A cohort analysis of the income distribution in Chile

In this paper we look at the income distribution by cohort in Chile. We construct a synthetic panel from cross section surveys and estimate the income distribution for cohorts born between 1902 and 1978. We then decompose the evolution of these distributions into age, year and cohort effects. The cohort effects show a period where inequality increases, to then decrease. We attempt to explain this evolution. The rise can be explained by variables associated with education, while the fall appears to be the consequence of a flattening of the income-age profile and hence a reduction in the returns to experience.Synthetic cohorts, Income distribution, Rates of return, Education.

Chile: Effects of Old Age on Health Services Utilization and Consequences on System Design

This paper analyzes the relationship between age and health services utilization in Chile, using the CASEN survey of 1994. Logistic analysis is performed to determine how age utilization profiles differ by income, location and system affiliation (private or public insurance). The results are used to discuss the consequences of population aging on the health system, detect problems and suggest possible solutions. In Chile, older persons have both a higher probability of being ill, and a higher probability of seeking care if they are ill. Expected utilization is more than three times higher for older persons than for persons 18-34 years old. Most old people currently are affiliates of the public health system. Hence the aging of the population could be expected to be mainly a problem for the public sector. However, this would be so only if the pricing system of both the private and public insurance systems is not reformed. Moreover, without such a change, a large injection of funds into the public sector could result in an unexpected shift of affiliates from the public and into the private sector, generating under capacity in the public sector and over capacity in the private sector.

The Political Economics of Import Substitution Industrialization

Chile has shown in Latin America that an open economy can detach itself from the vicissitudes of its neighbors. It also has shown that it delivers growth. However, other countries in Latin America have considered reinventing the ALALC strategy of the sixties, a strategy of opening to regional trade while closing itself to trade outside the region. Chile followed that strategy at some point. How did it get from there to here? How is the political economics of the reform from an ISI strategy to an open economy? Is there a role for IFIs in that process? This paper discusses Chilean economic policy choices in the period 1950-1973, the period of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy. The ISI model rested on two main pillars: a closed economy (high tariff barriers, quotas and exchange controls) and a strong role for the state (government expenditure as a large share of GDP, extensive regulations and an increasing presence of state-owned firms). Particular emphasis is put on trying to explain how the ISI strategy was sustained and what led to its demise. The framework of interpretation provided in the paper is also applied to Uruguay, in an attempt to gauge its capacity to interpret what happened in another Latin American country. Policy is endongenous, and hence reform is endogenous. Credibility can affect the chances of reform to succeed. According to the reasoning presented here, a key issue is to study the factors that affect the equilibrium rent extraction rate. There are many incentives to announce and then reverse a liberalization program. If investors believe in reform, and invest, then there is a short run boost to GDP, and then investors a repartially expropriated by the reversal (since without the liberalization their project was not profitable). Hence announcements are not credible unless signaling of commitment is present. This paper argues there is a role for IFIs in this process but that the loan size and the amount of conditionality are key in making the liberalization process credible. If the size is too small or there is not enough conditionality, then the rent seeking government will fool both the investors and the IFI by getting the investment, the loan, and not reforming. Investors know this moral hazard problem and hence invest less than expected initially, making the elasticity of supply to the RER lower, and making the optimal RER higher. The signaling of commitment is key to triggering investment. But if IFIs get into the problem and are unable to sustain conditionality or estimate the adequate size of the loan, then IFIs will lose credibility and this signaling device will be devoid of utility. IFIs can solve the time inconsistency problem faced by rent seeking governments that results in very low investment. However, if the donor agencies become unreliable in enforcing conditionality, they will result in countries free riding on the signal, the signal losing credibility, and IFIs will lose the ability to perform the role. This is a common property problem: each country individually would rather the IFI enforce the conditionality for all other countries and not for itself. If the negotiation process in the IFI permits this to occur sufficient times all are worse off since then a signaling device is lost.

Economic Analysis of Education Policies - Introduction

Vouchers, peer effect, treatment effects, program evaluation, education

Peer Effects and Relative Performance of Voucher Schools in Chile

The assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of vouchers has been hindered by the lack of sufficient empirical evidence. The Chilean education voucher system was established at a national scale and has data for more than 15 years. The empirical literature developed to evaluate the voucher system in Chile faced methodological and/or data limitations up until late 1999, since there was no individual data available, and papers used the school as a unit of study. Additionally, the studies lacked good information on the socioeconomic characteristics of the students. The most recent literature uses individual data and introduces the correction for selection bias, but do not take into account that some public schools receive additional resources from the government. In the first section of this paper we control for the amount of per capita funds received by the public schools from the government, and find that when public and private voucher schools receive similar per capita subsidies, the effect of treatment on the treated (where treatment is attendance to a private voucher school) is large in magnitude and statistically significant. Some fear that this result may be the consequence of sorting and peer effect, and not of the effectiveness of private voucher schools. To analyze the importance of peer effects on the previous results, in the second section we estimate new treatment parameters controlling for peer group characteristics. If the positive treatment effect estimated earlier were exclusively the result of the sorting process and peer effect, this new treatment parameter should be zero. This hypothesis is rejected. Even when we condition on peer group characteristics, we find a treatment parameter that is positive, large in magnitude and statistically significant, when public and private voucher schools receive similar per capita subsidies. Hence, papers that have asserted that positive treatment effects are due to the peer effect and/ or sorting are proved wrong

Private vs Public Voucher Schools in Chile: New Evidence on Efficiency and Peer Effects

We estimate the treatment effect associated with attending a private instead of a public voucher school in the Chilean voucher system. We find a large and significant positive treatment effect. We analyze the influence of peer effects on our result by estimating new treatment parameters that control for peer group characteristics. When we do so, we still find a positive treatment parameter that is large in magnitude and statistically significant. Hence we conclude that the positive treatment effects are not due to peer effects and sorting, but rather stem from the greater efficiency of private voucher schools.

The Performance of Private and Public Schools in the Chilean Voucher System

We estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) parameter and treatment on the treated (TT) for those students effectively choosing a private voucher school. With detailed individual data for both the school and the family of the student we are able to conEducation system, nonparametric methods, program evaluation and vouchers

Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance

In Chile, dependant workers are mandated to purchase health insurance and they can chose between one public provider and several private providers. Here, we analyze the relation between utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. Independent workers, however, are not mandated. In this case, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to purchase insurance. The results show adverse selection against insurance companies for independent workers and against FONASA for dependant workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization. Regarding medical visits, over consumption is quantitatively important and statistically significant in all cases (against insurance for independents; against public and private insurance in the case of dependant workers).Insurance, moral hazard, adverse selection, self selection, count data models

Avaliação da potenciometria e argentimetria para a detecção de íons cloretos provenientes da desalogenação de organoclorados

TCC (graduação) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Centro de Ciências Físicas e Matemáticas. Curso de Química.Os PCBs são uma classe de compostos químicos que possuem 209 congêneres. Estes compostos foram produzidos e comercializados por muito tempo, até a sua proibição por volta dos anos 80. Foram utilizados principalmente na indústria eletro-eletrônica em capacitores e transformadores elétricos. Os PCBs são compostos de difícil degradação, nocivos ao meio ambiente e são bioacumulados em organismos vivos. Devido a todos estes problemas, técnicas visando a degradação e determinação destes compostos fazem-se extremamente necessárias. O objetivo principal deste trabalho foi desenvolver uma metodologia que possa determinar estes compostos em relação a sua concentração de cloreto. Na primeira etapa deste trabalho os experimentos foram realizados com amostras de óleo mineral com 1,2,4 – triclorobenzeno para simular as amostras de PCB. Na segunda etapa do trabalho, os experimentos foram realizados com amostras reais de PCB. A determinação de cloreto proveniente da reação de descloração destas amostras (TCB e PCB) foi feita através de: Potenciometria utilizando eletrodo de íon seletivo que fornece a concentração de cloreto diretamente do potencial do eletrodo e, método argentimétrico (volumétrica de precipitação) cuja determinação de cloretos é feita através da titulação com solução padrão de nitrato de prata (AgNO3). A efetividade da descloração e confiabilidade dos métodos, foi confirmada pela análise de cloreto das amostras de TCB e PCB