Management control systems : a conceptual framework

Includes bibliographical references.Peter Lorange, Michael S. Scott Morton

Strategy formulation methodologies

"November 1986."Includes bibliographical references (p. 24-26).Michael S. Scott Morton

Information technology, integration, and organizational change

"April, 1986."Includes bibliographical references (p. [25]-[26]).Robert I. Benjamin, Michael S. Scott Morton

Some perspectives on computerized management decision making systems

Presented at the IEEE "COMPSAC 77" Conference, Chicago, Illinois, November 1977.Bibliography: leaf 13.Michael S. Scott Morton

The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines: A Suggested Revision (March 26, 2020)

The FTC and DOJ requested comments on their draft Vertical Merger Guidelines in January 2020. This article is a complete alternative set of suggested Vertical Merger Guidelines that reflects and supplements the approach explained in the comments submitted by the author along with Jonathan. Baker, Nancy Rose and Fiona Scott Morton, as well as their other comments, and might be read in conjunction with those comments. This suggested revision of the Agencies’ draft expands the list of potential competition harms and provides illustrative examples. It expands and unifies the discussion and treatment of potential competitive benefits. It deletes the quasi-safe harbor and suggests the circumstances under which competitive harms raise lessened concerns on the one hand and heightened concerns on the other

Implications of changes in information technology for corporate strategy

Bibliography: p. 25-26.Michael S. Scott Morton, John F. Rockart

Análisis y práctica de las políticas de precios y financiación de los medicamentos

Con textos de F. Scott Morton, M. Kyfle y P. DanzonCátedra de Economía de los Medicamentos Unfiversidad Carlos III de Madrid-ABBVI

State Casket Sales and Restrictions: A Pointless Undertaking?

We utilize a new micro dataset of prices of funeral goods and services at individual funeral homes, plus data from the Census to examine the effects of state regulations that restrict entry into funeral goods market. In particular, some states have regulations that allow only licensed funeral homes to sell caskets, while others allow unlicensed retailers, such as Costco, to compete with funeral homes in the sale of caskets. However, as caskets and funeral services are complements, generally purchased in one-to-one proportions, it is not a priori clear that casket sale restrictions can expand the rent extraction capabilities of licensed funeral homes. Our results suggest that when courts lift funeral goods sales restrictions the prices of funeral goods fall but the prices of funeral services rise by nearly as much. Overall, our results support the "one monopoly rent" hypothesis; we do not find that overall funeral home revenues decline when funeral goods sales are lifted.

The Strategic Positioning of Store Brands in Retailer - Manufacturer Bargaining

We argue in this paper that retailers can strategically position store brands in product space to strengthen their bargaining position when negotiating supply terms with manufacturers of national brands. Using a bargaining framework we model a retailer's decision whether to carry an additional national brand or a store brand, and if the retailer chooses to introduce the latter, where in product space to locate the store brand. Store brands differ from other brands in being both unadvertised and located at a position in product space that is determined by the retailer instead of by a manufacturer. To capture the negotiation effect of store brands empirically, our paper analyses a retailer's choice of whether or not to carry a store brand in a given category. We control for other motivations for carrying a store brand that have been used in the literature. We test our model on a cross-section of categories using supermarket data from multiple retailers. The first contribution of this paper is to show theoretically that the strategic positioning of a store brand in a category changes the bargaining over supply terms between a retailer and national brand manufacturers in that category. The empirical evidence is consistent with the theory. We find that retailers are more likely to carry a store brand in a category if the share of the leading national brand is higher, but that the leading national brand share does not affect the market share of the store brand. This indicates that there may be a bargaining motive for the introduction of the store brand. We propose that this is because the retailer can position the store brand to mimic the leading national brand and present data that shows that store brands frequently imitate national brand packaging on multiple dimensions.