Symposium: Gender, Health, and the Constitution: The New Gender Panic in Sport: Why State Laws Banning Transgender Athletes are Unconstitutional

This essay considers the role of sport in the new gender panic of legislative activity targeting transgender individuals, which now extends into health and family governance. Sport was one of the first settings—the gateway—to ignite the current culture war on transgender youth. This analysis examines how Title IX of the Education Act of 1972, the popular law responsible for the growth of opportunities for girls and women in sports, has been mobilized in service of a broader gender agenda. Far from providing a persuasive justification for the state laws banning transgender girls from girls’ sports, Title IX, properly understood, supports the case for transgender inclusion, not exclusion. Lacking a genuinely substantial connection to the preservation of girls’ and women’s athletic opportunities, state laws excluding transgender girls and women from sports violate the Equal Protection Clause. And these laws also have implications to health more generally and to other constitutional controversies

The International Legality of U.S. Military Cross-Border Operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan

To date, U.S. cross-border operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan have taken three forms: the use of Predator drones to target Al Qaeda fighters (although such drones may be launched solely from within Pakistan); the hot pursuit of militants who engaged in raids from Pakistan against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, as well as the Afghan government; and the deployment of special operations forces into Pakistan as a means of striking at Al Qaeda. These types of cross-border operations clearly implicate the jus ad bellum, in that they entail one state projecting highly coercive military force into another state. Arguably Pakistan has consented to at least some of these types of cross-border operations, but that consent is poorly documented, suffers from the conflicting and diffuse sources of authority within the Pakistani government, and ultimately may not endure given the vicissitudes of Pakistani domestic politics. As such, though consent is a powerful and useful basis for supporting the legality of U.S. cross-border operations, other justifications should be considered as well. Assuming Pakistani consent is lacking, other justifications for U.S. cross-border operations must be considered. The U.N. Security Council has on several occasions addressed the legality of foreign forces in Afghanistan. Yet the Security Council\u27s Chapter VII resolutions are best seen as either authorizing the presence of a multinational force designed to stabilize Afghanistan (without having as its mission counter-terrorism operations, let alone operations outside Afghanistan), or simply recognizing the inherent right of self-defense of the United States and its allies. The inherent right of self-defense (individual and collective) does justify U.S. cross-border operations that respond to raids by militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan, so long as the U.S. operations remain necessary and proportionate to the threat of those raids, and so long as the Afghan government consents to the presence of U.S. forces. Such self-defense would also support unilateral uses of U.S. force against Al Qaeda in Pakistan, either in the form of covert operations by special forces units or the launching of Predators from Afghanistan to strike at targets in Pakistan, so long as it can be shown that those Al Qaeda targets are ones that are supporting the cross-border raids into Pakistan, and so long as Pakistan is unwilling or unable to prevent Al Qaeda\u27s support for those raids. A broader right of self-defense against Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan based on the attacks of 9/11, however, is far more problematic, since the requirements of necessity and proportionality likely preclude unilateral uses of force against a third state that was not implicated in those attacks

Egypt\u27s New Regime and the Future of the U.S.-Egyptian Strategic Relationship

View the Executive SummaryThis monograph examines the strategic importance of Egypt for the United States by exploring Egypt\u27s role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, its geographical role (providing air and naval access) for U.S. military assets heading to the Persian Gulf, and joint training programs. With so much at stake in the Middle East, the idea of losing Egypt as a strategic ally would be a significant setback for the United States. The Egyptian revolution of early 2011 was welcomed by U.S. officials because the protestors wanted democratic government which conformed to U.S. ideals, and the institution that would shepherd the transition, the Egyptian military, had close ties with the United States. To bolster the U.S.-Egyptian relationship and help keep Egypt on the democratic path, the monograph recommends that U.S. military aid should not be cut, economic aid should be increased, and U.S. administration officials should not oppose congressional conditions tying aid to democratic norms because it signals U.S. support for democracy. The United States should continue to speak out for free and fair elections and other international norms, but should avoid commentating on the role of religion and Islamic law in the Egyptian Constitution. Helping the Egyptian military deal with the extremist threat in the Sinai, which the United States has already offered, should also be continued. The U.S. Army should continue to advocate for military-to-military contacts, encourage their Egyptian counterparts to continue to attend U.S. professional military educational institutions, engage with Egyptian counterparts on regional threat assessments, and advocate for a reactivation of the Bright Star exercises. What U.S. Army officials and officers should do is avoid getting into discussions with Egyptian military officers about Egyptian domestic politics, and drop any interest they may have in convincing Egypt to opt for a “more nimble” force because Egyptian defense officials would see it as an effort to weaken the Egyptian military.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1529/thumbnail.jp

Revolution without Reform: A Critique of Egypt\u27s Election Laws

This Article compares Egypt\u27s election laws before and after the January 25 Revolution to determine whether the changes are sufficient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. This Article concludes that Egyptian elections processes and institutions remain insufficiently transparent, fail to produce results reflecting the diversity within Egyptian society, and fail to offer all Egyptians-especially women and religious minorities-an equal opportunity to actively participate in governance of their country. The Article critically assesses recent changes in Egypt\u27s electoral regime and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The thesis is twofold. First, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for Egyptian women and Coptics to be elected to office, thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant contributions Egyptian women and Coptics made to the revolution. Second, the limited post-revolution reforms made to election laws are insufficient to produce the sustainable and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facilitate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in election outcomes. Nonetheless, in this early stage of the post-revolutionary phase, there is reason for cautious optimism. While Egyptian election laws have been amended for the better since the revolution, more legislative reforms are needed to ensure that future elections are fair, free, and accessible to all Egyptians. Sound election laws are the bedrock of a democracy insofar as they ensure that a dominant party does not extend its rule against the will of the people. As witnessed with the National Democratic Party under the Mubarak regime, laws can be manipulated to guarantee certain electoral outcomes benefitting the dominant party. In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and religious norms. One year after their historic revolution, Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one thing is quite clear--future political leaders who seek to impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril

Revolution without Reform: A Critique of Egypt\u27s Election Laws

This Article compares Egypt\u27s election laws before and after the January 25 Revolution to determine whether the changes are sufficient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. This Article concludes that Egyptian elections processes and institutions remain insufficiently transparent, fail to produce results reflecting the diversity within Egyptian society, and fail to offer all Egyptians-especially women and religious minorities-an equal opportunity to actively participate in governance of their country. The Article critically assesses recent changes in Egypt\u27s electoral regime and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The thesis is twofold. First, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for Egyptian women and Coptics to be elected to office, thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant contributions Egyptian women and Coptics made to the revolution. Second, the limited post-revolution reforms made to election laws are insufficient to produce the sustainable and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facilitate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in election outcomes. Nonetheless, in this early stage of the post-revolutionary phase, there is reason for cautious optimism. While Egyptian election laws have been amended for the better since the revolution, more legislative reforms are needed to ensure that future elections are fair, free, and accessible to all Egyptians. Sound election laws are the bedrock of a democracy insofar as they ensure that a dominant party does not extend its rule against the will of the people. As witnessed with the National Democratic Party under the Mubarak regime, laws can be manipulated to guarantee certain electoral outcomes benefitting the dominant party. In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and religious norms. One year after their historic revolution, Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one thing is quite clear--future political leaders who seek to impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril