The price elasticity of charitable giving: does the form of tax relief matter?

This paper uses a survey-based approach to test alternative methods of channeling tax relief to donors – as a tax rebate for the donor or as a matched payment to the receiving charity. On accounting grounds these two are equivalent but, in line with earlier experimental studies, we find that gross donations are significantly more responsive to a match change than to a rebate change. We show that the difference can largely be explained by the fact that a majority of donors do not adjust their nominal donations in response to a change in subsidy. This evidence adds to the growing empirical literature suggesting that consumers may not react to tax changes. In the case of tax subsidies for donations, this has implications for policy design – we show for the UK that a match-based system is likely to be more effective at increasing the total amount of money going to charities.charitable giving, tax subsidies, price elasticity

The price elasticity of charitable giving : does the form of tax relief matter?

This paper uses a survey-based approach to test alternative methods of channeling tax relief to donors – as a tax rebate for the donor or as a matched payment to the receiving charity. On accounting grounds these two are equivalent but, in line with earlier experimental studies, we find that gross donations are significantly more responsive to a match change than to a rebate change. We show that the difference can largely be explained by the fact that a majority of donors do not adjust their nominal donations in response to a change in subsidy. This evidence adds to the growing empirical literature suggesting that consumers may not react to tax changes. In the case of tax subsidies for donations, this has implications for policy design – for the UK a match-based system is likely to be more effective at increasing money going to charities

Rational Inattention to Subsidies for Charitable Contributions

Evidence suggests that individuals fail to process all relevant attributes when making decisions. Recent literature has mainly focused on shrouded attributes. Here we present a simple model where agents rationally choose not to process attributes even when they are not shrouded, and we investigate its predictions for the case of subsidies for charitable donations. These are offered as rebates or matches. Both lower the price of giving, but, crucially, with different implications for rational non-processing choices. Survey and experimental evidence on donation responses to equivalent changes in the match and the rebate is consistent with our model of rational inattention.Tax salience, rational inattention, charitable giving

The price elasticity of charitable giving: does the form of tax relief matter?

This paper uses a survey-based approach to test alternative methods of channeling tax relief to donors - as a tax rebate for the donor or as a matched payment to the receiving charity. On accounting grounds these two are equivalent but, in line with earlier experimental studies, we find that gross donations are significantly more responsive to a match change than to a rebate change. We show that the difference can largely be explained by the fact that a majority of donors do not adjust their nominal donations in response to a change in subsidy. This evidence adds to the growing empirical literature suggesting that consumers may not react to tax changes. In the case of tax subsidies for donations, this has implications for policy design - we show for the UK that a match-based system is likely to be more effective at increasing money going to charities.Charitable giving, tax subsidies, private provision of public goods

Relational Warm Glow and Giving in Social Groups

We study charitable giving within social groups. Exploiting a unique dataset, we establish three key relationships between social group size and fundraising outcomes: (i) a positive relationship between group size and the total number of donations; (ii) a negative relationship between group size and the amount given by each donor; (iii) no relationship between group size and the total amount raised by the fundraiser. We rule out classic free-riding to explain these relationships since the number of social group members is only a subset of total contributors. Instead, the findings are consistent with the notion that giving in social groups is motivated by relational warm glow

Ixodes brunneus (Acari: Ixodidae) from Two Bird Hosts: A New Michigan Tick

The tick Ixodes brunneus Koch (Acari: Ixodidae) is reported for the first time in Michigan from two bird hosts at two locations in the lower peninsula. All stages of this tick exclusively feed on birds, and are primarily known from the southern U.S., although abundant records occur from northern states. The role of this species as a vector of pathogens is discussed

Relational altruism and giving in social groups

Much fundraising is done by individuals within existing social groups. Exploiting a unique dataset, we demonstrate (i) a positive relationship between social group size and the number of donations; (ii) a negative relationship between group size and the size of individual donations; (iii) no clear relationship between group size and the total amount raised. Free riding with respect to the activity being funded cannot explain the relationship between group size and donation size, since the number of social group members is only a subset of total contributors. Instead, the findings are consistent with the notion that giving in social groups is motivated by “relational altruism”

Are Donors Afraid of Charities' Core Costs? Scale Economies in Non-profit Provision and Charity Selection

We study contestability in non-profit markets when non-commercial providers supply a homogeneous collective good through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. Unlike in the case of for-profit competition, in the non-profit case the absence of price-based sales contracts means that fixed costs are directly relevant to donors, and that they can translate into an entry barrier, protecting the position of an inefficient incumbent; or that, conversely, they can make it possible for inefficient newcomers to contest the position of a more efficient incumbent. Evidence from laboratory experiments show that fixed cost driven trade-offs between payoff dominance and perceived risk can lead to inefficient selection

Occurrence of Ticks (Acari: Ixodidae) on Birds in Northwestern Lower Michigan, 2011-2019

Abstract Monitoring tick infestation of wildlife provides baseline tick occurrence data that may have human or animal health implications. We collected 312 ticks of four species from 5,122 birds of 93 species while monitoring bird migration during 15 fall and spring seasons between 2011 and 2019 in the northern Lower Peninsula of Michigan. Twenty-seven of 93 bird species hosted ticks with an overall prevalence (=at least one tick) of 3.6% (185/5,122). Median burden was one tick/per infested bird with a range of 1-16 ticks per infested bird. Tick species collected were primarily Haemaphysalis leporispalustris (Packard) and Ixodes scapularis Say, with smaller numbers of Ixodes dentatus Marx and a single Ixodes brunneus (Koch). The prevalence of avian infestations by I. scapularis increased over the eight-year study period (P = 0.046) to a high of over 4.6% infestation by I. scapularis in 2019. Based on the migratory status of birds, our data suggest that birds transported ticks to our site from northern or southern areas. Additionally, based on bird recapture data during stopover periods at our site, we detected new tick infestations in 27 of 437 birds that had ticks removed on initial capture. These reinfestations potentially reflect bird’s local acquisition of ticks, such as I. scapularis. This indicates that I. scapularis is becoming established in the region, which appears to be on the leading edge of this tick’s expanding range in the Lower Peninsula of Michigan. Birds may be contributing to the establishment by contributing and possibly introducing and maintaining the ticks. Birds may be transporting ticks and seeding them elsewhere