170 research outputs found
Equity versus Warm Glow in Intergenerational Giving
In different treatments of an intergenerational common resource experiment, monetary payoff maximization by each generation causes either negative or positive externalities for future generations.Two behavioral types have been observed previously in single generation games: equity motivated individuals enjoy giving to the needy and taking from (not giving to) the prosperous, while warm glow altruists enjoy giving unconditionally.In the examined intergenerational game, observed behavior is not consistent with the equity motive.Roughly half of the subjects maximize own monetary payoffs, while the others exhibit altruistic behavior consistent with a model of warm glow giving with constant altruistic sacrifices across treatments.equity capital;altruism;sustainable development;natural resources
Overconfidence and Delegated Portfolio Management
Following extensive empirical evidence about market anomalies and overconfidence, the analysis of financial markets with agents overconfident about the precision of their private information has received a lot of attention.However, all these models consider agents trading for their own account.In this article, we analyse a standard delegated portfolio management problem between a financial institution and a money manager who may be of two types: rational or overconfident.We consider several situations.In each case, we derive the optimal contract and results on the performance of financial institution hiring overconfident managers relative to institutions hiring rational agents, and results on the price impact of overconfidence.portfolio management;financial markets;financial instutions
Inequality, trust and growth: An experimental study
In a three player dynamic public goods experiment, social output today determines production possibilities tomorrow.In each period, players choose to sabotage, to co-operate, or to play best response.Sabotage harms social output and growth.Mutual co-operation maximises both.The property rights to social output are distributed unequally.Extent and skew of inequality are varied. Empirical studies indicate a negative impact of inequality on trust and growth. We observe equilibrium play in most cases.There is also substantial co-operation, but little sabotage.Our exogenous variations of inequality are neutral to growth, neither negatively correlated to co-operation, nor positively correlated to sabotage.public goods;game theory
Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions
We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders.To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment.In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller s revenues and deviations from equilibrium).However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.auctions;bidding;strategy;behavioural science;general equilibrium;risk
On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices
In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium.We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium.Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial.game theory;trust
An Experimental Analysis of Optimal Renewable Resource Management: The Fishery
fishing industry;resource management;decision making;uncertainty;experimental economics
Self-Serving Dictators and Economic Growth
A new line of theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes the pivotal role of fair institutions for growth.We present a model, a laboratory experiment, and a simple cross-country regression supporting this view.We model an economy with an unequal distribution of property rights, in which individuals can free-ride or cooperate.Experimentally we observe a dramatic drop in cooperation (and growth), when inequality is increased by a selfserving dictator.No such effect is observed when the inequality is increased by a fair procedure.Our regression analysis provides basic macroeconomic support for the adverse growth effect of the interaction between the degree and the genesis of inequality.We conclude that economies giving equal opportunities to all are not likely to suffer retarded growth due to inequality in the way economies with self-serving dictators will.economic growth;inequality;corruption;public goods
Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior
We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame.In one treatment, responders' reactions are hidden to proposers.We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders' intrinsic resistance to unfairness.In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing for dynamic effects over eight rounds of play.The higher rejection rates can be attributed to responders' provision of a public good: Punishment creates a group reputation for being "tough" and effectively "educate" proposers.Since rejection rates with informed proposers drop to the level of the treatment with non-informed proposers, the hypothesis of responders' enjoyment of overt punishment is not supported.game theory;public goods;bargaining;punishment;experimental economics
An Intergenerational Common Pool Resource Experiment
intergenerational common pool resources;growth and altruism;free-riding intentions
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