Measuring the business value of IT: simplify with caution

Firms should not use single performance or IT metrics, excluding the context, write Rajiv Sabherwal and Anand Jeyara

Concentrated shareholdings and the number of outside analysts

Assuming some fixed cost to information acquisition, diffuse shareholders in publicly held firms have little incentive to produce information that can substitute for the services of financial analysts. However, we argue that concentrated shareholdings, either by outsiders like institutions or by inside managers, reduce the demand for analyst services. The former group finds it worthwhile to produce its own information and avoid any moral hazard problems associated with analyst forecasts, while the concentration of shareholdings by insiders reduces the moral hazard problem associated with outside claimants (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and may work as an independent signal of quality (Leland and Pyle 1977). Earlier authors have provided evidence that the number of analysts following a firm is associated with the distribution of shareholdings between institutions, insiders, and other shareholders. In this paper we provide evidence that, after controlling for any average distributional effects, increased concentration of shareholdings by either insiders or outsiders (like institutions) is associated with lower analyst following. The results are robust to alternative measures of concentration and the definition of outside shareholders.Business enterprises ; Investments ; Stockholders

Concentrated shareholdings and the number of outside analysts

Assuming some fixed cost to information acquisition, diffuse shareholders in publicly held firms have little incentive to produce information that can substitute for the services of financial analysts. However, we argue that concentrated shareholdings, either by outsiders like institutions or by inside managers, reduce the demand for analyst services. The former group finds it worthwhile to produce its own information and avoid any moral hazard problems associated with analyst forecasts, while the concentration of shareholdings by insiders reduces the moral hazard problem associated with outside claimants (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and may work as an independent signal of quality (Leland and Pyle 1977). Earlier authors have provided evidence that the number of analysts following a firm is associated with the distribution of shareholdings between institutions, insiders, and other shareholders. In this paper we provide evidence that, after controlling for any average distributional effects, increased concentration of shareholdings by either insiders or outsiders (like institutions) is associated with lower analyst following. The results are robust to alternative measures of concentration and the definition of outside shareholders

Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: by Andrew Futter

Publisher: Georgetown University Press Location: Washington, DC ISBN 978-162616565

Is an Investing Institution One Shareholder or a Collection of Separate Funds?

There is much discussion about the merits of co-ordinated action between investing institutions. But many institutional holdings consist of subholdings managed by separate fund managers. We examine the extent to which the fund managers within a given institution behave in a co-ordinated manner, in terms of their trading around the announcement of major takeovers. We find evidence of material disagreement within institutions, suggesting that blocks, at the level of the institution, do not always exist

A PROCESS MODEL FOR THE CONTROL OF INFORMATION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

A process model to portray the dynamics of Information Systems Development (ISD) is presented. The model, while primarily rooted in earlier process models, also incorporates two key contextual factors -- the perceived threat to users and the relative power of the users and the systems group -- from past factor studies. The model is then used to generate four scenarios across the ISD process. These are co-operative, user-dominated, MIS-dominate£4 and con/lict. The scenarios are illustrated with summaries from recent case studies in ISD. This indicates the effectiveness of the model. The paper concludes with suggestions for using the model to identify the relevant scenario and thereby improve the management of the ISD process

Bits and Rituals: The Role of Information and Communication Technology in Preserving and Sharing Intangible Cultural Heritage

In a world where technology continually reshapes tradition, this study investigates its role in preserving intangible cultural heritage. Drawing on structuralism, semiotics, and actor-network theory, we propose four propositions through which ICT may serve as both a structural hub and a dynamic force in shaping new cultural symbols and networks. Focusing on Tibetan ICH, we plan a nine‐month research design using both focused and digital ethnography to explore how digital spaces may support the survival of traditional knowledge, languages, and arts. Subsequent fieldwork will validate findings and record time-dependent changes. While concentrating on ICT, we also acknowledge the emerging influence of AI technologies as a direction for future exploration. This project aims to deepen understanding of how digital tools interact with living cultural traditions and offers practical insights for communities seeking to preserve their heritage in the digital era