Costly financial crises

This paper presents a model consistent with the business cycle view of the origins of banking panics. As in Allen and Gale [1], bank runs arise endogenously as a consequence of the standard deposit contract in a world with aggregate uncertainty about asset returns. The purpose of the paper is to show that Allen and Gale's result about the optimality of bank runs depends on individuals's preferences. In a more general framework, considered in the present work, a laisse-faire policy can never be optimal, and therefore, regulation is always needed in order to achieve the first best. This result supports the traditional view that bank runs are costly and should be prevented with regulation

Should bank runs be prevented?.

This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in which bank assets are risky, there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality. Others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high. In this environment, both information-induced and pure panic runs will occur. However, banks can prevent them by designing the deposit contract appropriately. It is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to prevent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior.Bank runs; Deposit contracts; Liquidation costs; Optimal risk sharing; Suspension of convertibility;

Banks increase welfare.

This paper examines the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by demand deposit contracts and equity contracts. It is shown that in a framework in which individuals have smooth preferences and there exists some type of aggregate uncertainty (interest rate risk), the allocations obtained with a financial intermediary allow in general for greater risk sharing than those achieved in an equity economy. However, the interest rate is essential in order to determine the superiority of demand deposit contracts over equity contracts. The results of the paper contradict the ones obtained by Jacklin [1987] and Hellwig [1994], where demand deposit and equity contracts are always equivalent risk sharing instruments.

Algunos temas relevantes en la teoría bancaria

El objeto de este trabajo es presentar una panorámica de algunos temas relevantes en el campo de la economía bancaria, que resultan ser de particular importancia, tanto por su relevancia empírica como por la contribución aportada al desarrollo teórico de esta materia. Se presentan también algunas de las cuestiones pendientes en esta literatura, que merecen especial atención, dados los retos regulatorios de los próximos años

Banks increase welfare

This paper examines the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by demand deposit contracts and equity contracts. It is shown that in a framework in which individuals have smooth preferences and there exists some type of aggregate uncertainty (interest rate risk), the allocations obtained with a financial intermediary allow in general for greater risk sharing than those achieved in an equity economy. However, the interest rate is essential in order to determine the superiority of demand deposit contracts over equity contracts. The results of the paper contradict the ones obtained by Jacklin [1987] and Hellwig [1994], where demand deposit and equity contracts are always equivalent risk sharing instruments.Publicad

Bank runs, suspension of convertibility versus deposit insurance

This paper models information-induced and "pure-panic" runs in the banking system, in an environment of risk-averse agents. In this framework, deposits are needed to provide insurance against investors' unexpected demand for liquidity and therefore, a role for a financial intermediary is justified. Conditions to assure bank-runs as an equilibrium phenomenon are derived, and a welfare analysis of two devices that have traditionally been used by banks in order to prevent runs (namely, suspension of convertibility versus deposit insurance), is presented. The analysis shown in this paper finds support for the "narrow banking" proposal that has been currently discussed in the literature

The role of demand deposits in risk sharing

Based on the work of Hellwig [12], this paper compares the implementation of the second best allocation (non traded solution) by a fmancial intermediary to the one achieved in a walrasian market in which individuals hold the assets directly (traded solution). In this framework, in which individuals have smooth preferences, the traded and non traded solutions are no longer welfare equivalent; in fact, the non traded solution allows for greater risk sharing than the traded one. This result, and contrary to Hellwig's work, shows that fmancial intermediaries do provide for a positive role in the economy

Should bank runs be prevented?

This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in which bank assets are risky, there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality. Others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high. In this environment, both information-induced and pure panic runs will occur. However, banks can prevent them by designing the deposit contract appropriately. It is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to prevent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior.Publicad

Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?.

We survey the theories on why banks promise to pay par on demand and examine evidence on the conditions under which banks have promised to pay the par value of deposits and banknotes on demand when holding only fractional reserves. The theoretical literature is divided into four strands: liquidity provision; asymmetric information; legal restrictions; and a medium of exchange. We assume that it is not zero cost to make a promise to redeem a liability at par value on demand. If so, then the conditions in the theories that result in par redemption are possible explanations why banks promise to pay par on demand. If the explanation based on customers’ demand for liquidity is correct, payment of deposits at par will be promised when banks hold assets that are illiquid in the short run. If the asymmetric-information explanation based on the difficulty of valuing assets is correct, the marketability of banks’ assets determines whether banks promise to pay par. If the legal restrictions explanation of par redemption is correct, banks will not promise to pay par if they are not required to do so. If the transaction explanation is correct, banks will promise to pay par if the deposits are used in transactions. We examine the history of banking in several countries in different eras: fourth century Athens, medieval Italy, Tokugawa Japan, and free banking and money market mutual funds in the United States. Each of the theories explains some of the observed banking arrangements and none explains all of them.Banking panics; Suspension of payments; Banking history; Money market funds;

Was the Argentine corralito an efficient measure?: a note

Theoretical banking literature has largely explored the role of financial intermediaries in the economy, market failures (banking panics) in the banking sector and the need for bank regulation. However, most models of banking panics and regulation have not been empirically tested. The Argentine 2001 crisis, with a large deposit withdrawal and the regulation introduced (suspension of convertibility) constitutes a scenario in order to apply some of the theoretical predictions. In particular, the paper applies Samartín (2002) to the particular case of Argentina. After the estimation of the most important parameters, the model predicts that suspension of convertibility seems to have been the most efficient intervention measure to stop the massive deposit withdrawals