Short-term accruals and the pricing and production of audit services

This study investigates how risk associated with increased levels of accruals that might be indicative of earnings management affects the pricing and production of audit services. Francis and Krishnan (1999) suggest that auditors can deal with the risk of earnings management in five ways: (1) screen out high-risk clients; (2) charge a premium to riskier clients; (3) increase audit effort; (4) negotiate adjustments to the financial statements; and/or (5) report more conservatively (e.g., by issuing a modified report). Using a unique data set, the current study investigates two of these options: charging a fee premium and increasing audit effort. Based on previous research on audit pricing and production, we construct models for audit fees, total audit effort, labor mix (extent of experienced auditor effort), and engagement profit margin including an accruals measure that could indicate earnings management. We test these models on a sample of 119 audit engagements from one Big 6 audit firm in The Netherlands. We find that signed short-term accruals are associated with a significant increase in audit fees as well as total effort, but not with experience mix or profit margin. However, we find secondary evidence that auditors utilize more supervisors, assistants and support personnel and earn smaller profits (returns) when a client has higher levels of short-term accruals. Taken together, these results suggest that auditors are responsive to high levels of short-term accruals that may be indicative of earnings management, and will increase their work effort even if they are unable to recoup all of the related costs

A modified audit production framework: Evaluating the relative efficiency of audit engagements.

We develop a model of audit production based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) using labor cost as input and hours spent on evidence-gathering activities that determine the level of assurance as output. Client characteristics are considered exogenous factors that affect audit production as a whole. We apply the model to a sample of U.S.-based engagements from an international accounting firm. Results indicate that a constrained DEA model using variable returns to scale is appropriate for modeling audit production. We find that audits are more efficient for clients that are larger, have a December year-end, and are highly automated. Audits are less efficient when the auditor relies on internal control, tax services are provided, and the client has subsidiaries. We also find that a well-specified regression-based production model can control for factors that influence auditor efficiency. Finally, we find that inefficiencies are impounded in fees for some industries and firm offices

Accounting Information Systems and internal Control

x, 386 p. ; 24 cm