Modeling Electricity Markets as Two-Stage Capacity Constrained Price Competition Games under Uncertainty

The last decade has seen an increasing application of game theoretic tools in the analysis of electricity markets and the strategic behavior of market players. This paper focuses on the model examined by Fabra et al. (2008), where the market is described by a two-stage game with the firms choosing their capacity in the first stage and then competing in prices in the second stage. By allowing the firms to endogenously determine their capacity, through the capacity investment stage of the game, they can greatly affect competition in the subsequent pricing stage. Extending this model to the demand uncertainty case gives a very good candidate for modeling the strategic aspect of the investment decisions in an electricity market. After investigating the required assumptions for applying the model in electricity markets, we present some numerical examples of the model on the resulting equilibrium capacities, prices and profits of the firms. We then proceed with two results on the minimum value of price caps and the minimum required revenue from capacity mechanisms in order to induce adequate investments

Patterns of Plant Adjustment

This paper provides a description of the dynamic choices of manufacturing plants when they undertake rapid adjustment in output. The focus is on epsodes that involve lumpy adjustment in capital or employment. I examine the behavior of variables such as capital utilization, hours per worker, overtime use, capacity utilization, materials and energy use. Finally I describe the observed patterns of productivity during those adjustment episodes and propose some hypotheses that seem to fit them. The costs associated with output adjustment seem to arise form building and destroying a particular organizaqtion of the structure of production and associated worker experience. As such they are related to learning-by-doing and investment in specific training.capital investment, employment adjustment, capacity utilization, productivity, learning effects, specific training

The Greek Capacity Adequacy Mechanism: Design, Incentives, Strategic Behavior and Regulatory Remedies

This paper describes and analyzes the Greek Capacity Market or, as named, the “Capacity Adequacy Mechanism”. A detailed description of the recently established mechanism is given, whose design is a hybrid model combining elements from three different designs: the US Capacity Markets, the Capacity Payment Mechanisms and the Centralized Auctions for Capacity Contracts. Next, the goals of this design are explained. In the case of Greece the goals are not restricted just to the so-called “missing money” problem, therefore an analysis follows examining the incentives given to the market participants. The analysis shows the dependence of the mechanism on mainly two factors: the over/under-capacity of the market and the strategic behavior of the market participants, especially of the incumbent. In general, the Capacity Adequacy Mechanism is expected to operate quite satisfactory, giving the “right” incentives to the market participants. Some minor amendments to the rules are proposed, aiming to further increase its efficiency.Capacity Mechanisms, Electricity Markets, Mechanism Design, Strategic Behavior

SEE Regional Wholesale Market Design: Recommendations, Available Options and Implementation

In 2005 the countries of South East Europe (SEE) committed themselves to develop a regional energy market in SEE. The World Bank offered to provide technical assistance and recommendations for the most effective implementation of the electricity wholesale market opening. This paper presents and discusses the main proposals of the Study for the SEE Regional Market Design. It then proceeds to the provision of recommendations on how the Study’s proposals can be enhanced and fit better to the current status of the SEE markets.South East Europe, Regional Electricity Market, Market Design.

Automatic fluid dispenser

Fluid automatically flows to individual dispensing units at predetermined times from a fluid supply and is available only for a predetermined interval of time after which an automatic control causes the fluid to drain from the individual dispensing units. Fluid deprivation continues until the beginning of a new cycle when the fluid is once again automatically made available at the individual dispensing units

Modeling Electricity Markets as Two-Stage Capacity Constrained Price Competition Games under Uncertainty

The last decade has seen an increasing application of game theoretic tools in the analysis of electricity markets and the strategic behavior of market players. This paper focuses on the model examined by Fabra et al. (2008), where the market is described by a two-stage game with the firms choosing their capacity in the first stage and then competing in prices in the second stage. By allowing the firms to endogenously determine their capacity, through the capacity investment stage of the game, they can greatly affect competition in the subsequent pricing stage. Extending this model to the demand uncertainty case gives a very good candidate for modeling the strategic aspect of the investment decisions in an electricity market. After investigating the required assumptions for applying the model in electricity markets, we present some numerical examples of the model on the resulting equilibrium capacities, prices and profits of the firms. We then proceed with two results on the minimum value of price caps and the minimum required revenue from capacity mechanisms in order to induce adequate investments.Capacity Constraints; Electricity Markets; Regulatory Policy; Strategic Behaviour;

Curvature stabilized skyrmions with angular momentum

We examine skyrmionic field configurations on a spherical ferromagnet with large normal anisotropy. Exploiting variational concepts of angular momentum we find a new family of localized solutions to the Landau-Lifshitz equation that are topologically distinct from the ground state and not equivariant. Significantly, we observe an emergent spin-orbit coupling on the level of magnetization dynamics in a simple system without individual rotational invariance in spin and coordinate space