A Generalized Theory of Varying Alpha

In this paper, we formulate a generalization of the simple Bekenstein-Sandvik-Barrow-Magueijo (BSBM) theory of varying alpha by allowing the coupling constant, \omega, for the corresponding scalar field \psi\ to depend on \psi. We focus on the situation where \omega\ is exponential in \psi\ and find the late-time behaviours that occur in matter-dominated and dark-energy dominated cosmologies. We also consider the situation when the background expansion scale factor of the universe evolves in proportion to an arbitrary power of the cosmic time. We find the conditions under which the fine structure `constant' increases with time, as in the BSBM theory, and establish a cosmic no-hair behaviour for accelerating universes. We also find the conditions under which the fine structure `constant' can decrease with time and compare the whole family of models with astronomical data from quasar absorption spectra.Comment: 25 pages, 6 figures. Minor corrections and clarifications added. Final section on spatial variations removed so that the paper focuses exclusively on time-variatio

Effects of negative energy balance on liver gene and protein expression during the early postpartum period and its impacts on dairy cow fertility

End of project reportNegative energy balance (NEB) is a severe metabolic affecting high yielding dairy cows early post partum with both concurrent and latent negative effects on cow fertility as well as on milk production and cow health. The seasonal nature of Irish dairy production necessitates high cow fertility and a compact spring calving pattern in order to maximise grass utilisation. Poor dairy cow reproductive performance currently costs the Irish cattle industry in excess of €400 million annually. High milk yields have been associated with lower reproductive efficiency, and it has been suggested that this effect is probably mediated through its effects on the energy balance of the cow during lactation. The modern high genetic merit dairy cow prioritises nutrient supply towards milk production in early lactation and this demand takes precedence over the provision of optimal conditions for reproduction. In this study we used the bovine Affymetrix 23,000 gene microarray, which contains the most comprehensive set of bovine genes to be assembled and provides a means of investigating the modifying influences of energy balance on liver gene expression. Cows in severe negative energy balance (SNEB) in early lactation showed altered hepatic gene expression in metabolic processes as well as a down regulation of the insulin-like growth factor (IGF) system, where insulin like growth factor-1 (IGF-1), growth hormone receptor variant 1A (GHR1A) and insulin-like growth factor binding protein-acid labile subunit (IGFBP-ALS) were down regulated compared to the cows in the moderate negative energy balance MNEB group, consistent with a five-fold reduction in systemic concentrations of IGF1 in the SNEB group.Cows in SNEB showed elevated expression of key genes involved in the inflammatory response such as interleukin-8 (IL-8). There was a down regulation of genes involved in cellular growth in SNEB cows and moreover a negative regulator of cellular proliferation (HGFIN) was up regulated in SNEB cows, which is likely to compromise adaptation and recovery from NEB. The puma method of analysis revealed that 417 genes were differentially regulated by EB (P<0.05), of these genes 190 were up-regulated while 227 were down-regulated, with 405 genes having known biological functions. From Ingenuity Pathway Analysis (IPA), lipid catabolism was found to be the process most affected by differences in EB status

Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the \u27War on Terrorism\u27: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed \u27Unprivileged Combatants\u27

The purpose of this essay, written in late 2006, is to take stock of the current application of the Geneva Conventions in the global war on terrorism, including interpretations recently taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hamdan case. The Geneva Conventions and the laws of war more generally comprise a sophisticated regulatory regime whose rules can and should be closely analyzed by lawyers. Yet, like all law, the inevitable imprecision in the rules presents opportunities for governments to exploit gray areas so as to augment governmental authority, and to avoid sensible interpretations that will protect individuals from overreaching governmental power. Such exploitation invariably severs the rules from their ethical foundation and loses sight of their underlying object and purpose. The events of 9/11 and their aftermath revealed complicated scenarios that do not fit easily into the traditional paradigms of the laws of war, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Highly knowledgeable persons in the field have reached diametrically opposite conclusions about certain fundamental issues, such as whether the conflict with Al Qaeda constitutes an armed conflict within the meaning of the laws of war, whether it matters if the Taliban wore regular uniforms or operated within a regular command structure, and whether a person who fails to qualify as a prisoner of war under one convention must invariably then qualify as a protected civilian under another. Many of these controversies arise because the two dominant paradigms that operate within the Geneva Conventions - one concerning international armed conflict between two or more states, and the other concerning non-international (typically understood as internal) armed conflict between a state and non-state actors - do not fit the phenomenon of global terrorism, where the dominant paradigm concerns transnational armed conflict between state and non-state actors. Yet from their earliest formation, the laws of war have recognized the problem of dealing with irregular forces and the problem of adapting the law to circumstances that change over time. For that reason, built into the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols are the means for taking account of areas that are not addressed explicitly or in detail. Rather than trying to exploit such gray areas in the law, lawyers should seek to inject the dictates of humanity into them, in a manner that best reconciles the competing interests during armed conflict of both governments and persons who are at risk. As an example of how one might allow the Geneva Conventions to evolve in a sensible fashion, this essay discusses the rules that should be applied with respect to the termination of the captivity of unprivileged combatants, such as those held at Guantánamo Bay. While the environment for handling such detainees remains fluid, and the norms expressed by the laws of war on these points are far from certain, this essay suggests answers that are legally plausible and that appear consistent with sound policy choices. Similar efforts to fill in the gray areas for other aspects of the law of war as it relates to global terrorism should also be pursued

The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with Antinomies

Since 1946, the United States has had an uneasy relationship with the International Court of Justice (ICJ or World Court or Court). This chapter addresses certain salient aspects of that relationship. Following an introductory Part I, Part II briefly sets forth three antinomies (i.e. equally rational but conflicting principles) in U.S. foreign relations that have had important ramifications for the U.S. relationship with the Court from the outset. First, the United States operates on the basis of conflicting principles with respect to the relevance of international law and institutions for U.S. foreign policy. These conflicting principles have been referred to broadly in international relations theory as realism and institutionalism. Second, the United States operates on the basis of conflicting principles with respect to whether states should be treated as equal sovereigns or as units characterized by inescapable power differentials. Third, the United States operates on the basis of conflicting principles with respect to whether international law should be embedded in U.S. law, including the manner in which international courts relate to U.S. law. Part III suggests that the International Court was initially designed to accommodate such antinomies (which also exist with respect to other states, to varying degrees) by providing the means for mediating between these conflicting principles. These techniques for mediating antinomies are discussed in the context of the history of the U.S. relationship with the Court from its inception to modern times. Part IV then briefly highlights the unfolding of these antimonies in some of the recent cases of the United States before the Court, with particular attention to the Oil Platforms case, the Israeli Wall advisory opinion, and the Breard/LaGrand/Avena cases. Among other things, Part V suggests that certain formal and informal means for mediating these antimonies may have been forgotten in the past twenty years, leading to a point where the Court readily finds fault in the United States and the United States holds the Court in very low regard. The chapter concludes that these antinomies are unlikely to be resolved through the further development of formal or informal mediating techniques. In the near term, American policymakers will seek to avoid any involvement in matters before the Court, while the Court will embrace opportunities to speak to the legality of U.S. actions

Taking Stock of the “Compatibility Requirement”: What Limitations Does It Impose for High Seas Fishing?

Under the contemporary law of the sea, coastal States enjoy sovereign rights within their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) to manage and exploit fishery resources. At the same time, States maintain the traditional freedom to fish on the high seas subject to some treaty obligations, including those arising from regional management fisheries organizations (RMFOs) and other treaties, such as (once it enters into force) the agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ agreement). Given that straddling stocks and highly migratory species of fish move with ease between EEZs and the high seas, the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) contains provisions that seek to bridge the gap for conservation and management of such stocks within the two zones. Those provisions were elaborated in the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, notably in its Article 7(2), which provides in part that “[c]onservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety.” A similar “compatibility” concept may be found in Article 19(b) of the BBNJ agreement, albeit in the context of the compatibility of high seas marine protected areas and RFMOs or other bodies. Unfortunately, Article 7(2) contains several ambiguities as to its interpretation, which over time have not been resolved and may be inhibiting sound conservation and management measures. Indeed, studies indicate that the current legal framework has not succeeded in addressing declines in fish stocks either within EEZs or on the high seas. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the legal framework within which this “compatibility requirement” rests and to identify the ambiguities that may be impeding international cooperation. To promote greater cooperation, this chapter considers whether an advisory opinion should be sought by an RFMO from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on the nature and scope of the compatibility requirement. While doubts have been expressed about addressing abstract legal questions through advisory proceedings, doing so might allow for a more granular legal understanding as to how States should be cooperating in the management and conservation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species

International Judicial Bodies for Resolving Disputes Between States

This chapter of the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on International Adjudication assesses those international judicial bodies that are established principally to resolve disputes between States, notably the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body. Unlike courts oriented toward regional economic integration or regional human rights, such as the European Court of Justice or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, these courts and tribunals primarily focus on resolving disputes between States. Contentious cases before these bodies, for the most part, do not involve institutional organs or other non-State actors as litigants. Unlike international criminal courts, these courts focus exclusively on issues of State responsibility, generally finding that international law has or has not been violated; if a violation is found, matter is usually negotiated to a resolution by the concerned States. Although reparation in the form of restitution, compensation or satisfaction is possible, criminal sanctions are not. Unlike ad hoc arbitral tribunals formed to address matters of investment or commerce, such as under the auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the International Chamber of Commerce, these judicial bodies are permanent institutions; they are designed to operate for decades, with adjudicators who serve for years on a range of cases, not for just a single claim or group of claims. Unlike processes for mediation or conciliation, these courts or tribunals issue decisions that are legally binding on the parties appearing before them. Such international judicial bodies have a prominent place in the pantheon of international adjudication; indeed, the ICJ is often viewed — symbolically — as at the pinnacle of international adjudication. Yet with the rise of numerous other dispute resolution bodies, including those before which non-State actors may appear and that may hear hundreds of cases per year, questions have arisen as to whether such ‘old school’ fora still play a dominant or even important role for international law, especially given the relative paucity of their caseloads

The International Legality of U.S. Military Cross-Border Operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan

To date, U.S. cross-border operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan have taken three forms: the use of Predator drones to target Al Qaeda fighters (although such drones may be launched solely from within Pakistan); the hot pursuit of militants who engaged in raids from Pakistan against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, as well as the Afghan government; and the deployment of special operations forces into Pakistan as a means of striking at Al Qaeda. These types of cross-border operations clearly implicate the jus ad bellum, in that they entail one state projecting highly coercive military force into another state. Arguably Pakistan has consented to at least some of these types of cross-border operations, but that consent is poorly documented, suffers from the conflicting and diffuse sources of authority within the Pakistani government, and ultimately may not endure given the vicissitudes of Pakistani domestic politics. As such, though consent is a powerful and useful basis for supporting the legality of U.S. cross-border operations, other justifications should be considered as well. Assuming Pakistani consent is lacking, other justifications for U.S. cross-border operations must be considered. The U.N. Security Council has on several occasions addressed the legality of foreign forces in Afghanistan. Yet the Security Council\u27s Chapter VII resolutions are best seen as either authorizing the presence of a multinational force designed to stabilize Afghanistan (without having as its mission counter-terrorism operations, let alone operations outside Afghanistan), or simply recognizing the inherent right of self-defense of the United States and its allies. The inherent right of self-defense (individual and collective) does justify U.S. cross-border operations that respond to raids by militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan, so long as the U.S. operations remain necessary and proportionate to the threat of those raids, and so long as the Afghan government consents to the presence of U.S. forces. Such self-defense would also support unilateral uses of U.S. force against Al Qaeda in Pakistan, either in the form of covert operations by special forces units or the launching of Predators from Afghanistan to strike at targets in Pakistan, so long as it can be shown that those Al Qaeda targets are ones that are supporting the cross-border raids into Pakistan, and so long as Pakistan is unwilling or unable to prevent Al Qaeda\u27s support for those raids. A broader right of self-defense against Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan based on the attacks of 9/11, however, is far more problematic, since the requirements of necessity and proportionality likely preclude unilateral uses of force against a third state that was not implicated in those attacks

Does International Law Obligate States to Open their National Courts to Persons for the Invocation of Treaty Norms that Protect or Benefit Persons?

In its decisions in the LaGrand and Avena cases, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J. or Court) determined that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) creates individual rights (as opposed to just rights of states) and that the United States has an obligation to provide an individual with meaningful access to U.S. courts to vindicate those rights. Based on those determinations, it might be thought that international law generally obligates a state to open its courts for private persons to vindicate rights or benefits that a treaty accords to them, whether or not the treaty expressly provides for such a remedy. Such a proposition, however, is over broad, and does not follow from a close reading of the I.C.J.\u27s decisions, or from a more general assessment of the international legal system. At present, there is no obligation under general international treaty law, customary international law, or general principles of international law for a state to open its courts for invocation by individuals of treaty norms. Various treaties, however, either expressly or by implication, provide a right for individuals to invoke those treaties in national court systems. The I.C.J.\u27s decisions in LaGrand and Avena indicate the circumstances in which a right of this kind may be implied in a treaty, but there are also various circumstances that can be postulated for when such a right should not be implied. International law is changing, particularly under the pressures of globalization. It is possible that one aspect of that change will be the ultimate recognition of a general obligation under international law for states to make their national courts available to individuals seeking interpretation and application of treaty norms that are protective of the individual. While there are reasons to welcome a general obligation of that nature, there are also reasons to be wary of it. The caution evinced by the I.C.J. in the LaGrand and Avena cases should be heeded as states and non-state actors contemplate whether such a general norm should be recognized

Temporal Issues Relating to BIT Dispute Resolution

An investor–State tribunal formed under a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) may be called upon to determine its jurisdiction ratione temporis based on various “critical dates” such as: the date of entry into force of the BIT; the date when the investment was made; the date when the investor acquired the requisite nationality; the date of the alleged breach; the date when the investor first acquired knowledge of the alleged breach and of its loss; and/or the date when the dispute arose. When confronted with such temporal issues, tribunals over the past two decades have often reverted to the “secondary” rules found in the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, and found in the law of treaties. This article identifies a series of propositions that may be extracted from recent investor–State jurisprudence concerning those secondary rules, with particular attention to application of the rule on non-retroactivity. Except in relatively limited situations, tribunals appear disinclined to find temporal jurisdiction over breaches or disputes that are based on pre-BIT acts. Consequently, this article considers as well recent jurisprudence on whether the host State’s alleged breach has a continuing or composite character, thus overcoming any temporal bar. While it would be excessive to say that the secondary rules in this area have provided the perfect means for addressing temporal issues, they appear to have generated a comprehensible framework within which investor–State tribunals are successfully operating