The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Research

The New Basel Accord for bank capital regulation is designed to better align regulatory capital to the underlying risks by encouraging better and more systematic risk management practices, especially in the area of credit risk. We provide an overview of the objectives, analytical foundations and main features of the Accord and then open the door to some research questions provoked by the Accord. We see these questions falling into three groups: what is the impact of the proposal on the global banking system through possible changes in bank behavior; a set of issues around risk analytics such as model validation, correlations and portfolio aggregation, operational risk metrics and relevant summary statistics of a bank’s risk profile; issues brought about by Pillar 2 (supervisory review) and Pillar 3 (public disclosure).Bank capital regulation, risk management, credit risk, operational risk

Are banks still important for financing large businesses?

As more corporations turn to the securities markets to meet their funding needs, the role of banks as providers of credit to large businesses seems increasingly uncertain. But a look at developments during the financial market turmoil last fall suggests that banks are still a critical source of liquidity at times of economic stress.Bank loans ; Commercial loans ; Financial crises

Diversification, Organization, and Efficiency: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies

We use a portfolio-simulation technique to estimate the value added from diversification by bank holding companies. Using a sample of 412 multi-bank bank holding companies (MBHCs) from 1990 to 1994, we construct pro forma benchmark portfolios for each MBHC composed of shares of single banks, weighted to correspond to the MBHC's distribution of activities. We then compare the performance and characteristics of the MBHCs to that of their pro forma benchmarks. Diversification through the holding company structure does appear to bring certain benefits: the MBHCs hold less capital and engage in more lending, on average, then their pro forma benchmarks. However, these desirable characteristics do not translate into higher profits, implying some organizational inefficiencies inherent in the holding company structure. This suggests that banks should be allowed to realize the benefits of diversification without limiting them to a particular organizational form.

How effective is lifeline banking in assisting the 'unbanked'?

Many consumers who lack checking accounts are paying relatively high costs to access the nation's payments system. Legislation aimed at opening the system to these unbanked individuals has centered on requiring commercial banks to offer low-cost "lifeline" accounts. But will cost savings alone motivate these consumers to access the payments system through banks?Checking accounts ; Banks and banking - Service charges ; Poverty

Regulatory incentives and consolidation: the case of commercial bank mergers and the Community Reinvestment Act

Bank regulators are required to consider a bank’s record of providing credit to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and individuals in approving bank applications for mergers and acquisitions. We test the hypothesis that banks strategically prepare for the regulatory and public scrutiny associated with a merger or acquisition by increasing their lending to low-and moderate-income individuals in anticipation of acquiring another institution. We find evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In particular, we show that the higher the percentage of the institution’s mortgage originations in a given year that are directed to low- and moderate-income individuals or neighborhoods, the greater the probability that the institution will acquire another bank in the following year. Further investigation bolsters the view that this correlation is due to banks’ anticipation of the public and regulatory scrutiny during the merger review process. The effect cannot be explained by other bank characteristics. The relationship is observed for acquiring banks, which are the focus of public and regulatory scrutiny, but not for the banks that are being acquired. In addition, the positive effect of lending to low- and moderate-income individuals and neighborhoods on the likelihood that a bank will acquire another bank increases over the 1991 - 1995 time frame, a period when public and regulatory scrutiny of an institution’s community lending record increased. The effect of lending to low- and moderate-income individuals and neighborhoods is also largest for big banks, who face particularly intense public and regulatory scrutinyBank mergers ; Bank supervision ; Community Reinvestment Act of 1977

Banks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of franchise value

As protectors of the safety and soundness of the banking system, banking supervisors are responsible for keeping banks' risk taking in check. The authors explain that franchise value--the present value of the stream of profits that a firm is expected to earn as a going concern--makes the supervisor's job easier by reducing banks' incentives to take risks. The authors explore the relationship between franchise value and risk taking from 1986 to 1994 using both balance-sheet data and stock returns. They find that banks with high franchise value operate more safely than those with low franchise value. In particular, high-franchise-value banks hold more capital and take on less portfolio risk, primarily by diversifying their lending activities.Bank holding companies ; Bank management ; Retail trade

Using credit risk models for regulatory capital: issues and options

The authors describe the issues and options that would be associated with the development of regulatory minimum capital standards for credit risk based on banks' internal risk measurement models. Their goal is to provide a sense of the features that an internal-models (IM) approach to regulatory capital would likely incorporate, and to stimulate discussion among financial institutions, supervisors, and other interested parties about the many practical and conceptual issues involved in structuring a workable IM regulatory capital regime for credit risk. The authors focus on three main areas: prudential standards defining the risk estimate to be used in the capital requirements, model standards describing the essential components of a comprehensive credit risk model, and validation techniques that could be used by supervisors and banks to assess model accuracy. The discussion highlights a range of alternatives for each of these areas.Bank capital ; Bank loans ; Risk ; Bank supervision

Organizational Structure and the Diversification Discount: Evidence from Commercial Banking

"Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming."Includes bibliographical references."This version: August 6, 2008"This paper provides evidence on organizational structure, geographic diversification, and performance at bank holding companies (BHCs). First, we show that a BHC's member banks benefit from access to the parent organization's internal capital market. Second, we ask if the benefits of internal capital markets are best realized within loosely structured, decentralized organizations or more consolidated, centralized firms. We find that BHCs with many subsidiaries are less profitable and have lower q ratios than similar BHCs with fewer subsidiaries. However, because we study multi-unit firms in a single industry, our results suggest that the valuation discount reported in the diversification literature in empirical corporate finance reflects not only industry diversification, but also organizational structure