Nuclear export controls and nuclear safeguards

Export control of dual use goods developed since the early 70’s to counter nuclear proliferation. The paper provides an overview of dual-use export control issues also in relation with the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which requires States to provide declarations of the export of the controlled items listed in its Annex II, derived from the Nuclear Suppliers Group Trigger list. Recommendations for improvement are proposed. On the EU level, the paper summarises the framework set by the European Council Regulation 428/2009, requiring Member States to impose control on exports, brokering and transit of dual use goods. The Regulation includes the so-called “EU dual-use control list” integrating the lists of dual-use items defined by the international regimes and requires also the control on intangible technology transfers as foreseen by UN Security Council Resolution 1540. ESARDA has recently launched a new sub-Working Group on export control, which raised large interest and may evolve to a full-fledged WG. Export control may provide an opportunity of technical collaboration between ESARDA and INMM.JRC.E.8-Nuclear securit

Innovation in Safeguards R&D and EU Contributions to Strengthening the Global Safeguards System

To address the safeguards challenges in a changing and transnational world, there is a need to combine the "classical" safeguards technologies, with new approaches and tools, which in some cases try to "think outside the box". Research and Development performed by the European Commission Joint Research Centre in this area, include advanced monitoring techniques, open source information and satellite imagery analysis, use of trade data and risk based assessment of sensitive technologies. A number of developments are done in close collaboration with its colleagues in other Directorate General of the European Commission (ENER, RELEX, DEVCO, TRADE etc), with the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), with IAEA, US-DOE, with facility operators and other international collaborations. This paper will illustrate a few of the latest developments with the example of "monitoring uranium enrichment facilities and related activities". A second part of the paper, describes the legal framework and instruments, at the disposal of the European Union, which support the developments to address the challenges and which seek to implement programmes to address global threats.JRC.E.9-Nuclear security (Ispra

ESARDA 39th Annual Meeting: 2017 Symposium

The 39th ESARDA symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation was held in Düsseldorf, Germany from 16-18 May, 2017. The Symposium has been preceded by meetings of the ESARDA Working Groups on 15 May 2017. The event has once again been an opportunity for research organisations, safeguards authorities and nuclear plant operators to exchange information on new aspects of international safeguards and non-proliferation, as well as recent developments in nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation related research activities and their implications for the safeguards community.JRC.G.II.7-Nuclear securit

ESARDA 37th Annual Meeting Proceedings

The 37th ESARDA symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation was held in Manchester, United Kingdom from 19-21 May, 2015. The Symposium has been preceded by meetings of the ESARDA Working Groups on 18 May 2015. The event has once again been an opportunity for research organisations, safeguards authorities and nuclear plant operators to exchange information on new aspects of international safeguards and non-proliferation, as well as recent developments in nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation related research activities and their implications for the safeguards community. The Proceedings contains the papers (118) submitted according to deadlines.JRC.E.8-Nuclear securit

Development of IAEA High Level Guidelines for Designers and Operators - Safeguards-By-Design

At the end of 2008, the IAEA launched a new task on ¿Guidance for Designers and Operators and Measures to facilitate the implementation of Safeguards at Future Nuclear Cycle Facilities¿, contributed by EURATOM and other MS Support Programmes, whose goal is to formulate ¿safeguards by design¿, or SBD, Guidelines to designers and operators. SBD is a process that facilitates the implementation of international safeguards by taking into account requirements and guidelines very early in the design phase. To this scope, the legal framework and the interaction among the stake-holders need to be improved. The overall process can thus be made more effective and efficient without costly back-fitting and iterations. In this context, at the end of 2008, the IAEA launched a new task on ¿Guidance for Designers and Operators and Measures to facilitate the implementation of Safeguards at Future Nuclear Cycle Facilities¿, with contributions by EURATOM and other Member State Support Programmes (MSSP). A first set of high level guidelines of the IAEA Safeguards by Design series was drafted by EURATOM experts, and will be the basis for further improvements. This paper will develop on the contents of the document, as well as on methodological developments. Facility specific guidelines will have to be prepared to serve as reference for the design of new evolutionary and innovative facilities. All this will be achieved within useful deadlines with the contributions of other support programmes.JRC.DG.E.9-Nuclear security (Ispra

Supporting the Additional Protocol declarations on nuclear research and technology by the JRC TIM DU platform

peer reviewedResearch subject to dual-use trade controls may play an important role in proliferation programmes because the exchanges among research entities are traditionally open and prone to be exploited by third countries’ illicit developments. For these reasons, apart from information “in the public domain” or “basic scientific research”, transfers of nuclear technology are subject to export authorisation requirements and government-to-government assurances like the export of tangible goods, as specified by the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s guidelines and national export control laws. Also the requirements of the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards include declarations about national research and development activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, but do not require declarations of technology transfers to third countries. The European Commission JRC, in collaboration with Liege University, has developed the Tools for Innovation Monitoring Dual-use (TIM DU) platform that can facilitate the identification of entities publishing research with a dual-use potential in the various countries. Together with many dual-use goods and emerging technologies, TIM DU maps nuclear-fuel cycle activities’ results included in scientific abstracts, patents, and EU-funded projects, allowing analysts to gather lists of documents, geographical distributions, collaborations, and authors related to these activities. These results can help the national authorities submitting declarations to IAEA in accordance with Additional Protocol’s Article 2.a, both to identify also previously unknown national research actors and their collaboration networks, as well as to raise the awareness of national research entities about potential sensitivities with external collaborators. The IAEA could also use TIM DU to support the verification of the completeness and correctness of the declarations concerning nuclear fuel cycle research

Project PISA: Phosphorus Influence on Steel Ageing

The integrity of the pressure vessel is vital to the safe operation of a nuclear reactor. It is therefore necessary to monitor or predict the changes in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) material during operation. Exposure to irradiation (or elevated temperatures) causes the segregation of phosphorus to internal grain boundaries in RPV steels. This, in turn, encourages brittle intergranular failure of the material. The PISA project had the objective of reducing the uncertainties associated with the impact of this failure mechanism on the properties of the RPV, both during service and at the end-of-life. This report presents the experimental results on the segregation of P and C during irradiation and thermal treatments, and the associated mechanical property changes, generated within PISA. The new data cover a range of bulk P levels, irradiation temperatures and fluences, steel types and product forms. In all cases only modest increases of P level on the grain boundary have been observed in commercial steels. Segregation is higher in pre-strained than in unstrained material. In addition a model for P segregation under irradiation has been developed, and shown to be capable of fitting the experimentally observed changes in P level after irradiation. Significant insight into the development of the microstructure under irradiation has thereby been obtained. Overall, the data and modelling together indicated that relatively small amounts of segregation are likely to occur under most reactor operational conditions in homogeneous commercial steels, and an (unexpectedly) small amount of additional embrittlement likely to derive from this process during reactor service.JRC.F.4-Nuclear design safet

Joint Research Centre Keeps it Safe.

Abstract not availableJRC.F-Institute for Energy (Petten

Nuclear export controls updates

Nuclear export controls are based on the guidelines issued by the Nuclear Suppliers Group international export control regime, whose membership includes 48 countries and the European Commission as observer. The NSG guidelines are published as IAEA INFCIRC/254, respectively Part 1 (Trigger List) and Part 2 (Dual-use list) and applied also by non-participating countries adhering to their principles. The NSG control lists are integrated in the dual-use control lists attached to the national laws and regulations of the participating countries, including the European Union. Moreover the NSG Trigger List is included into Additional Protocol Annex II, which establishes the link between nuclear safeguards and export controls. Both the Trigger list and the Dual-use list have been fundamentally reviewed during a three-year’s exercise which has involved experts from all the Participating Governments. The paper will review the main results of this process, outlining the main changes introduced and commenting on the impact that these changes may have to exporters and adhering countries.JRC.E.8-Nuclear securit

35th ESARDA Symposium proceedings, Bruges, 27-30 May 2013

The 35th ESARDA symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation was held in Bruges, Belgium from 28- 30 May, 2013. The Symposium has been preceded by meetings of the ESARDA Working Groups on 27 May 2013. The event has once again been an opportunity for research organisations, safeguards authorities and nuclear plant operators to exchange information on new aspects of international safeguards and non-proliferation, as well as recent developments in nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation related research activities and their implications for the safeguards community. The Proceedings contain the papers (112) submitted according to deadlines and are available only on-line.JRC.E.8-Nuclear securit