What determines the specificity of conflict adaptation? A review, critical analysis, and proposed synthesis

Over the past decade, many cognitive control researchers have studied to what extent adaptations to conflict are domain-general or rather specific, mostly by testing whether or not the congruency sequence effect (CSE) transfers across different conditions (e.g., conflict type, task sets, contexts, et cetera). The CSE refers to the observation that congruency effects in conflict tasks tend to be reduced following incongruent relative to following congruent trials, and is considered a prime measure of cognitive control. By investigating the transfer of this CSE across different conflict types, tasks, or contexts, researchers made several inferences about the scope of cognitive control. This method gained popularity during the last few years, spawning an interesting, yet seemingly inconsistent set of results. Consequently, these observations gave rise to a number of equally divergent theories about the determinants and scope of conflict adaptation. In this review, we offer a systematic overview of these past studies, as well as an evaluation of the theories that have been put forward to account for the results. Finally, we propose an integration of these various theoretical views in a unifying framework that centers on the role of context (dis)similarity. This framework allows us to generate new predictions about the relation between task or context similarity and the scope of cognitive control. Specifically, while most theories imply that increasing contextual differences will result in reduced transfer of the CSE, we propose that context similarity and across-context control follow a U-shaped function instead

The heterogeneous world of congruency sequence effects: an update

Congruency sequence effects (CSEs) refer to the observation that congruency effects in conflict tasks are typically smaller following incongruent compared to following congruent trials. This measure has long been thought to provide a unique window into top-down attentional adjustments and their underlying brain mechanisms. According to the renowned conflict monitoring theory, CSEs reflect enhanced selective attention following conflict detection. Still, alternative accounts suggested that bottom-up associative learning suffices to explain the pattern of reaction times and error rates. A couple of years ago, a review by Egner (2007) pitted these two rivalry accounts against each other, concluding that both conflict adaptation and feature integration contribute to the CSE. Since then, a wealth of studies has further debated this issue, and two additional accounts have been proposed, offering intriguing alternative explanations. Contingency learning accounts put forward that predictive relationships between stimuli and responses drive the CSE, whereas the repetition expectancy hypothesis suggests that top-down, expectancy-driven control adjustments affect the CSE. In the present paper, we build further on the previous review (Egner, 2007) by summarizing and integrating recent behavioral and neurophysiological studies on the CSE. In doing so, we evaluate the relative contribution and theoretical value of the different attentional and memory-based accounts. Moreover, we review how all of these influences can be experimentally isolated, and discuss designs and procedures that can critically judge between them