Incentives and Invention in Universities

Using data on U.S. universities, we show that universities that give higher royalty shares to faculty scientists generate greater license income, controlling for university size, academic quality, research funding and other factors. We use pre-sample data on university patenting to control for the potential endogeneity of royalty shares. We find that scientists respond both to cash royalties and to royalties used to support their research labs, suggesting both pecuniary and intrinsic (research) motivations. The incentive effects appear to be larger in private universities than in public ones, and we provide survey evidence indicating this may be related to differences in the use of performance pay, government constraints, and local development objectives of technology license offices. Royalty incentives work both by raising faculty effort and sorting scientists across universities. The effect of incentives works primarily by increasing the quality (value) rather than the quantity of inventions.royalty incentives, invention, technology licensing

The Interaction Between Capital Investment and R&D in Science-Based Firms

This paper analyzes the interaction among R&D, capital investment , and the stock market rate of return for 191 firms in science-based industries for the period 1973-1981. Using a framework based on dynamic factor analysis, we show how several prominent hypotheses about the determination of R&D and investment generate testable parameter restrictions. The data indicate that R&D Granger-causes investment, but that investment does not Granger-cause R&D. We use this finding to examine the validity of those hypotheses, to characterize the movements over time of R&D and investment, and to measure the stock market valuation of these movements.

Incentives and Invention in Universities

We show that economic incentives affect the number and commercial value of inventions generated in universities. Using panel data for 102 U.S. universities during the period 1991-1999, we find that universities which give higher royalty shares to academic scientists generate more inventions and higher license income, controlling for other factors including university size, quality, research funding and technology licensing inputs. The incentive effects are much larger in private universities than in public ones. For private institutions there is a Laffer curve effect: raising the inventor's royalty share increases the license income retained by the university. The incentive effect appears to work both through the level of effort and sorting of academic scientists.

Incentives and Invention in Universities

We show that economic incentives affect the commercial value of inventions generated in universities. Using data for 102 U.S. universities during the period 1991-1999, we find that universities which give higher royalty shares to academic scientists generate higher license income, controlling for other factors including university size, quality, research funding and technology licensing inputs. We provide evidence that this is due to the fact that public universities are less effective at commercialising inventions, which weakens the incentive effect of higher royalty shares. Other findings include: 1) there is a Laffer effect in private universities: raising the inventor's royalty share increases the license income retained by the university; 2) the incentive effect works primarily by increasing the quality of inventions, and 3) the incentive effect appears to operate both by raising faculty effort and by sorting academic scientists across universities.Academic research, incentives, licensing, royalties, technology transfer, intellectual property.

Government financing of R&D: a mechanism design approach

We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal government contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero cofinancing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed loan schemes. With adverse selection and moral hazard, allowing for two levels of effort by the entrepreneur, the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest and zero self-financing and a second with a lower interest plus cofinancing. Calibrated simulations assess welfare gains from the optimal policy, observed loan programs, and a direct subsidy to private venture capital firms. The gains vary with the size of the externalities, the cost of public funds, and the effectiveness of the private venture capital industry

Incentives and invention in universities

We show that economic incentives affect the number and commercial value of inventions generated in universities. Using panel data for 102 U.S. universities during the period 1991-1999, we find that universities which give higher royalty shares to academic scientists generate more inventions and higher license income, controlling for other factors including university size, quality, research funding and technology licensing inputs. The incentive effects are much larger in private universities than in public ones. For private institutions there is a Laffer curve effect: raising the inventor's royalty share increases the license income retained by the university. The incentive effect appears to work both through the level of effort and sorting of academic scientists

Royalty sharing and technology licensing in universities

Using data for 102 U.S. universities, we show that royalty-sharing arrangements (cash flow rights) vary substantially across universities and that they are largely unrelated to most observed university characteristics including faculty size, quality, research funding, technology mix of the faculty, and size of the technology licensing office. However, higher inventors' royalty shares are associated with higher licensing income at the university, controlling for other factors. The results suggest that monetary incentives from inventions have real effects in the university sector

Dynamics of r&d and investment in the scientific sector.

This paper empirically explores the dynamic interactions among research and development, capital investment, and the stock market performance of 191 firms in science-based industries during the period 1973-81. Using a framework based on dynamic factor analysis, we test asymmetric specifications of the dynamics between R & D and investment. The data indicate that R & D Granger-causes investment but that investment does not Granger-cause R & D. We discuss interpretations of this causal ordering, characterize the stylized facts of the movements over time of R & D and investment, and measure the stock market valuation of these movements

The interaction between capital investment and r&d in science-based firms

This paper analyzes the interaction among R&D, capital investment , and the stock market rate of return for 191 firms in science-based industries for the period 1973-1981. Using a framework based on dynamic factor analysis, we show how several prominent hypotheses about the determination of R&D and investment generate testable parameter restrictions. The data indicate that R&D Granger-causes investment, but that investment does not Granger-cause R&D. We use this finding to examine the validity of those hypotheses, to characterize the movements over time of R&D and investment, and to measure the stock market valuation of these movements