The Necessity of 'Need'

Many philosophers have suggested that claims of need play a special normative role in ethical thought and talk. But what do such claims mean? What does this special role amount to? Progress on these questions can be made by attending to a puzzle concerning some linguistic differences between two types of 'need' sentence: one where 'need' occurs as a verb, and where it occurs as a noun. I argue that the resources developed to solve the puzzle advance our understanding of the metaphysics of need, the meaning of 'need' sentences, and the function of claims of need in ethical discourse

The application of the Bill of Rights

For centuries South Africa has been embroiled in racial conflict with human rights as one of the tragic casualties. With the adoption of the lnterim and Final Constitutions a decisive break was made with the past. One of the foundations laid to forge our new society based on equality and human dignity was the adoption of a Bill of Rights. Embodied in the clauses of the Bill of Rights are the values by which the people should guide their conduct in the future

INTERPRETING THE \u3cem\u3eREPUBLIC\u3c/em\u3e AS A PROTREPTIC DIALOGUE

Protreptic is a form of rhetoric, textual and oral in form, which exhorts its recipients to reorient their lives both morally and intellectually. Plato frequently portrays Socrates\u27 use of this rhetoric with interlocutors who are enticed by the moral and political views of figures from Athens\u27 intellectual culture. During these conversations Socrates attempts to persuade his interlocutors to reorient their lives in a way that conforms more closely to his own moral and intellectual practice of philosophy. Plato\u27s depiction of protreptic, however, also exerts a protreptic effect on readers of his dialogues. Plato\u27s writing thus performs a dual function, simultaneously depicting instances of protreptic at work and attempting to exert a protreptic effect on readers. In this dissertation I argue that understanding this dual function of Plato\u27s writing is inseparable from understanding his conception of philosophy. I analyze the structure of protreptic in Plato\u27s writing by identifying four aspects essential to an interpretive method that takes full stock of the protreptic function of Plato\u27s dialogues. These aspects are (1) the proper recipient of protreptic; (2) the persuasive means available to protreptic; (3) the immediate target of persuasion; (4) the ultimate philosophical aim toward which protreptic advances the recipient. While some of these aspects must be determined with respect to particular dialogues, those that concern the form of Plato\u27s writing—such as the means of persuasion and ultimate philosophical goals—can inform a general approach to Plato\u27s dialogues. The means that Socrates uses to persuade his interlocutors are sometimes affective, influencing their emotions, and other times intellectual, appealing to them exclusively with logical argument. I argue that a combination of these means into a form I call “provocative-aporetic” better accounts for the means that Plato uses to exert a protreptic effect on readers. Aporia is a simultaneously intellectual and affective experience, and the way that readers choose to respond to aporia has a greater protreptic effect than either affective or intellectual means alone. The Republic is a crucial dialogue for studying protreptic because it addresses the ultimate moral and intellectual ends toward which Plato hopes to reorient readers, and puts the various protreptic means at Socrates\u27 and Plato\u27s disposal on full display. The dialogue offers both an argument for a life committed to virtue, and an outline of the theoretical insights—mathematical and dialectical—that philosophers may hope to gain from more serious study. It also portrays Socrates in conversation with characters of a variety sufficient to show his rhetorical and argumentative repertoire. In this dissertation I carry out a reading of the Republic according to the four aspects of the structure of protreptic discussed above. More specifically, I identify moments at which Glaucon and Adeimantus answer Socrates\u27 questions in such a way that they concede to Socrates the truth of premises that contradict their defense of the unjust life. These moments reveal that the central point of dispute in the Republic concerns the nature of moral agency— particularly the functions of reason, desire, and habituation for moral agents. Accordingly, I identify two models of agency—a Technē Model and a Virtue Model— that ground their respective defenses of justice and injustice, and hold their own assumptions about reason, desire, and habituation within their respective moral psychologies. Glaucon and Adeimantus\u27 moments of capitulation, function as moments of aporia for readers, who are then provoked to overcome the aporia by explaining why the capitulation is reasonable. In doing so, we gain an account how Glaucon and Adeimantus are coaxed to abandon their original views about justice, injustice, and moral agency and to accept those of Socrates. This account in turn yields insight into protreptic by depicting how Socrates brings about a reorientation toward philosophy from within a non-philosophical perspective

Abilities, freedom, and inputs: a time traveller's tale

The philosophy of time travel is a sub-field of metaphysics – the study of what there is and what things are like – that considers questions about the possibility of time travel and what a world in which time travel is possible looks like. These questions range from whether time travel is actually possible, to how time travellers can act in the past or future. This thesis delves into a particularly interesting, yet historically undertreated theme: the abilities of time travellers and relatedly their freedom as well. The abilities and freedom of time travellers has been the source of a lot of recent discussion with some polarising views. The minority (which includes Lewis (1976), but also Ted Sider (2002)) argue for the affirmative – that time travellers are free and have the same (or perhaps more) abilities as non-time travellers. The majority (which includes Kadri Vihvelin (1996), Michael Rea (2005), Stephanie Rennick (2015), Alison Fernandes (2020), amongst others) argue for the negative, that time travellers do not have exactly the same freedoms and abilities as non-time travellers. I think that it is a mistake to be so pessimistic about the abilities and freedom of time travellers. I treat concerns about the freedom of time travellers and concerns about the abilities of time travellers as two sides of the same coin. Therefore, in what follows, I argue for two related conclusions. First, I argue that time travellers have all sorts of abilities. Second, I argue that time travellers are just as free as non-time travellers. In arguing for these conclusions, I first produce a novel analysis of ability which reveals important details about how abilities track inputs rather than outputs. Second, I use this new analysis of ability to present a new compatibilist account of free will. If I am right in arguing positively for the abilities and freedoms of time travellers, then this has large implications for both the current time travel discourse and the general debate surrounding freedom. Significantly, I am arguing against some prominent views about time travel and in suggesting that these views are mistaken, I am presenting new ideas about ability and freedom: specifically, that time travellers have the ability and are free to do impossible things

The impact and influence of the constitutional court in the formative years of democracy in South Africa

The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact and influence of South Africa's Constitutional Court in the first two years of our democracy. To achieve this objective, some of the definitive and controversial cases already decided by the Court have been selected and analysed in an attempt to glean some jurisprudential perspectives of the Court. It focuses on the work of the Court over the past two years. It deals with the evolution of South Africa into a democracy, and analyzes the South African legal system prior to the beginning of the process of transformation. It briefly surveys the evolution of our constitutional system, dating back from the pre-1910 colonial period and provides a broad outline of the legal system in the post-April 1994 period of transformation. It analyzes the Court from the point of view of, inter alia, its composition, jurisdiction and powers. The Court is also contrasted with courts in other jurisdictions which exercise full judicial review. The Court's emerging jurisprudence is examined. A review is made, inter alia, of the Court's understanding of, and approach to, the questions of the values underpinning the post-apartheid society and its constitutional system, and constitutional interpretation. The right against self-incrimination and South African company law and the two relevant Constitutional Court cases are discussed. The collection of evidence by the State and the constitutionality of provisions relating to search and seizure and the taking of fingerprints are looked into. The Court's approach to statutory presumptions and criminal prosecutions; some aspects of our appeals procedures; an accused's right to be assisted by a lawyer at state expense; the question of a fair trial and access to information; capital punishment; corporal punishment; committal to prison for debt; and the certification of constitutions is analyzed. Two of the cases in which the provinces clashed with the national government on the distribution of posers between provinces and the national government are discussed. The conclusion is that the Court has, overall, hitherto acquitted itself well in the handling of particularly the controversial quasi-political questions that arose in the cases it has decided.Constitutional, International and Indigenous LawL.L. D. (Law

Mental Disability and Discrimination in Employment Under New Zealand's Human Rights Act 1993

The New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA) prohibits discrimination in employment on the ground of disability, which includes mental illness. However, what is unclear is, if an employee develops a mental illness during employment and their performance is compromised, to what extent does the legislation require the employer to accommodate (or tolerate) this poor performance. The question arises — if an employee could otherwise be justifiably dismissed for poor performance, would this nevertheless be discrimination if the poor performance was due to a mental illness? To answer this question this thesis examines the discrimination in employment provisions of the HRA, seeking to clarify the obligations and prerogatives of the employer, and the rights of the disabled employee. In addition, this thesis critically evaluates the content of the legislation in light of New Zealand’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). Finding that there is a lack of case law relating to disability discrimination (that might otherwise clarify the law in this area), this thesis uses the ‘spiral approach’ to interpretation to analyse the relevant provisions. This analysis exposes several interpretive issues within the current legislation for disability discrimination, and reveals that the legislation may not be sufficient to ensure New Zealand is meeting its obligations under the UNCRPD. These interpretive issues arise as key terms in the legislation are not defined, and because of the inherent ambiguity and complexity of the individual provisions. Consequently, it is unclear when a disabled employee might still be ‘qualified’ for their position, or when their adverse treatment (such as dismissal) might be by reason of their disability, rather than due to poor performance alone. This research also suggests that New Zealand is not meeting its obligations under the UNCRPD to ensure reasonable accommodation of disability is provided in employment. Instead, the so-called ‘reasonable accommodation’ provisions of the HRA merely provide a defence against a claim of discrimination, and any obligation of reasonable accommodation is only inferred from this defence. Furthermore, despite the purpose of the HRA being to better protect human rights ‘in general accordance’ with United Nations Conventions on human rights, it is difficult to interpret the HRA in accordance with the UNCRPD. This thesis argues that this is because the HRA is premised on a medical model of disability, and on the idea of formal equality, whereas the UNCRPD is premised on a mixed medical-social model of disability and aims to achieve substantive equality for those with disabilities. As a consequence, even with the best possible interpretation of the provisions, the lack of a positive duty to accommodate the disabled employee, the emphasis on formal rather than substantive equality, and the failure to utilise the social model of disability, means New Zealand legislation provides inadequate protection against discrimination in employment on the ground of mental disability. Therefore, this thesis suggests that the HRA should be amended to clarify the law for disability discrimination in New Zealand, and proposes a series of changes that might be made to achieve this. Ultimately, this thesis contends that New Zealand’s current model of law is inappropriate for disability discrimination, and contends that a new social model of disability discrimination law is required to provide better employment protection for those with disabilities