Stoics against stoics in Cudworth's "A Treatise of Freewill"

In his 'A Treatise of Freewill', Ralph Cudworth argues against Stoic determinism by drawing on what he takes to be other concepts found in Stoicism, notably the claim that some things are ‘up to us’ and that these things are the product of our choice. These concepts are central to the late Stoic Epictetus and it appears at first glance as if Cudworth is opposing late Stoic voluntarism against early Stoic determinism. This paper argues that in fact, despite his claim to be drawing on Stoic doctrine, Cudworth uses these terms with a meaning first articulated only later, by the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias

Opening the doors of memory: Is declarative memory a natural kind?

Klein's target article argues that autonoetic consciousness is a necessary condition for memory; this unusually narrow view of the scope of memory implies that only episodic memory is, strictly speaking, memory. The narrow view is opposed to the standard broad view, on which causal connection with past experience is sufficient for memory; on the broad view, both declarative (i.e., episodic and semantic) and procedural memory count as genuine forms of memory. Klein mounts a convincing attack on the broad view, arguing that it opens the "doors of memory" too far, but this commentary contends that the narrow view does not open them far enough. It may be preferable to adopt an intermediate view of the scope of memory, on which causal connection is sufficient for memory only when it involves encoding, storage, and retrieval of content. More demanding than the simple causal condition but less demanding than the autonoesis condition, the encoding-storage-retrieval condition implies that both episodic and semantic memory count as genuine forms of memory but that procedural memory does not

Negative Capability and the Capacity to Think in the Present Moment: Some Implications for Leadership Practice

Two themes that are prevalent in the literature on leadership practice are planning for the future and learning from the past. In this ‘Leading Questions’ piece, we raise the question of whether, in addition, attention needs to be given to a third element that is not well represented in the literature: the leader's capacity to think in the present. We suggest that such thinking requires the capacity to see what is actually going on, in contrast with what was planned for, expected or intended – even when what is actually going on is uncertain or even unknown. In keeping with the theme of this special issue we demonstrate that attending to the present moment is a refrain both ancient and modern, to be found in eastern and western religion and philosophy while having a direct impact on practical modern disciplines, such as psychoanalysis. For example, Wilfred Bion's writings on psychoanalytic theory explore the nature of mental and emotional capacities demanded by this focus on the present moment and its relationship to the development of thought. Using an idea employed by Bion in this context, we suggest that an important dimension of leadership practice is negative capability, which comprises patience and the ability to tolerate frustration and anxiety. This capability can help the leader to retain the capacity to think in the present moment, even in the face of uncertainty. In this context, important dimensions of leadership practice include the ability to embody key thoughts on behalf of an organization and the capacity to contain the impact of the new thinking that can arise in the present moment. © 2011, Sage Publications. All rights reserved

The Paradox of Colour Constancy: Plotting the Lower Borders of Perception

This paper resolves a paradox concerning colour constancy. On the one hand, our intuitive, pre-theoretical concept holds that colour constancy involves invariance in the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in illumination. On the other, there is a robust scientific consensus that colour constancy can persist in cerebral achromatopsia, a profound impairment in the ability to perceive colours. The first stage of the solution advocates pluralism about our colour constancy capacities. The second details the close relationship between colour constancy and contrast. The third argues that achromatopsics retain a basic type of colour constancy associated with invariants in contrast processing. The fourth suggests that one person-level, conscious upshot of such processing is the visual awareness of chromatic contrasts ‘at’ the edges of surfaces, implicating the ‘colour for form’ perceptual function. This primitive type of constancy sheds new light on our most basic perceptual capacities, which mark the lower borders of representational mind