Non-Compete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth

We find that the enforcement of non-compete clauses significantly impedes entrepreneurship and employment growth. Based on a panel of metropolitan areas in the United States from 1993 to 2002, our results indicate that, relative to states that enforce non-compete covenants, an increase in the local supply of venture capital in states that restrict the scope of these agreements has significantly stronger positive effects on (i) the number of patents, (ii) the number of firm starts, and (iii) employment. We address potential endogeneity issues in the supply of venture capital by using endowment returns as an instrumental variable. Our results point to a strong interaction between financial intermediation and the legal regime in promoting entrepreneurship and economic growth.

Monopsony and Automation

We examine the impact of labor market power on firms' adoption of automation technologies. We develop a model that incorporates labor market power into the task-based theory of automation. We show that, due to higher marginal cost of labor, monopsonistic firms have stronger incentives to automate than wage-taking firms, which could amplify or mitigate the negative employment effects of automation. Using data from US commuting zones, our results show that commuting zones that are more exposed to industrial robots exhibit considerably larger reductions in both employment and wages when their labor markets demonstrate higher levels of concentration

Replication data for: Venture capital, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth

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Venture capital as a catalyst to commercialization

We find that the public funding of academic research and venture capital have a complementary relationship in fostering innovation and the creation of new firms. Using panel data on metropolitan areas in the United States, from 1993 to 2002, our analyses reveal that the positive relationships between government research grants to universities and research institutes and the rates of patenting and firm formation in a region become more pronounced as the supply of venture capital in that region increases. Our results remain robust to estimation with an instrumental variable to address potential endogeneity in the provision of venture capital. Consistent with perspectives that emphasize the importance of an innovation ecosystem, our findings point to a strong interaction between private financial intermediation and public research funding in promoting entrepreneurship and innovation.R&D Research grants Science Innovation Patenting Entrepreneurship

Venture Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth

Using a panel of U.S. metropolitan areas, we find that increases in the supply of venture capital positively affect firm starts, employment, and aggregate income. Our results remain robust to a variety of specifications, including ones that address endogeneity. The estimated magnitudes imply that venture capital stimulates the creation of more firms than it funds, which appears consistent with two mechanisms: First, would-be entrepreneurs anticipating financing needs more likely start firms when the supply of capital expands. Second, funded companies may transfer know-how to their employees, thereby enabling spin-offs, and may encourage others to become entrepreneurs through demonstration effects. © 2011 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth

We find that the enforcement of noncompete clauses significantly impedes entrepreneurship and employment growth. Based on a panel of metropolitan areas in the United States from 1993 to 2002, our results indicate that, relative to states that enforce noncompete covenants, an increase in the local supply of venture capital in states that restrict the scope of these agreements has significantly stronger positive effects on (i) the number of patents, (ii) the number of firm starts, and (iii) employment. We address potential endogeneity in the supply of venture capital by using endowment returns as an instrumental variable. Our results point to a strong interaction between financial intermediation and the legal regime in promoting entrepreneurship and economic growth. This paper was accepted by Gérard P. Cachon, entrepreneurship and innovation.venture capital, financial intermediaries, legal institutions, entrepreneurship, employment, innovation, wages