Public opinion outside of Europe is generally favourable toward the EU, but this is only partly due to the EU’s actions.

How is the EU viewed outside of Europe? Bernd Schlipphak assesses public opinion toward the EU in non-European countries. He notes that for the most part citizens have favourable attitudes about European integration and the EU, but that the EU’s actions are only part of the explanation for these positive opinions. Attitudes are also strongly influenced by the extent to which individuals support the concept of international co-operation, with other international organisations, such as the United Nations, also benefitting from positive views of supranational decision-making

Threat perceptions, blame attribution, and political trust

Under what conditions do threat perceptions lead to an increasing distrust in government? This article argues that the answer is the degree of ease with which a perceived threat can be linked to governmental actors. First, I argue that threats directed toward society should be more easily linked by citizens to the domestic government compared to perceived threats to the individual (general linkage). Second, a threat linked to a citizen’s general political stance more strongly affects their attitude toward governmental actors in negative ways (heuristic linkage). Third, I expect threat perceptions to further increase governmental distrust if the latter’s actors are blamed for a perceived threat that is salient to citizens’ ideological worldviews (blame attribution). Empirical tests using self-administered survey- and experimental data corroborate the argument. In closing I discuss the implications of the theoretical and empirical setup, emphasizing the need for future studies on blame attribution, heuristic linkages, and political trust

Verdrossen über PolitikerInnen und die Demokratie? Der Effekt des Vertrauens in PolitikerInnen auf die individuelle Demokratiezufriedenheit in Österreich

"In den letzten Jahren haben mehr und mehr gesellschaftliche AkteurInnen die sinkende Demokratiezufriedenheit in Österreich beklagt und dafür vornehmlich das sinkende Vertrauen in die politischen, als korrupt und unfähig wahrgenommenen AkteurInnen als Ursache ausgemacht. Dieser Artikel überprüft diese Annahme anhand klassischer theoretischer Literatur aus der Politischen Kulturforschung sowie der quantitativen Datensätze des European Social Survey 2002-2008 und kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass diese grundlegende Annahme infrage gestellt werden muss. Weder sinkt die Demokratiezufriedenheit in Österreich über die Messzeitpunkte hinweg in einem signifikanten Ausmaß, noch lässt sich die individuelle Demokratiezufriedenheit vornehmlich über das Vertrauen in die individuellen PolitikerInnen erklären." (Autorenreferat)"In recent years, more and more civil society actors have lamented over the decline of satisfaction with democracy in Austria, and have attributed this decline most prominently to the decline of trust in individual political actors, which are perceived as corrupt and scandal-laden. This article examines that assumption by discussing fundamental literature in Political Culture research and by testing hypotheses derived from the discussion with data sets from the European Social Survey 2002-2008. It concludes that the assumption should be challenged as the aggregate satisfaction with democracy does not decline significantly over the years and as individual satisfaction with democracy cannot be explained predominantly by citizens' trust in individual political actors." (author's abstract

Genießen islamistische Parteien tatsächlich einen politischen Vorteil? Das Beispiel Tunesien

Ein kürzlich erschienener Literaturüberblick von Cammett und Luong diskutiert den politischen Vorteil islamistischer Parteien in Nordafrika und Nahost, kann die angenommene Funktionsweise des politischen Vorteils aber nicht empirisch belegen. Durch den Rückgriff auf das Konzept der individuellen Nutzung von Heuristiken umgehen wir gängige Messprobleme und argumentieren, dass durch die von islamistischen Parteien bereitgestellten „cues“ bestimmte Gruppen von BürgerInnen eine höhere Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit zugunsten eben dieser Parteien haben sollten. Der Test unseres Arguments mit Daten des Arab Barometer für das Beispiel Tunesien zeigt ein ambivalentes Bild. Während Befragte, die unverbrauchte politische Akteure bevorzugen, zu islamistischen Parteien tendieren, gilt dies für Befragte, denen die Integrität von KandidatInnen wichtig ist, entgegen unserer Erwartungen nicht. A recent literature review by Cammett and Luong discusses the political advantage of Islamist parties in North Africa and the Middle East. Yet, there is a lack of empirical evidence with regard to the mechanism through which the political advantage is assumed to work. Drawing on the concept of the individual use of heuristics, we are able to circumvent common measuring problems. We then argue that specific groups of citizens should have a higher likelihood to vote for Islamist parties as a result of the cues these parties provide. Testing our argument with data from the Arab Barometer for the Tunisian case, we find mixed results. In line with our expectations, respondents who prefer untested political actors are more likely to vote for Islamist parties, whereas – contrary to our hypothesis – respondents who value integrity are less likely to vote for these parties

Conspiracy Theory Beliefs and Political Trust: The Moderating Role of Political Communication

A plentitude of research has analyzed citizens' belief in conspiracy theories and its individual‐level correlates. Yet, the effects of (political) context factors on the causes and effects of individual belief in conspiracy theories are still neglected. However, such context should be especially relevant when it comes to the impact of one’s belief in conspiracy theories on one's political preference. In this article, we argue that the communication of governmental actors exerts a moderating influence on the link leading from a belief in conspiracy theories to political attitudes. In a nutshell, the belief in conspiracy theories should make citizens less likely to distrust their government - and the political system in general - in contexts where these theories are shared or at least publicly represented by governmental actors. Using two original data sets with data from Germany, Poland, and Jordan (Study 1) and data from Germany, Poland, Sweden, and France (Study 2), we test our argument based on an overall sample of about 10,000 cases. Our results indicate that higher degrees of generic conspiracy theories beliefs are associated with higher levels of political distrust across countries. Yet, confirming our argument, such an effect takes place less strongly in those countries in which governmental actors use conspiracy theories as a political communication strategy

Individual‐Level Predictors of Conspiracy Mentality in Germany and Poland

Conspiracy mentality (CM), the general propensity to believe in conspiracy theories, has been linked to political behaviors, prejudice, and non‐compliance with public health guidelines. While there is increasing evidence that conspiracy beliefs are pervasive, research on individual‐level predictors of CM is scarce. Specifically, we identify three gaps in research: First, evidence on the question which individual‐level characteristics predict CM is inconsistent and often based on small samples. Second, personality, political, and religious predictors are usually examined in isolation. Third, differences on the societal level have been mostly neglected. In the present research, we gathered CAWI (Study 1) and CATI (Study 2) data on generalized interpersonal trust (GIT), right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), and religiosity in two politically and culturally different European countries, namely Germany (N = 2,760) and Poland (N = 2,651). This allowed for a well‐powered test of three theoretically relevant predictors of CM, including their unique predictive value. Moreover, we were able to explore whether these associations replicate across or are moderated by country context. Our findings underline the role of GIT and RWA in predicting CM in both countries. Analyses based on RWA subdimensions yielded a differentiated picture of the role of RWA. Furthermore, we found cross‐country differences with stronger associations of GIT and RWA with CM in Germany. Findings are discussed concerning political and religious differences between the examined countries

Von Verteidigern und Entdeckern

Dieses Open-Access-Buch bietet eine Einführung in den Identitätskonflikt zwischen Verteidigern und Entdeckern. Basierend auf einer Studie mit 5000 Befragten aus vier europäischen Ländern zeigen die Autoren, dass sich Verteidiger und Entdecker im Hinblick auf ihre Zugehörigkeitskonzepte und das Ausmaß wahrgenommener Bedrohung durch Muslime und Geflüchtete unterscheiden. Differenzen zwischen beiden Gruppen lassen sich auch für die jeweils wahrgenommene gesellschaftliche Marginalisierung und politische Repräsentation finden. Die Studie weist zudem nach, dass mit verschiedenen Positionen im Identitätskonflikt auch unterschiedliche Konzepte von Demokratie verbunden werden

Les grandes tendances du comportement électoral

En France et en Allemagne, comme dans tous les grands pays démocratiques, les élections sont encadrées et régulées par les partis politiques. Ceux-ci sélectionnent les candidats qui se présentent en leur nom pour recueillir les suffrages des électeurs, organisent le débat d’idées et essaient de faire prévaloir leur programme dans l’opinion publique. On ne saurait donc traiter des partis politiques sans évoquer les comportements électoraux, qui enregistrent les résultats de la compétition part..

Les grandes tendances du comportement électoral

Chaque chapitre de ce livre est écrit par un universitaire français et un universitaire allemandAnalyse comparée du comportement électoral en France et en Allemagn