The American University Press

Fifteen years ago the conveners of a symposium on "Trends in American Publishing" would probably not have invited a representative of the then rather esoteric and little known field of the university presses. For until a few years after World War II and certainly for the two decades preceding it, the scholarly publishers on university campuses were hardly considered legitimate, far less as presenting an important segment of the publishing industry which had to be taken into account. With the exception of a few Ivy League schools, plus Columbia, Cornell and Johns Hopkins, and a little later of the universities of Chicago and California, the academic publisher was considered woefully amateurish. Thus the industry could well afford to ignore the scholarly presses, or to use them as places to which they could refer authors whose manuscripts, they knew, would not be profitable to publish. The label "a typical university press book" was used to characterize the often ponderously written, jargon-laden and treatise- like manuscript which might later find its published form in a drab, badly printed hardback of forbidding and voluminous proportions. For in those pre- sputnik days the campus publishers were mainly concerned with issuing research reports and monographs, primarily destined for the specialists and the libraries in their fields, and of interest exclusively to the academic community. Although many of these influenced the course of research, only very rarely was a book published which was destined actually to change attitudes or to bring such new insights that a whole discipline was born and not many presses were as lucky as Chicago at the end of the last century when it published John Dewey.published or submitted for publicatio

Method for the Production of Titanium

Sponsorship: Armour Research Foundation of Illinois Institute of TechnologyUnited States Paten

Method for the Production of Titanium

Sponsorship: Armour Research Foundation of Illinois Institute of TechnologyUnited States Paten

Method for the Preparation of Titanium Tetrachloride

Sponsorship: Armour Research Foundation of Illinois Institute of TechnologyUnited States Paten

Moral agency in the system of Kant\u27s realm of ends

This thesis explores a variety of issues related to Kant\u27s account of human moral judgment in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and, to a lesser extent, The Critique of the Power of Judgment . In the first Chapter, I discuss the rational ideal of the Realm of Ends and its role in the overall strategy of the Groundwork. I also examine Kant\u27s famous formulations of the categorical imperative. I argue against overemphasizing the “universalization test.” I propose that Kant devised the several formulations of the categorical imperative, not to provide a method for conducting moral decisions, but rather in order to assist the reader in envisioning the moral “world-whole” (Kant\u27s term) which is ideally possible for moral agents such as ourselves. I treat Groundwork I and II as a description of human agency according to which systematic moral cooperation is possible in the Realm of Ends, which Kant describes as the unity of ends, aims and desires of multiple agents achieved by moral agents. So Chapter One describes what the ideal moral world would look like on Kant\u27s view. In Chapter Two I examine the particular account of rational agency that is required in order for Kant\u27s ideal to be realized. Chapter Two has two goals: (1) to explain the qualities of the single rational agent in Kant\u27s realm of Ends, and (2) to reinterpret the four examples of Groundwork II with this account in mind, and in order to demonstrate that the examples are not best interpreted as examples of prudential reasoning. In Chapter Three I discuss common human understanding and the faculty of judgment, and give an account of how individual moral judgments are actually made—or at least how we may best them. I argue that both determining and reflecting judgments are necessary components of judgments which involve both perfect and imperfect duties; and I begin an outline of how Kant\u27s vision of systematicity in the natural world may be given an analog in the moral realm, where determining and reflecting judgment collaborate in moral concept application just as they do in theoretical concept application

Dry Alkali Chlorotitanates and Method of Making the Same

Sponsorship: Armour Research Foundation of Illinois Institute of TechnologyUnited States Paten

Moral agency in the system of Kant\u27s realm of ends

This thesis explores a variety of issues related to Kant\u27s account of human moral judgment in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and, to a lesser extent, The Critique of the Power of Judgment . In the first Chapter, I discuss the rational ideal of the Realm of Ends and its role in the overall strategy of the Groundwork. I also examine Kant\u27s famous formulations of the categorical imperative. I argue against overemphasizing the “universalization test.” I propose that Kant devised the several formulations of the categorical imperative, not to provide a method for conducting moral decisions, but rather in order to assist the reader in envisioning the moral “world-whole” (Kant\u27s term) which is ideally possible for moral agents such as ourselves. I treat Groundwork I and II as a description of human agency according to which systematic moral cooperation is possible in the Realm of Ends, which Kant describes as the unity of ends, aims and desires of multiple agents achieved by moral agents. So Chapter One describes what the ideal moral world would look like on Kant\u27s view. In Chapter Two I examine the particular account of rational agency that is required in order for Kant\u27s ideal to be realized. Chapter Two has two goals: (1) to explain the qualities of the single rational agent in Kant\u27s realm of Ends, and (2) to reinterpret the four examples of Groundwork II with this account in mind, and in order to demonstrate that the examples are not best interpreted as examples of prudential reasoning. In Chapter Three I discuss common human understanding and the faculty of judgment, and give an account of how individual moral judgments are actually made—or at least how we may best them. I argue that both determining and reflecting judgments are necessary components of judgments which involve both perfect and imperfect duties; and I begin an outline of how Kant\u27s vision of systematicity in the natural world may be given an analog in the moral realm, where determining and reflecting judgment collaborate in moral concept application just as they do in theoretical concept application