Effect of spin-orbit interaction on the critical temperature of an ideal Bose gas

We consider Bose-Einstein condensation of an ideal bose gas with an equal mixture of `Rashba' and `Dresselhaus' spin-orbit interactions and study its effect on the critical temperature. In uniform bose gas a `cusp' and a sharp drop in the critical temperature occurs due to the change in the density of states at a critical Raman coupling where the degeneracy of the ground states is lifted. Relative drop in the critical temperature depends on the diluteness of the gas as well as on the spin-orbit coupling strength. In the presence of a harmonic trap, the cusp in the critical temperature smoothened out and a minimum appears. Both the drop in the critical temperature and lifting of `quasi-degeneracy' of the ground states exhibit crossover phenomena which is controlled by the trap frequency. By considering a 'Dicke' like model we extend our calculation to bosons with large spin and observe a similar minimum in the critical temperature near the critical Raman frequency, which becomes deeper for larger spin. Finally in the limit of infinite spin, the critical temperature vanishes at the critical frequency, which is a manifestation of Dicke type quantum phase transition.Comment: 9 pages, 6 figure

Audit Games with Multiple Defender Resources

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, social networks, government agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential information. Recent work on audit games models the strategic interaction between an auditor with a single audit resource and auditees as a Stackelberg game, augmenting associated well-studied security games with a configurable punishment parameter. We significantly generalize this audit game model to account for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to practical auditing scenarios. We provide an FPTAS that computes an approximately optimal solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem. The main technical novelty is in the design and correctness proof of an optimization transformation that enables the construction of this FPTAS. In addition, we experimentally demonstrate that this transformation significantly speeds up computation of solutions for a class of audit games and security games

A learning and masking approach to secure learning

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been shown to be vulnerable against adversarial examples, which are data points cleverly constructed to fool the classifier. Such attacks can be devastating in practice, especially as DNNs are being applied to ever increasing critical tasks like image recognition in autonomous driving. In this paper, we introduce a new perspective on the problem. We do so by first defining robustness of a classifier to adversarial exploitation. Next, we show that the problem of adversarial example generation can be posed as learning problem. We also categorize attacks in literature into high and low perturbation attacks; well-known attacks like fast-gradient sign method (FGSM) and our attack produce higher perturbation adversarial examples while the more potent but computationally inefficient Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack is low perturbation. Next, we show that the dual approach of the attack learning problem can be used as a defensive technique that is effective against high perturbation attacks. Finally, we show that a classifier masking method achieved by adding noise to the a neural network's logit output protects against low distortion attacks such as the CW attack. We also show that both our learning and masking defense can work simultaneously to protect against multiple attacks. We demonstrate the efficacy of our techniques by experimenting with the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets

Security Games with Information Leakage: Modeling and Computation

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy -- an issue we refer to as information leakage -- is a significant concern in practical applications. While previous research on patrolling games has considered the attacker's real-time surveillance, our settings, therefore models and techniques, are fundamentally different. More specifically, after describing the information leakage model, we start with an LP formulation to compute the defender's optimal strategy in the presence of leakage. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that a key subproblem to solve this LP (more precisely, the defender oracle) is NP-hard even for the simplest of security game models. We then approach the problem from three possible directions: efficient algorithms for restricted cases, approximation algorithms, and heuristic algorithms for sampling that improves upon the status quo. Our experiments confirm the necessity of handling information leakage and the advantage of our algorithms

Learning adversary behavior in security games: A PAC model perspective

Recent applications of Stackelberg Security Games (SSG), from wildlife crime to urban crime, have employed machine learning tools to learn and predict adversary behavior using available data about defender-adversary interactions. Given these recent developments, this paper commits to an approach of directly learning the response function of the adversary. Using the PAC model, this paper lays a firm theoretical foundation for learning in SSGs (e.g., theoretically answer questions about the numbers of samples required to learn adversary behavior) and provides utility guarantees when the learned adversary model is used to plan the defender's strategy. The paper also aims to answer practical questions such as how much more data is needed to improve an adversary model's accuracy. Additionally, we explain a recently observed phenomenon that prediction accuracy of learned adversary behavior is not enough to discover the utility maximizing defender strategy. We provide four main contributions: (1) a PAC model of learning adversary response functions in SSGs; (2) PAC-model analysis of the learning of key, existing bounded rationality models in SSGs; (3) an entirely new approach to adversary modeling based on a non-parametric class of response functions with PAC-model analysis and (4) identification of conditions under which computing the best defender strategy against the learned adversary behavior is indeed the optimal strategy. Finally, we conduct experiments with real-world data from a national park in Uganda, showing the benefit of our new adversary modeling approach and verification of our PAC model predictions