17 research outputs found
Les opĂ©rations dâinitiĂ©s en droit europĂ©en : Ă©tat de la question et perspectives dâavenir
Lâarticle trace dâabord les grands traits du rĂ©gime europĂ©en actuel des opĂ©rations dâinitiĂ©s. Dans ce cadre, les enseignements des arrĂȘts « Spector » du 23 dĂ©cembre 2009 et « Daimler » du 28 juin 2012 sont analysĂ©s. Ensuite, aprĂšs un Ă©tat des lieux de la rĂ©forme du rĂ©gime europĂ©en de lâabus de marchĂ©, les dispositions sur les opĂ©rations dâinitiĂ©s contenues dans la proposition de rĂšglement et le rĂ©gime des sanctions pĂ©nales instaurĂ© par la proposition de directive de la Commission europĂ©enne du 20 octobre 2011 sont exposĂ©s. Ce second chapitre est conclu par une premiĂšre Ă©valuation critique des projets de rĂ©vision. Le troisiĂšme chapitre propose un rapide tour dâhorizon du niveau de rĂ©pression des opĂ©rations dâinitiĂ©s dans quelques Ătats membres. Et le dernier chapitre interroge, sous forme de conclusions, lâefficacitĂ© du rĂ©gime, partant du prĂ©supposĂ© que lâimpact du nouveau rĂ©gime sur les participants du marchĂ© sera rĂ©el. Sont ici dĂ©veloppĂ©es certaines pistes de rĂ©flexion qui aboutissent Ă la suggestion de supprimer la proposition de directive instaurant des sanctions pĂ©nales pour ne retenir, comme mode de rĂ©pression des opĂ©rations dâinitiĂ©s, que le rĂ©gime mis en place par la proposition de rĂšglement
PRODUCT INTERVENTION: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
This article wishes to contribute to the debate on how to best regulate the European retail financial market. This article is a reflection on the recent emphasis put by the European regulator on product intervention to address the various risks facing the retail investor
Client protection under Belgian financial law: recent developments in information duties, product intervention and beyond
LâautoritĂ© de surveillance des marchĂ©s financiers belge (la âFSMAâ) a rĂ©cemment multipliĂ© les initiatives pour la protection des âconsommateurs financiersâ. Elle a contribuĂ© Ă lâĂ©laboration des rĂšgles lĂ©gales nouvelles en cette matiĂšre, et a Ă©galement Ă©mis des rĂšglements, avertissements, circulaires et autres communications dans ce cadre. Une question mĂ©rite cependant dâĂȘtre posĂ©e: cet activisme va-t-il Ă lâencontre de la sĂ©curitĂ© juridique, de la compĂ©titivitĂ© du secteur financier belge, et, dans une certaine mesure, des âconsommateurs financiersâ eux-mĂȘmes ? Nous tenterons dây rĂ©pondre en examinant les Ă©volutions les plus rĂ©centes dans ce domaine au niveau (1) des obligations dâinformation prĂ©contractuelle et publicitaire, ainsi que des rĂšgles de responsabilitĂ©, contrĂŽle et sanctions qui y sont liĂ©es, (2) de la âgouvernance-produitâ et (3) des âpouvoirs dâintervention-produitâ. Ces dĂ©veloppements ont Ă©tĂ© introduits en droit belge par la rĂ©forme Twin Peaks II, le Livre VI du nouveau code de droit Ă©conomique, lâarrĂȘtĂ© royal transversal imposant un document dâinformation standardisĂ© en cas de commercialisation aux investisseurs de dĂ©tail, le rĂšglement de la FSMA imposant un label de risque sur certains produits financiers et le rĂšglement de la FSMA interdisant la commercialisation de produits financiers ânon-conventionnelsâ aux clients de dĂ©tail. Nous conclurons par une prise de position critique sur les deux points dâattention majeurs du rĂ©gulateur belge - les obligations dâinformation et âlâintervention-produitâ. Nous expliquerons quâĂ notre avis une meilleure approche rĂ©glementaire serait de se concentrer sur la rĂ©glementation des intermĂ©diaires financiers et la gouvernance-produit. Nous ne pouvons soutenir les initiatives de la FSMA que si elles vont dans ce sens.The Belgian financial supervisory authority (the Financial Services and Markets Authority or âFSMAâ) pro-activity in recent months is striking. It drafted many rules and issued many regulations, warnings, circulars or other communications to increase the protection of clients who buy financial products on Belgian financial markets. But does the FSMA go too far too fast to the detriment of legal certainty, the competitiveness of the Belgian financial sector and, to some extent, financial clients themselves? This article tries to answer that question by examining some of the most recent developments in client protection on Belgian financial markets with respect to (1) provisions relating to pre-contractual and marketing information obligations, and related liability, supervision and sanction regimes, (2) product governance arrangements and (3) âproduct intervention powersâ. They were introduced in Belgian law by the âTwin Peaks II packageâ, Book VI of the new Code of economic law, the transversal marketing Royal decree, the FSMA label regulation, and the FSMA prohibition on the distribution of several non-mainstream financial products to retail clients. In the conclusions to this article, we give a critical assessment of the focus of the Belgian legislator on disclosure and product intervention. We explain that we favor point-of-sale regulation and product governance arrangements as regulatory approach to protect financial clients. Only to that extent do we support the FSMA pro-activity
Client protection on European financial markets â from inform your client to know your product and beyond : an assessment of the PRIIPs Regulation, MiFID II/MiFIR and IMD 2
This article aims at assessing some of the most recent developments in European law which are said to improve clientsâ protection buying on European financial markets. It focuses on (a) provisions relating to pre-contractual and marketing information obligations, and related liability, supervision and sanction regimes, (b) developments in product governance arrangements which are meant to reduce potential risks of failure to comply with investor protection rules and on (c) âproduct intervention powersâ of supervisory authorities, considered as the last resort measure for investor protection purposes. This article concludes that European regulators move in the right direction where they focus on point-of-sale regulation and product governance arrangements. This article also stresses that appropriate rules should go hand in hand with a change of culture to bring back ethos at manufacturersâ and distributorsâ. Not only the letter of the rules, but more fundamentally, the spirit of the rules should be complied with at each level of the distribution chain. Only that combination will bring back investorsâ confidence for the long-term
The case for a single-document-driven European issuer-disclosure regime
The disclosure regime to which corporate equity
issuers listed on European regulated markets are subject under
the relevant European financial regulation have similar objectives
whether or not the issuer is offering securities at the time of
disclosure. From this premise, this article argues that the
content and format of disclosure should be the same on primary
and secondary markets, at least with respect to large and
thickly traded issuers whose securities are traded in an efficient
market. More specifically, a move to an integrated disclosure
regime and to a company registration system is advocated. This
includes the suppression of the separate drafting, dissemination
and storage of periodic reports which should be replaced by a
periodic update of the initial disclosure document. The suggested
scheme should lower the costs for issuers and supervisory
authorities. It should also make comparisons by investors
easier
The EU issuer-disclosure regime : analysis of its objectives and proposals for reform : comparative and interdisciplinary approach
Part I consists of the general introduction. It aims to set out the general context of the work. It also explains why it is a particularly appropriate timing for researches in disclosure matters in the European Union. It sets out the scope of inquiries, i.e., what I call the âEU issuer-disclosure regimeâ and the objectives the dissertation tries to meet. It then details the specific approach adopted, i.e., a comparative law and interdisciplinary perspective. It touches upon the impact of the financial crisis on the reasoning and the points of view adopted throughout the work.
Part II discusses the objectives of issuer-disclosure and assesses whether issuer-disclosure can effectively achieve them. The two first chapters concern the objectives of the EU issuer-disclosure regime as set out by the European regulator, i.e., investor protection (Chapter Investor Protection) and market efficiency (Chapter Market Efficiency). The last chapter of Part II identifies another objective of issuer-disclosure not mentioned by the European Commission, i.e., corporate governance (Chapter Corporate Governance).
Part II suggests a new taxonomy of objectives for the EU issuer-disclosure regime and suggests that investor protection is effectively achieved once the two immediate objectives of issuer-disclosure are met, i.e., market efficiency and corporate governance. It is argued that issuer-disclosure should not be considered as an effective means to protect unsophisticated retail investors, who nevertheless seem to be an important dimension of the European disclosure regime. Unsophisticated retail investors do not seem to have the necessary will and the required competence to read, and make use of, the information that is disclosed to them. By contrast, issuer-disclosure can serve to enhance market efficiency, which has to be understood as ârelative market efficiencyâ, by impacting its two components, i.e., price accuracy and liquidity. Issuer-disclosure can also improve corporate governance in European firms by reducing their agency problems. In particular, it is argued that issuer-disclosure can enhance shareholder voting and shareholder monitoring in European companies. Chapter Corporate Governance incidentally discusses shareholdersâ engagement and responsibilities in Europe.
Part III explains, sometimes in much details, at other times by only sketching the general ideas, policy and regulatory implications derived from the new taxonomy of objectives suggested in Part II. The first chapter (Chapter Issuer-Disclosure Addressees and Consequences) flows from the contention that issuer-disclosure is meant for more sophisticated actors, referred to as âinformed tradersâ and âinformation tradersâ, as they are the ones likely to impact the sole immediate objectives of issuer-disclosure, i.e., market efficiency and corporate governance. It starts with cost-efficient modifications in the EU issuer-disclosure regime. As participation of unsophisticated retail investors in equity markets is not to be banned, alternatives to issuer-disclosure as a means to protect unsophisticated retail investors are suggested, including an increased focus on their relationship with professional intermediaries. The second chapter (Chapter Issuer-Disclosure of Well-Established Companies in Efficient Markets) is based on the assertion that disclosure has equal social value on primary markets and on secondary markets as it impacts market efficiency and corporate governance on both markets, i.e., whether or not the issuer is offering equity at that time. This should impact the content, the level and the format of disclosure, as well as its quality and the civil liability regime related to breaches of disclosure requirements. European-level regulatory modifications in all those fields are therefore suggested.
Part IV concludes by summing up the main ideas of the dissertation along different themes to offer another perspective.(DROI 3) -- UCL, 201