Climate Justice

Eric Posner and David Weisbach take the threat of climate change seriously. Their book Climate Change Justice offers policy prescriptions that deserve serious attention. While the authors adopt the framework of conventional welfare economics, they show a willingness to engage with noneconomic perspectives, which softens their conclusions. Although they are right to see a risk that overly aggressive ethical claims could derail international agreement on restricting greenhouse gases, their analysis makes climate justice too marginal to climate policy. The developed world does have a special responsibility for the current climate problem, and we should be willing both to agree to more stringent restrictions on emissions to protect future generations and the global poor and to agree to assist poor nations with their own adaptation and mitigation measures

The Costs of Judging Judges by the Numbers

This essay discredits current empirical models that are designed to “judge” or rank appellate judges, and then assesses the harms of propagating such models. First, the essay builds on the discussion of empirical models by arguing that (1) the judicial virtues that the legal empiricists set out to measure have little bearing on what actually makes for a good judge; and (2) even if they did, the empiricists’ chosen variables have not measured those virtues accurately. The essay then concludes that by generating unreliable claims about the relative quality of judges, these studies mislead both decision-makers and the public, degrade discussions of judging, and could, if taken seriously, detrimentally alter the behavior of judges themselves

Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and Internet Exceptionalism

In this Article, I argue that, notwithstanding these contemporary developments, the Court got it mostly right in Brandenburg. Or, I want to at least suggest that it is premature to reconstruct the Brandenburg test to address perceived changes in our global environment. For the most part, Brandenburg has succeeded in mediating the balance between protecting political or ideological advocacy and enabling the government to regulate actual incitement, even in the contemporary era. Moreover, I argue that society should be especially wary of calls to narrow Brandenburg’s speech-protective standard because such changes might be significantly influenced by the confluence of two forms of exceptionalism—national security exceptionalism and internet exceptionalism—both of which are continuing to evolve in real time. In development of this argument, this Article contains three parts

International Legal Positivism and Legal Realism

This chapter, a contribution to a book on International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World, gauges the potential for mutually enriching interactions between international legal positivism and legal realism. It first describes the encounter between legal positivism and legal realism in the U.S. legal academy and then proceeds to discuss the rise of a new legal realism in international legal theory. In a concluding section, the chapter assesses the compatibilities and tensions between the new international legal realism and the new international legal positivism.With its forthright embrace of the inescapability of uncertainty in law, the new international legal positivism adopts a sceptical position very similar to legal realism. However, this chapter contends, the new international legal positivism still requires a realist supplement in order to provide a fuller understanding of the way in which legal norms interact with non-legal factors and to help us describe, predict and analyse the behaviour of actors in international affairs. At the same time, new international legal realists can learn from the sceptical attitude towards sources of law that new international legal positivists have developed. The two movements can be symbiotic if brought into closer dialogue. Nonetheless, this chapter concludes with a dose of pessimism about the capacity of any of the currently available theories of international law to fully assimilate the complexities of both postmodern theory and postmodern global society into a comprehensive theory of international law in the postmodern world

A Winner’s Curse?: Promotions from the Lower Federal Courts

The standard model of judicial behavior suggests that judges primarily care about deciding cases in ways that further their political ideologies. But judicial behavior seems much more complex. Politicians who nominate people for judgeships do not typically tout their ideology (except sometimes using vague code words), but they always claim that the nominees will be competent judges. Moreover, it stands to reason that voters would support politicians who appoint competent as well as ideologically compatible judges. We test this hypothesis using a dataset consisting of promotions to the federal circuit courts. We find, using a set of objective measures of judicial performance, that competence seems to matter in promotions in that the least competent judges do not get elevated. But the judges who score the highest on our competence measures also do not get elevated. So, while there is no loser’s reward, there may be something of a winner’s curse, where those with the highest levels of competence hurt their chances of elevation

Norming in Administrative Law

How do regulatory agencies decide how strictly to regulate an industry? They sometimes use cost-benefit analysis or claim to, but more often the standards they invoke are so vague as to be meaningless. This raises the question whether the agencies use an implicit standard or instead regulate in an ad hoc fashion. We argue that agencies frequently use an approach that we call “norming.” They survey the practices of firms in a regulated industry and choose a standard somewhere within the distribution of existing practices, often no higher than the median. Such a standard burdens only the firms whose practices lag the industry. We then evaluate this approach. While a case can be made that norming is appropriate when a regulatory agency operates in an environment of extreme uncertainty, we argue that on balance norming is an unwise form of regulation. Its major attraction for agencies is that it minimizes political opposition to regulation. Norming does not serve the public interest as well as a more robust standard like cost-benefit analysis