A Natural Supersymmetric Model with MeV Dark Matter

It has previously been proposed that annihilating dark matter particles with MeV-scale masses could be responsible for the flux of 511 keV photons observed from the region of the Galactic Bulge. The conventional wisdom, however, is that it is very challenging to construct a viable particle physics model containing MeV dark matter. In this letter, we challenge this conclusion by describing a simple and natural supersymmetric model in which the lightest supersymmetric particle naturally has a MeV-scale mass and the other phenomenological properties required to generate the 511 keV emission. In particular, the small ($\sim$ $10^{-5}$) effective couplings between dark matter and the Standard Model fermions required in this scenario naturally lead to radiative corrections that generate MeV-scale masses for both the dark matter candidate and the mediator particle.Comment: 4 pages, 1 figure. v2: Small modification to discussion of spectru

Between history and values: A study on the nature of interpretation in international law

My thesis discusses the place of evaluative judgements in the interpretation of general international law. It concentrates on two questions. First, whether it is possible to interpret international legal practices without making an evaluative judgement about the point or value that provides the best justification of these practices. Second, whether the use of evaluative judgements in international legal interpretation threatens to undermine the objectivity of international law, the neutrality of international lawyers or the consensual and voluntary basis of the international legal system. I answer both questions in the negative. As regards the first, I argue that international legal practice has an interpretive structure, which combines appeals to the history of international practice with appeals to the principles and values that these practices are best understood as promoting. This interpretive structure is apparent not only in the claims of international lawyers about particular rules of international law (here I use the rule of estoppel as an example) but also in the most basic intuitions of international theorists about the theory and sources of general international law. I then argue that some popular concerns to the effect that the exercise of evaluation in the interpretation of international law will undermine the coherence or the usefulness of the discipline are generally unwarranted. The fact that international legal practice has an interpretive structure does not entail that propositions of international law are only subjectively true, that the interpreter enjoys license to manipulate their meaning for self-serving purposes, or that international law will collapse under the weight of irresolvable disagreements, divisions and conflicts about its proper interpretation