Embedding Kozen-Tiuryn Logic into Residuated One-Sorted Kleene Algebra with Tests

Kozen and Tiuryn have introduced the substructural logic $\mathsf{S}$ for reasoning about correctness of while programs (ACM TOCL, 2003). The logic $\mathsf{S}$ distinguishes between tests and partial correctness assertions, representing the latter by special implicational formulas. Kozen and Tiuryn's logic extends Kleene altebra with tests, where partial correctness assertions are represented by equations, not terms. Kleene algebra with codomain, $\mathsf{KAC}$, is a one-sorted alternative to Kleene algebra with tests that expands Kleene algebra with an operator that allows to construct a Boolean subalgebra of tests. In this paper we show that Kozen and Tiuryn's logic embeds into the equational theory of the expansion of $\mathsf{KAC}$ with residuals of Kleene algebra multiplication and the upper adjoint of the codomain operator

One-sorted Program Algebras

Kleene algebra with tests, KAT, provides a simple two-sorted algebraic framework for verifying properties of propositional while programs. Kleene algebra with domain, KAD, is a one-sorted alternative to KAT. The equational theory of KAT embeds into KAD, but KAD lacks some natural properties of KAT. For instance, not each Kleene algebra expands to a KAD, and the subalgebra of tests in each KAD is forced to be the maximal Boolean subalgebra of the negative cone. In this paper we propose a generalization of KAD that avoids these features while still embedding the equational theory of KAT. We show that several natural properties of the domain operator of KAD can be added to the generalized framework without affecting the results. We consider a variant of the framework where test complementation is defined using a residual of the Kleene algebra multiplication

Knowledge is a Diamond

In the standard epistemic logic, the knowledge operator is represented as a box operator, a universal quantifier over a set of possible worlds. There is an alternative approach to the semantics of knowledge, according to which an agent a knows a proposition iff a has a reliable (e.g. sensory) evidence that supports the proposition. In this interpretation, knowledge is viewed rather as an existential, i.e. a diamond modality. In this paper, we will propose a formal semantics for substructural logics that allows to model knowledge on the basis of this intuition. The framework is strongly motivated by a similar semantics introduced by (Bílková, Majer, Peliš, 2016). However, as we will argue, our framework overcomes some unintuitive features of the semantics from (Bílková, Majer, Peliš, 2016). Most importantly, knowledge does not distribute over disjunction in our logic