373 research outputs found

    Unsupervised Anomaly-based Malware Detection using Hardware Features

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    Recent works have shown promise in using microarchitectural execution patterns to detect malware programs. These detectors belong to a class of detectors known as signature-based detectors as they catch malware by comparing a program's execution pattern (signature) to execution patterns of known malware programs. In this work, we propose a new class of detectors - anomaly-based hardware malware detectors - that do not require signatures for malware detection, and thus can catch a wider range of malware including potentially novel ones. We use unsupervised machine learning to build profiles of normal program execution based on data from performance counters, and use these profiles to detect significant deviations in program behavior that occur as a result of malware exploitation. We show that real-world exploitation of popular programs such as IE and Adobe PDF Reader on a Windows/x86 platform can be detected with nearly perfect certainty. We also examine the limits and challenges in implementing this approach in face of a sophisticated adversary attempting to evade anomaly-based detection. The proposed detector is complementary to previously proposed signature-based detectors and can be used together to improve security.Comment: 1 page, Latex; added description for feature selection in Section 4, results unchange

    Applied constant gain amplification in circulating loop experiments

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    The reconfiguration of channel or wavelength routes in optically transparent mesh networks can lead to deviations in channel power that may impact transmission performance. A new experimental approach, applied constant gain, is used to maintain constant gain in a circulating loop enabling the study of gain error effects on long-haul transmission under reconfigured channel loading. Using this technique we examine a number of channel configurations and system tuning operations for both full-span dispersion-compensated and optimized dispersion-managed systems. For each system design, large power divergence was observed with a maximum of 15 dB at 2240 km, when switching was implemented without additional system tuning. For a bit error rate of 10-3, the maximum number of loop circulations was reduced by up to 33%

    Dynamic circulating-loop methods for transmission experiments in optically transparent networks

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    Recent experiments incorporating multiple fast switching elements and automated system configuration in a circulating loop apparatus have enabled the study of aspects of long-haul WDM transmission unique to optically transparent networks. Techniques include per-span switching to measure the performance limits due to dispersion compensation granularity and mesh network walk-off, and applied constant-gain amplification to evaluate wavelength reconfiguration penalties

    The Gestalt: A Secure, High Performance, Low Cost Satellite Ground Station Architecture and its Implementation

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    In this paper we present The Gestalt, a novel security methodology developed with support from the Office of Naval Research for satellite ground stations systems. While security is often a stated priority for these systems, often it is traded off for better performance, lower cost and reduced design complexity. We identified two main classes of security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers in small-sat systems: 1) intentionally introduced supply chain vulnerabilities in both software and hardware, and 2) inadvertent coding and logic vulnerabilities in code. Our engineering methodology reduces the risk of attacks through four methods: 1. Debloating: Ground stations are complex and involve the integration of many hardware and software systems. This complexity makes them vulnerable to a range of software, and hardware based attacks. Our method of implementing what was previously software functionality in hardware through system debloating achieves this attack surface reduction. 2. Hardware synthesis from Specifications: The use of legacy-free high-level synthesis (HLS) for the specification of processing functions reduces implementation errors, increases productivity, and permits hardware validation using commercial software fuzz testing techniques. 3. Use of hardware scanning techniques: We use a novel method for performing security scans of hardware blocks generated by High-level Synthesis. This step reduces the risk of backdoors inserted by specification developers, attackers modifying the code without knowledge of developers or high-level synthesis tools going undetected. 4. Static memory allocation: A majority of software attacks today are due to memory safety problems in software: Microsoft revealed that 70% of the exploited software vulnerabilities are related to the absence of memory safety. When we use software in the The Gestalt, we take a radical approach to solving the pervasive memory safety problem by completely eliminating the use of dynamic memory. Instead, data processing takes place in hardware using static memory allocation. The result of these approaches is the Exos FEP, a tightly-integrated ground station system that operates in a bit-serial manner. Compared to conventional designs, the Exos FEP achieves high performance by implementing all data processing functions in hardware. Our solution is able to achieve data rates up to 125 Mbps per FPGA in a commodity, commercially cloud-based environment. Perhaps, the most important benefit is a 1000-fold reduction in lines of code compared to state-of-the-art FEP implementation, and achieves Zero Trust supply chain guarantees. With the increased adoption of smallsats, the security problems normally only associated with large military control centers are now spreading to smaller organizations which may not have the necessary security infrastructure to fully understand or cope with the threats. The possibility of using a security-forward approach such as The Gestalt methodology and the resulting ground system architecture and implementation are a promising approach for protecting the smallsat ecosystem

    Self-monitoring Monitors

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    Many different monitoring systems have been created to identify system state conditions to detect or prevent a myriad of deliberate attacks, or arbitrary faults inherent in any complex system. Monitoring systems are also vulnerable to attack. A stealthy attacker can simply turn off or disable these monitoring systems without being detected; he would thus be able to perpetrate the very attacks that these systems were designed to stop. For example, many examples of virus attacks against antivirus scanners have appeared in the wild. In this paper, we present a novel technique to "monitor the monitors" in such a way that (a) unauthorized shutdowns of critical monitors are detected with high probability, (b) authorized shutdowns raise no alarm, and (c) the proper shutdown sequence for authorized shutdowns cannot be inferred from reading memory. The techniques proposed to prevent unauthorized shut down (turning off) of monitoring systems was inspired by the duality of safety technology devised to prevent unauthorized discharge (turning on) of nuclear weapons
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