Exploring the Mental Lexicon of the Multilingual: Vocabulary Size, Cognate Recognition and Lexical Access in the L1, L2 and L3

Recent empirical findings in the field of Multilingualism have shown that the mental lexicon of a language learner does not consist of separate entities, but rather of an intertwined system where languages can interact with each other (e.g. Cenoz, 2013; Szubko-Sitarek, 2015). Accordingly, multilingual language learners have been considered differently to second language learners in a growing number of studies, however studies on the variation in learners’ vocabulary size both in the L2 and L3 and the effect of cognates on the target languages have been relatively scarce. This paper, therefore, investigates the impact of prior lexical knowledge on additional language learning in the case of Hungarian native speakers, who use Romanian (a Romance language) as a second language (L2) and learn English as an L3. The study employs an adapted version of the widely used Vocabulary Size Test (Nation & Beglar, 2007), the Romanian Vocabulary Size Test (based on the Romanian Frequency List; Szabo, 2015) and a Hungarian test (based on a Hungarian frequency list; Varadi, 2002) in order to measure vocabulary sizes, cognate knowledge and response times in these languages. The findings, complemented by a self-rating language background questionnaire, indicate a strong link between Romanian and English lexical proficiency

A geometric spectral sequence in Khovanov homology

The aim of this paper is to introduce and study a geometric spectral sequence in Khovanov homology. The construction was motivated by a similar spectral sequence from Khovanov homology to Heegaard Floer homology.Comment: 37 pages, 24 figures, minor revision

On the Role of External Constraints in a Spatially Extended Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game

We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T), and their total payoffs come from games with the nearest neighbors. During the random sequential updates the players adopt one of their neighboring strategies if the chosen neighbor has higher payoff. We compare the effect of two types of external constraints added to the Darwinian evolutionary processes. In both cases the strategy of a randomly chosen player is replaced with probability P by another strategy. In the first case, the strategy is replaced by a randomly chosen one among the two others, while in the second case the new strategy is always C. Using generalized mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations the strategy concentrations are evaluated in the stationary state for different strength of external constraints characterized by the probability P.Comment: 19 pages, 10 figure