27 research outputs found
Public opinion outside of Europe is generally favourable toward the EU, but this is only partly due to the EUâs actions.
How is the EU viewed outside of Europe? Bernd Schlipphak assesses public opinion toward the EU in non-European countries. He notes that for the most part citizens have favourable attitudes about European integration and the EU, but that the EUâs actions are only part of the explanation for these positive opinions. Attitudes are also strongly influenced by the extent to which individuals support the concept of international co-operation, with other international organisations, such as the United Nations, also benefitting from positive views of supranational decision-making
Threat perceptions, blame attribution, and political trust
Under what conditions do threat perceptions lead to an increasing distrust in government? This article argues that the answer is the degree of ease with which a perceived threat can be linked to governmental actors. First, I argue that threats directed toward society should be more easily linked by citizens to the domestic government compared to perceived threats to the individual (general linkage). Second, a threat linked to a citizenâs general political stance more strongly affects their attitude toward governmental actors in negative ways (heuristic linkage). Third, I expect threat perceptions to further increase governmental distrust if the latterâs actors are blamed for a perceived threat that is salient to citizensâ ideological worldviews (blame attribution). Empirical tests using self-administered survey- and experimental data corroborate the argument. In closing I discuss the implications of the theoretical and empirical setup, emphasizing the need for future studies on blame attribution, heuristic linkages, and political trust
Verdrossen ĂŒber PolitikerInnen und die Demokratie? Der Effekt des Vertrauens in PolitikerInnen auf die individuelle Demokratiezufriedenheit in Ăsterreich
"In den letzten Jahren haben mehr und mehr gesellschaftliche AkteurInnen die sinkende Demokratiezufriedenheit in Ăsterreich beklagt und dafĂŒr vornehmlich das sinkende Vertrauen in die politischen, als korrupt und unfĂ€hig wahrgenommenen AkteurInnen als Ursache ausgemacht. Dieser Artikel ĂŒberprĂŒft diese Annahme anhand klassischer theoretischer Literatur aus der Politischen Kulturforschung sowie der quantitativen DatensĂ€tze des European Social Survey 2002-2008 und kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass diese grundlegende Annahme infrage gestellt werden muss. Weder sinkt die Demokratiezufriedenheit in Ăsterreich ĂŒber die Messzeitpunkte hinweg in einem signifikanten AusmaĂ, noch lĂ€sst sich die individuelle Demokratiezufriedenheit vornehmlich ĂŒber das Vertrauen in die individuellen PolitikerInnen erklĂ€ren." (Autorenreferat)"In recent years, more and more civil society actors have lamented over the decline of satisfaction with democracy in Austria, and have attributed this decline most prominently to the decline of trust in individual political actors, which are perceived as corrupt and scandal-laden. This article examines that assumption by discussing fundamental literature in Political Culture research and by testing hypotheses derived from the discussion with data sets from the European Social Survey 2002-2008. It concludes that the assumption should be challenged as the aggregate satisfaction with democracy does not decline significantly over the years and as individual satisfaction with democracy cannot be explained predominantly by citizens' trust in individual political actors." (author's abstract
GenieĂen islamistische Parteien tatsĂ€chlich einen politischen Vorteil? Das Beispiel Tunesien
Ein kĂŒrzlich erschienener LiteraturĂŒberblick von Cammett und Luong diskutiert den politischen Vorteil islamistischer Parteien in Nordafrika und Nahost, kann die angenommene Funktionsweise des politischen Vorteils aber nicht empirisch belegen. Durch den RĂŒckgriff auf das Konzept der individuellen Nutzung von Heuristiken umgehen wir gĂ€ngige Messprobleme und argumentieren, dass durch die von islamistischen Parteien bereitgestellten âcuesâ bestimmte Gruppen von BĂŒrgerInnen eine höhere Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit zugunsten eben dieser Parteien haben sollten. Der Test unseres Arguments mit Daten des Arab Barometer fĂŒr das Beispiel Tunesien zeigt ein ambivalentes Bild. WĂ€hrend Befragte, die unverbrauchte politische Akteure bevorzugen, zu islamistischen Parteien tendieren, gilt dies fĂŒr Befragte, denen die IntegritĂ€t von KandidatInnen wichtig ist, entgegen unserer Erwartungen nicht. A recent literature review by Cammett and Luong discusses the political advantage of Islamist parties in North Africa and the Middle East. Yet, there is a lack of empirical evidence with regard to the mechanism through which the political advantage is assumed to work. Drawing on the concept of the individual use of heuristics, we are able to circumvent common measuring problems. We then argue that specific groups of citizens should have a higher likelihood to vote for Islamist parties as a result of the cues these parties provide. Testing our argument with data from the Arab Barometer for the Tunisian case, we find mixed results. In line with our expectations, respondents who prefer untested political actors are more likely to vote for Islamist parties, whereas â contrary to our hypothesis â respondents who value integrity are less likely to vote for these parties
Conspiracy Theory Beliefs and Political Trust: The Moderating Role of Political Communication
A plentitude of research has analyzed citizens' belief in conspiracy theories and its individualâlevel correlates. Yet, the effects of (political) context factors on the causes and effects of individual belief in conspiracy theories are still neglected. However, such context should be especially relevant when it comes to the impact of oneâs belief in conspiracy theories on one's political preference. In this article, we argue that the communication of governmental actors exerts a moderating influence on the link leading from a belief in conspiracy theories to political attitudes. In a nutshell, the belief in conspiracy theories should make citizens less likely to distrust their government - and the political system in general - in contexts where these theories are shared or at least publicly represented by governmental actors. Using two original data sets with data from Germany, Poland, and Jordan (Study 1) and data from Germany, Poland, Sweden, and France (Study 2), we test our argument based on an overall sample of about 10,000 cases. Our results indicate that higher degrees of generic conspiracy theories beliefs are associated with higher levels of political distrust across countries. Yet, confirming our argument, such an effect takes place less strongly in those countries in which governmental actors use conspiracy theories as a political communication strategy
IndividualâLevel Predictors of Conspiracy Mentality in Germany and Poland
Conspiracy mentality (CM), the general propensity to believe in conspiracy theories, has been linked to political behaviors, prejudice, and nonâcompliance with public health guidelines. While there is increasing evidence that conspiracy beliefs are pervasive, research on individualâlevel predictors of CM is scarce. Specifically, we identify three gaps in research: First, evidence on the question which individualâlevel characteristics predict CM is inconsistent and often based on small samples. Second, personality, political, and religious predictors are usually examined in isolation. Third, differences on the societal level have been mostly neglected. In the present research, we gathered CAWI (Study 1) and CATI (Study 2) data on generalized interpersonal trust (GIT), rightâwing authoritarianism (RWA), and religiosity in two politically and culturally different European countries, namely Germany (N = 2,760) and Poland (N = 2,651). This allowed for a wellâpowered test of three theoretically relevant predictors of CM, including their unique predictive value. Moreover, we were able to explore whether these associations replicate across or are moderated by country context. Our findings underline the role of GIT and RWA in predicting CM in both countries. Analyses based on RWA subdimensions yielded a differentiated picture of the role of RWA. Furthermore, we found crossâcountry differences with stronger associations of GIT and RWA with CM in Germany. Findings are discussed concerning political and religious differences between the examined countries
Von Verteidigern und Entdeckern
Dieses Open-Access-Buch bietet eine EinfĂŒhrung in den IdentitĂ€tskonflikt zwischen Verteidigern und Entdeckern. Basierend auf einer Studie mit 5000 Befragten aus vier europĂ€ischen LĂ€ndern zeigen die Autoren, dass sich Verteidiger und Entdecker im Hinblick auf ihre Zugehörigkeitskonzepte und das AusmaĂ wahrgenommener Bedrohung durch Muslime und GeflĂŒchtete unterscheiden. Differenzen zwischen beiden Gruppen lassen sich auch fĂŒr die jeweils wahrgenommene gesellschaftliche Marginalisierung und politische ReprĂ€sentation finden. Die Studie weist zudem nach, dass mit verschiedenen Positionen im IdentitĂ€tskonflikt auch unterschiedliche Konzepte von Demokratie verbunden werden
Les grandes tendances du comportement Ă©lectoral
En France et en Allemagne, comme dans tous les grands pays dĂ©mocratiques, les Ă©lections sont encadrĂ©es et rĂ©gulĂ©es par les partis politiques. Ceux-ci sĂ©lectionnent les candidats qui se prĂ©sentent en leur nom pour recueillir les suffrages des Ă©lecteurs, organisent le dĂ©bat dâidĂ©es et essaient de faire prĂ©valoir leur programme dans lâopinion publique. On ne saurait donc traiter des partis politiques sans Ă©voquer les comportements Ă©lectoraux, qui enregistrent les rĂ©sultats de la compĂ©tition part..
Les grandes tendances du comportement Ă©lectoral
Chaque chapitre de ce livre est écrit par un universitaire français et un universitaire allemandAnalyse comparée du comportement électoral en France et en Allemagn