A political economy of global security approach to migration and border control

Population movements have causes and consequences for both global security and the economic and security considerations of states. Migration itself is inexorably intertwined with global security outcomes, in the form of instability, state fragility, transnational terrorism and crime, and the radicalization (or perceived radicalization) of migrants and host societies.While modern states may have monopolized the authority over legitimate movement, they have never fully captured the management and enforcement of migration flows. Instead, market actors play key roles in determining migration outcomes—including the scale, direction, and violence associated with migration flows. Migration outcomes are, thus, critically constituted by two key forces—the security priorities of states and the complementary and competing forces of privatization and profit-making. While market forces undermine state control over migration, states have buffered and further consolidated their power over mobility by harnessing private actors and markets toward migration management and border control. We situate migration management and border control as a political economy of security issue, arguing that migration outcomes cannot be explained without examining the interaction between state security imperatives, private actors, and market forces.Accepted manuscrip

What goes up, must come down? The asymmetric effects of economic growth and international threat on military spending

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Embedded in Brussels: Public agendas and private actors in the European Union

In an international institution such as the European Union (EU), what are the roles of private actors (firms, lobbyists, industry associations, NGOs, civil society) and interest groups? What happens when organized international interests lobby bureaucrats in EU institutions? What impact does interest group mobilization have on the institutions, agendas and policies of the EU? The conventional wisdom of EU studies posits that interest group mobilization follows the delegation of authority to the EU. However, a cursory look at many policy domains casts doubt on this direction of causality: interest groups sometimes precede the formal institutionalization of authority at the EU. How does this affect the balance of public-private power in an institutionalizing environment? Lastly, how does the mobilization and concentration of groups affect the content of the agenda emerging from these new institutions? In new, weak, and institutionalizing domains such as internal and external security, is there a tradeoff between the EU\u27s capacity to create and implement an effective agenda and its autonomy over the content of that public agenda? This dissertation research addresses the broader question of agenda setting in a political environment where the institutions and the groups are co-evolving. Specifically, I hypothesize that the activity of mobilized private actors affects (1) the content and direction of policy agendas and (2) the agenda-setting capacity of EU bureaucracies

Embedded in Brussels: Public agendas and private actors in the European Union

In an international institution such as the European Union (EU), what are the roles of private actors (firms, lobbyists, industry associations, NGOs, civil society) and interest groups? What happens when organized international interests lobby bureaucrats in EU institutions? What impact does interest group mobilization have on the institutions, agendas and policies of the EU? The conventional wisdom of EU studies posits that interest group mobilization follows the delegation of authority to the EU. However, a cursory look at many policy domains casts doubt on this direction of causality: interest groups sometimes precede the formal institutionalization of authority at the EU. How does this affect the balance of public-private power in an institutionalizing environment? Lastly, how does the mobilization and concentration of groups affect the content of the agenda emerging from these new institutions? In new, weak, and institutionalizing domains such as internal and external security, is there a tradeoff between the EU\u27s capacity to create and implement an effective agenda and its autonomy over the content of that public agenda? This dissertation research addresses the broader question of agenda setting in a political environment where the institutions and the groups are co-evolving. Specifically, I hypothesize that the activity of mobilized private actors affects (1) the content and direction of policy agendas and (2) the agenda-setting capacity of EU bureaucracies

European Defense Budget Cuts, Defense Posture, and Reform

Introduction: In this paper, we find that these claims of an emerging qualitative change in the perspective of European states towards their international security role do not materialize in any country cases. We identified time periods when European states reduce their aggregate military expenditures-we conceptualize and measure them as 'cut periods'. When defense spending 'cut periods' coincide with cuts in other 'input' measures of military capability/power, there are six possible cases of demilitarization. Because material indicators of cuts in several measures of military power are insufficient determinants of the strategic intent behind these cuts, we qualitatively analyze two most likely cases of ideological demilitarization - Austria and Denmark. In neither case can widespread cuts be attributed to demilitarization. Alternatively, when there are aggregate (top-level) cuts but increases in lower (force structure or line item) levels of spending, we hypothesize that states are undergoing defense reforms. We find that a vast majority of defense cut periods are associated with potential defense reform. In all country cases, with the exception of Hungary and Slovakia, countries accelerated their investments in military manpower, R&D, or equipment while they were cutting overall spending. In order to explore whether defense reform is actually intentional, we look at two opposite cases: France and Bulgaria. We find that while both countries underwent defense reform during the 2008-2012 cut period, the French case represents a different kind of reform than the Bulgarian case

Markets in defense of Europe: Providing public goods in European defense

The EU is not yet a defense public goods buyer, but it is generally a public goods provider in the form of the single market, which includes security goods. Public defense goods provision includes a functioning defense market, but the European market for defense equipment remains insufficiently integrated. EU regulation can reduce defense market uncertainty and incentivize R&D spending, ensuring future company competitiveness. The EU should expand its regulatory authority in defense and indirectly provide Europe with a defense market as a public good. Eventually, the EU should work toward consolidating demand and supply, which would further reduce inefficiencies and meet the challenge of secular rises in costs for defense

A More Martial Europe? Permissive Consensus or Robust Support for CSDP

Introduction: This paper reflects a research agenda to clarify the individual, social, and national correlates for support of a collective European foreign, defense, and security policy. Extant research (Schoen 2008, Foucault et. al. 2009, Peters 2011) has found important predictors of support in national identities, utilitarian versus ideational correlates, and dimensions of strategic culture. Our research indicates that individuals who support a more robust European presence in the world understand very well what they mean by this support: they are well-educated, high-information citizens who do not necessarily shun the robust use of force under certain conditions, including protecting their societies from asymmetric threats such as terrorism and failed states. If so, individuals might favor more robust European defense, but with variation on the specifics: they might favor collective defense institutions or interventions based on their assessment of specific conflicts, cost/benefit calculations, or even constructed aspects of European prestige or competition vis a vis the US. These correlates of support demonstrate that the conventional wisdom that Europeans are turning inward, away from global affairs, favor only multilateral foreign policy solutions, and abhor the use of force in security and defense is empirically unsubstantiated