Near-seismic effects in ULF fields and seismo-acoustic emission: statistics and explanation

International audiencePreseismic intensification of fracturing has been investigated from occurrence analysis of seismo-acoustic pulses (SA foreshocks) and ULF magnetic pulses (ULF foreshocks) observed in Karimshino station in addition to seismic foreshocks. Such analysis is produced for about 40 rather strong and nearby isolated earthquakes during 2 years of recording. It is found that occurrence rate of SA foreshocks increases in the interval (-12, 0 h) before main shock with 3-times exceeding of background level in the interval (-6, -3 h), and occurrence probability of SA foreshocks (pA~75%) is higher than probability of seismic foreshocks (ps~30%) in the same time interval.ULF foreshocks are masked by regular ULF activity at local morning and daytime, nevertheless we have discovered an essential ULF intensity increase in the interval (-3, +1 h) at the frequency range 0.05-0.3 Hz. Estimated occurrence probability of ULF foreshocks is about 40%. After theoretical consideration we conclude: 1) Taking into account the number rate of SA foreshocks, their amplitude and frequency range, they emit due to opening of fractures with size of L=70-200 m (M=1-2); 2) The electro-kinetic effect is the most promising mechanism of ULF foreshocks, but it is efficient only if two special conditions are fulfilled: a) origin of fractures near fluid-saturated places or liquid reservoirs (aquifers); b) appearance of open porosity or initiation of percolation instability; 3) Both SA and ULF magnetic field pulses are related to near-distant fractures (r<20-30 km); 4) Taking into account number rate and activation period of seismic, SA and ULF foreshocks, it is rather probable that opening of fractures and rupture of fluid reservoirs occur in the large preparation area with horizontal size about 100-200km

Patterns of calcium oxalate monohydrate crystallization in complex biological systems

The paper presents the features of calcium oxalate crystallization in the presence of additives revealed through experimental modeling. The patterns of phase formation are shown for the Ca{2+} – C[2]O[4]{ 2–} – H[2]O and Ca{2+} – C[2]O[4]{2–} – PO[4]{3–} – H[2]O systems with the components and pH of the saline varying over a wide concentrations range. The effect of additives on crystallization of calcium oxalate monohydrate was investigated. It was found that the ionic strength and magnesium ions are inhibitors, and calcium oxalate and hydroxyapatite crystals are catalysts of calcium oxalate monohydrate crystallization. The basic calcium phosphate (apatite) was found to be most thermodynamically stable, which indicates its special role in kidney stone formation since it is found in virtually all stones

Breaking The FF3 Format-Preserving Encryption Standard Over Small Domains

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently published a Format-Preserving Encryption standard accepting two Feistel structure based schemes called FF1 and FF3. Particularly, FF3 is a tweakable block cipher based on an 8-round Feistel network. In CCS~2016, Bellare et. al. gave an attack to break FF3 (and FF1) with time and data complexity $O(N^5\log(N))$, which is much larger than the code book (but using many tweaks), where $N^2$ is domain size to the Feistel network. In this work, we give a new practical total break attack to the FF3 scheme (also known as BPS scheme). Our FF3 attack requires $O(N^{\frac{11}{6}})$ chosen plaintexts with time complexity $O(N^{5})$. Our attack was successfully tested with $N\leq2^9$. It is a slide attack (using two tweaks) that exploits the bad domain separation of the FF3 design. Due to this weakness, we reduced the FF3 attack to an attack on 4-round Feistel network. Biryukov et. al. already gave a 4-round Feistel structure attack in SAC~2015. However, it works with chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts whereas we need a known-plaintext attack. Therefore, we developed a new generic known-plaintext attack to 4-round Feistel network that reconstructs the entire tables for all round functions. It works with $N^{\frac{3}{2}} \left( \frac{N}{2} \right)^{\frac{1}{6}}$ known plaintexts and time complexity $O(N^{3})$. Our 4-round attack is simple to extend to five and more rounds with complexity $N^{(r-5)N+o(N)}$. It shows that FF1 with $N=7$ and FF3 with $7\leq N\leq10$ do not offer a 128-bit security. Finally, we provide an easy and intuitive fix to prevent the FF3 scheme from our $O(N^{5})$ attack