Les opérations d’initiés en droit européen : état de la question et perspectives d’avenir

L’article trace d’abord les grands traits du régime européen actuel des opérations d’initiés. Dans ce cadre, les enseignements des arrêts « Spector » du 23 décembre 2009 et « Daimler » du 28 juin 2012 sont analysés. Ensuite, après un état des lieux de la réforme du régime européen de l’abus de marché, les dispositions sur les opérations d’initiés contenues dans la proposition de règlement et le régime des sanctions pénales instauré par la proposition de directive de la Commission européenne du 20 octobre 2011 sont exposés. Ce second chapitre est conclu par une première évaluation critique des projets de révision. Le troisième chapitre propose un rapide tour d’horizon du niveau de répression des opérations d’initiés dans quelques États membres. Et le dernier chapitre interroge, sous forme de conclusions, l’efficacité du régime, partant du présupposé que l’impact du nouveau régime sur les participants du marché sera réel. Sont ici développées certaines pistes de réflexion qui aboutissent à la suggestion de supprimer la proposition de directive instaurant des sanctions pénales pour ne retenir, comme mode de répression des opérations d’initiés, que le régime mis en place par la proposition de règlement

Client protection under Belgian financial law: recent developments in information duties, product intervention and beyond

L’autorité de surveillance des marchés financiers belge (la ‘FSMA’) a récemment multiplié les initiatives pour la protection des ‘consommateurs financiers’. Elle a contribué à l’élaboration des règles légales nouvelles en cette matière, et a également émis des règlements, avertissements, circulaires et autres communications dans ce cadre. Une question mérite cependant d’être posée: cet activisme va-t-il à l’encontre de la sécurité juridique, de la compétitivité du secteur financier belge, et, dans une certaine mesure, des ‘consommateurs financiers’ eux-mêmes ? Nous tenterons d’y répondre en examinant les évolutions les plus récentes dans ce domaine au niveau (1) des obligations d’information précontractuelle et publicitaire, ainsi que des règles de responsabilité, contrôle et sanctions qui y sont liées, (2) de la ‘gouvernance-produit’ et (3) des ‘pouvoirs d’intervention-produit’. Ces développements ont été introduits en droit belge par la réforme Twin Peaks II, le Livre VI du nouveau code de droit économique, l’arrêté royal transversal imposant un document d’information standardisé en cas de commercialisation aux investisseurs de détail, le règlement de la FSMA imposant un label de risque sur certains produits financiers et le règlement de la FSMA interdisant la commercialisation de produits financiers ‘non-conventionnels’ aux clients de détail. Nous conclurons par une prise de position critique sur les deux points d’attention majeurs du régulateur belge - les obligations d’information et ‘l’intervention-produit’. Nous expliquerons qu’à notre avis une meilleure approche réglementaire serait de se concentrer sur la réglementation des intermédiaires financiers et la gouvernance-produit. Nous ne pouvons soutenir les initiatives de la FSMA que si elles vont dans ce sens.The Belgian financial supervisory authority (the Financial Services and Markets Authority or ‘FSMA’) pro-activity in recent months is striking. It drafted many rules and issued many regulations, warnings, circulars or other communications to increase the protection of clients who buy financial products on Belgian financial markets. But does the FSMA go too far too fast to the detriment of legal certainty, the competitiveness of the Belgian financial sector and, to some extent, financial clients themselves? This article tries to answer that question by examining some of the most recent developments in client protection on Belgian financial markets with respect to (1) provisions relating to pre-contractual and marketing information obligations, and related liability, supervision and sanction regimes, (2) product governance arrangements and (3) ‘product intervention powers’. They were introduced in Belgian law by the ‘Twin Peaks II package’, Book VI of the new Code of economic law, the transversal marketing Royal decree, the FSMA label regulation, and the FSMA prohibition on the distribution of several non-mainstream financial products to retail clients. In the conclusions to this article, we give a critical assessment of the focus of the Belgian legislator on disclosure and product intervention. We explain that we favor point-of-sale regulation and product governance arrangements as regulatory approach to protect financial clients. Only to that extent do we support the FSMA pro-activity

PRODUCT INTERVENTION: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

This article wishes to contribute to the debate on how to best regulate the European retail financial market. This article is a reflection on the recent emphasis put by the European regulator on product intervention to address the various risks facing the retail investor

Client protection on European financial markets – from inform your client to know your product and beyond : an assessment of the PRIIPs Regulation, MiFID II/MiFIR and IMD 2

This article aims at assessing some of the most recent developments in European law which are said to improve clients’ protection buying on European financial markets. It focuses on (a) provisions relating to pre-contractual and marketing information obligations, and related liability, supervision and sanction regimes, (b) developments in product governance arrangements which are meant to reduce potential risks of failure to comply with investor protection rules and on (c) “product intervention powers” of supervisory authorities, considered as the last resort measure for investor protection purposes. This article concludes that European regulators move in the right direction where they focus on point-of-sale regulation and product governance arrangements. This article also stresses that appropriate rules should go hand in hand with a change of culture to bring back ethos at manufacturers’ and distributors’. Not only the letter of the rules, but more fundamentally, the spirit of the rules should be complied with at each level of the distribution chain. Only that combination will bring back investors’ confidence for the long-term

The case for a single-document-driven European issuer-disclosure regime

The disclosure regime to which corporate equity issuers listed on European regulated markets are subject under the relevant European financial regulation have similar objectives whether or not the issuer is offering securities at the time of disclosure. From this premise, this article argues that the content and format of disclosure should be the same on primary and secondary markets, at least with respect to large and thickly traded issuers whose securities are traded in an efficient market. More specifically, a move to an integrated disclosure regime and to a company registration system is advocated. This includes the suppression of the separate drafting, dissemination and storage of periodic reports which should be replaced by a periodic update of the initial disclosure document. The suggested scheme should lower the costs for issuers and supervisory authorities. It should also make comparisons by investors easier

The EU issuer-disclosure regime : analysis of its objectives and proposals for reform : comparative and interdisciplinary approach

Part I consists of the general introduction. It aims to set out the general context of the work. It also explains why it is a particularly appropriate timing for researches in disclosure matters in the European Union. It sets out the scope of inquiries, i.e., what I call the “EU issuer-disclosure regime” and the objectives the dissertation tries to meet. It then details the specific approach adopted, i.e., a comparative law and interdisciplinary perspective. It touches upon the impact of the financial crisis on the reasoning and the points of view adopted throughout the work. Part II discusses the objectives of issuer-disclosure and assesses whether issuer-disclosure can effectively achieve them. The two first chapters concern the objectives of the EU issuer-disclosure regime as set out by the European regulator, i.e., investor protection (Chapter Investor Protection) and market efficiency (Chapter Market Efficiency). The last chapter of Part II identifies another objective of issuer-disclosure not mentioned by the European Commission, i.e., corporate governance (Chapter Corporate Governance). Part II suggests a new taxonomy of objectives for the EU issuer-disclosure regime and suggests that investor protection is effectively achieved once the two immediate objectives of issuer-disclosure are met, i.e., market efficiency and corporate governance. It is argued that issuer-disclosure should not be considered as an effective means to protect unsophisticated retail investors, who nevertheless seem to be an important dimension of the European disclosure regime. Unsophisticated retail investors do not seem to have the necessary will and the required competence to read, and make use of, the information that is disclosed to them. By contrast, issuer-disclosure can serve to enhance market efficiency, which has to be understood as “relative market efficiency”, by impacting its two components, i.e., price accuracy and liquidity. Issuer-disclosure can also improve corporate governance in European firms by reducing their agency problems. In particular, it is argued that issuer-disclosure can enhance shareholder voting and shareholder monitoring in European companies. Chapter Corporate Governance incidentally discusses shareholders’ engagement and responsibilities in Europe. Part III explains, sometimes in much details, at other times by only sketching the general ideas, policy and regulatory implications derived from the new taxonomy of objectives suggested in Part II. The first chapter (Chapter Issuer-Disclosure Addressees and Consequences) flows from the contention that issuer-disclosure is meant for more sophisticated actors, referred to as “informed traders” and “information traders”, as they are the ones likely to impact the sole immediate objectives of issuer-disclosure, i.e., market efficiency and corporate governance. It starts with cost-efficient modifications in the EU issuer-disclosure regime. As participation of unsophisticated retail investors in equity markets is not to be banned, alternatives to issuer-disclosure as a means to protect unsophisticated retail investors are suggested, including an increased focus on their relationship with professional intermediaries. The second chapter (Chapter Issuer-Disclosure of Well-Established Companies in Efficient Markets) is based on the assertion that disclosure has equal social value on primary markets and on secondary markets as it impacts market efficiency and corporate governance on both markets, i.e., whether or not the issuer is offering equity at that time. This should impact the content, the level and the format of disclosure, as well as its quality and the civil liability regime related to breaches of disclosure requirements. European-level regulatory modifications in all those fields are therefore suggested. Part IV concludes by summing up the main ideas of the dissertation along different themes to offer another perspective.(DROI 3) -- UCL, 201