the field of behavioural ethics, should inform policy and industry leaders about the best ways to adopt a long-term perspective when designing companies and policy

The truth comes naturally! Does it?

Does the truth come naturally? And by implication, does this mean that a lie may not come as naturally as the truth? Truth-Default Theory and the Information Manipulation Theory 2 diverge in their opinion on whether people's natural response is to lie or tell the truth. In line with Truth-Default Theory, cognitive psychology research supports the notion that the truth is the default in human communication. Information Manipulation Theory 2 holds that lying may come as naturally as, or even more naturally than, truth telling, and recent social psychology research supports this possibility. We suggest that motivation may explain the divergence between the two theories and the two lines of research. We raise the hypothesis that truth telling may be the natural response absent clear motivations to lie (hence, most human communication) and that lying may prevail as the automatic reaction when it brings about important self-profit. We hope that this hypothesis will stimulate new research that will allow for bridging the theoretical and empirical findings that seem discrepant at first and show when the truth (vs. the lie) comes naturally

Motivated Interpretations of Deceptive Information

We examine whether people seek information that might help them make sense of others’ dishonest behavior. Participants were told that a hypothetical partner (either a friend or a stranger) had engaged in a task in which the partner could lie to boost their earnings at the expense of the participant’s earnings. Participants were less likely to search for information that can justify potential dishonest behavior conducted by a friend than by a stranger (Experiment 1). When participants knew for certain that their partners had lied to them, they were less likely to assume that that the lie was justified when told that the partner was a friend rather than a stranger (Experiment 2). The results imply that people are more likely to search for information that may reduce the severity of possible dishonest behavior when a stranger, rather than a friend, is responsible for the behavior