Prospects for Implementing the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement

The KORUS FTA was signed on June 30, 2007, but has not yet been sent to Congress for ratification. US concerns about auto and beef trade are the main stumbling blocks. At the Toronto G-20 Summit in June 2010, Presidents Obama and Lee Myung Bak tasked their officials to find solutions by the November Seoul G-20 Summit. If a deal is struck, implementing legislation could be submitted to Congress in early 2011. This paper assesses the problems and potential solutions to these problems and options for legislative action. The author concludes that, once submitted, the KORUS FTA will be approved for three reasons--all related to actions taken by other countries that could adversely affect US commercial and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The first reason is to demonstrate support for a strong ally facing North Korean aggression. Neither country wants to let a few provisions in a major trade agreement create friction in a strategically important bilateral alliance. The second reason is to secure a level playing field for US exporters in the Korean market. The imminent signing of the Korea-EU FTA, an agreement modeled on and largely comparable to the KORUS FTA, increases the urgency of Congressional action on the KORUS FTA since US and EU exports compete for sales in the Korean market. The third reason relates to the ability of US officials to advance US economic interests through an effective trade policy. Implementing KORUS is important to help maintain the credibility of US trade initiatives that seek to boost US exports, constrain Chinese economic influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and advance overall US foreign policy and security interests.

A Trade Agenda for the G-20

G-20 summit planners seem to be giving trade issues short shrift on the already full agenda for their two scheduled meetings in 2010. Such complacency is unwarranted, argues Jeffrey J. Schott, given ongoing protectionist pressures fed by near double digit unemployment rates in the United States and Europe and the continuing impasse in the Doha Round negotiations. Instead, he recommends three concrete actions that G-20 leaders should take to demonstrate their commitment to deterring protectionism and advancing multilateral trade liberalization: "topping up" Doha offers, especially on services; expanding existing offers to provide duty-free/quota-free access for the poorest countries; and extending the G-20 trade standstill commitment by declaring a temporary moratorium on climate change related border measures.

Implications of the DOHA Round for the U.S. Farm Bill and Vice Versa

Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade,

The Korea-US Free Trade Agreement: A Summary Assessment

The Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) opens up substantial new opportunities for bilateral trade and investment in goods and services and promotes important foreign policy interests of both countries. The FTA quickly removes most tariff barriers to auto trade and substantially reduces tax and regulatory burdens that impede sales of US cars in Korea; improves access to the Korean market for a wide range of US farm products; and opens up the Korean services market in key areas such as financial services, insurance, express delivery, and legal and accounting services. Nonetheless the ratification of the KORUS FTA has been controversial. In the United States attention has focused on both the auto sector, which accounts for almost one-quarter of bilateral trade and a large share of the US trade deficit with Korea, and Korean restrictions on US beef imports due to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) concerns. Several automakers and auto unions have opposed the deal, and the Democratic leadership in the US House of Representatives has demanded that the auto provisions be recast. In the US Senate, the resolution of the beef problem--which is now being addressed by Korean regulators--is a prerequisite to passage of implementing legislation. No clear timetable exists for the congressional vote and action may be deferred until 2008. The Bush administration will have to respond constructively to Democratic concerns about the FTA before the deal can be ratified and should consider new federal programs to help promote the competitiveness of US automakers. Doing so should attract a substantial minority of Democrats in the House, along with the majority of Republicans, to support the FTA. The stakes--in terms of both US economic and security interests in East Asia--are too great, and the costs too high, to reject the pact or defer a decision.

Completing the Doha Round

Reviving and completing the Doha Round will pose significant challenges for all the major trading nations. The United States has to make further cuts in farm support and open up trade in labor services, and the European Union has to do more on agricultural market access as well as industrial tariffs and services. Major developing countries need to make concrete offers to reduce protection for goods and services and to give poorer developing countries preferential market access. China needs to contribute more than any other developing country and perhaps as much as industrial countries on market access for manufactured goods. To complete the Doha Round, US officials need Congress to extend trade promotion authority (TPA), but it won't do so unless the Bush administration demonstrates progress in trade talks. TPA is dead unless the Doha Round and big bilateral trade talks promise to deliver a substantial package of reforms in agriculture, manufactures, and services that create trade and investment opportunities for US firms, workers, and farmers.

KORUS FTA 2.0: Assessing the Changes

On December 3, 2010, the United States and South Korea agreed to incremental changes to the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) that greatly increase prospects for Congressional ratification next year. Immediate tariff cuts on autos and light trucks have been deferred a few years. Korea agreed to auto regulatory reforms that should help mitigate existing problems and preclude the introduction of new nontariff barriers. Minor adjustments also were made to the phase-out of Korean pork tariffs, the duration of US L-1 visas, and the grace period before Korea has to implement a pharmaceutical "patent linkage" system. The new deal should provide gains of more than $20 billion in bilateral trade. The pact also should have positive knock-on effects on the awakening global trade talks and on negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Toward WTO 2000: a Seattle odyssey

World Trade Organization ; International trade

What Should the United States Do about Doha?

Doha Round "doctors" have prescribed a wide range of treatments for what ails the trade talks, ranging from placebo pills to euthanasia. In essence, the treatment options fall into three broad categories: (1) declare victory and sign the deal "on the table"; (2) "declare failure and go home"; or (3) recognize that the talks cannot conclude in the current environment and that the Doha Round needs a "time-out." Under either option 2 or 3, US officials would receive a large share of the blame for Doha's woes. So what should the United States do now to deflect such criticism, minimize damage to the World Trade Organization, and advance US trading interests? Schott recommends that the United States needs to keep open the multilateral option while accelerating bilateral and regional trade initiatives. The former requires, as a practical matter, making a down payment (in the form of provisional implementation of specific reforms) on a future Doha package that is more ambitious and balanced than what is now "on the table" in Geneva; the latter requires working particularly with the European Union, Brazil, and India to resolve problems that can subsequently be "locked in" WTO schedules.

Cross-grid display and computer input study Final report, Apr. - Dec. 1969

Feasibility of plasma panels as graphic display device

Comparison of modelled and empirical atmospheric propagation data

The radiometric integrity of TM thermal infrared channel data was evaluated and monitored to develop improved radiometric preprocessing calibration techniques for removal of atmospheric effects. Modelled atmospheric transmittance and path radiance were compared with empirical values derived from aircraft underflight data. Aircraft thermal infrared imagery and calibration data were available on two dates as were corresponding atmospheric radiosonde data. The radiosonde data were used as input to the LOWTRAN 5A code which was modified to output atmospheric path radiance in addition to transmittance. The aircraft data were calibrated and used to generate analogous measurements. These data indicate that there is a tendancy for the LOWTRAN model to underestimate atmospheric path radiance and transmittance as compared to empirical data. A plot of transmittance versus altitude for both LOWTRAN and empirical data is presented