United or divided in diversity? The heterogeneous effects of ethnic diversity on European and national identities

In this article, we argue that the size and cultural proximity of immigrant populations in people's residential surroundings shape national and European identities. This means that the type of migrant population activates cultural threat perceptions and opportunities for contact to varying degrees. Geocoded survey data from the Netherlands suggests that large non-Western immigrant shares are associated with more exclusive national identities, while mixed contexts with Western and non-Western populations show more inclusive identities. These results suggest that highly diverse areas with mixed immigrant populations hold a potential for more tolerance. In contrast, exclusive national identities become strongly pronounced under the presence of sizeable culturally distant immigrant groups

How our neighbourhoods shape our European and national identities

How does the diversity of a neighbourhood affect the political identities of the people who live there? Drawing on new research, Dominik Schraff and Ronja Sczepanski show that those who live in neighbourhoods with a diverse mix of western and non-western immigrants are more likely to have strong European identities

Different yet the same? Differentiated integration and flexibility in implementation in the European Union

Differentiated integration (DI) and flexibility in implementation (FI) are two forms of differentiation that can be used to cope with heterogeneity among EU member states. Given the different ways in which they do so, this article asks whether DI and FI are alternatives for each other or whether they serve different functions in EU legislation. Based on a dataset that maps the occurrence of opt-outs and flexibility provisions in EU directives, the analysis shows that DI and FI tend to be used together. A qualitative analysis of directives that combine different levels of DI and FI shows that, within that overall pattern, DI is used to accommodate individual outliers, while FI is used to address widespread concerns among member states. This suggests that DI and FI are two forms of differentiation in the EU, which are used to address different aspects of a common underlying set of concerns

Different yet the same?: Differentiated integration and flexibility in implementation in the European Union

Differentiated integration (DI) and flexibility in implementation (FI) are two forms of differentiation that can be used to cope with heterogeneity among EU member states. Given the different ways in which they do so, this article asks whether DI and FI are alternatives for each other or whether they serve different functions in EU legislation. Based on a dataset that maps the occurrence of opt-outs and flexibility provisions in EU directives, the analysis shows that DI and FI tend to be used together. A qualitative analysis of directives that combine different levels of DI and FI shows that, within that overall pattern, DI is used to accommodate individual outliers, while FI is used to address widespread concerns among member states. This suggests that DI and FI are two forms of differentiation in the EU, which are used to address different aspects of a common underlying set of concerns

Differentiated integration and flexible implementation

This paper reports the findings of a comparative analysis of differentiated integration (DI) versus flexible implementation (FI). It finds overall support for our expectation that both DI and FI address international heterogeneity among EU member states and the complications in decision-making and compliance that derive from it. In addition, differentiation typically exempts individual member states in a particular situation (such as geographical location or treaty-based opt-outs) and reflects particularly high conflict in the legislative process. By contrast, our expectation that the EU uses DI in areas of core state powers, whereas FI is the instrument of choice in less politicized, market-related policy domains, receives mixed support. Finally, we observe no significant difference in the compliance effects of DI and FI. Neither instrument is sufficient to overcome the non-compliance threat emanating from imposing uniform legislation on a heterogeneous membership.This project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 822304. The content of this document represents only the views of the InDivEU consortium and is its sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains

Becoming European - How individuals’ actions and social perceptions impact European and national identity development

Identities have shaped the history of the recent centuries. Especially, identities bound to a territory and to political values have been a central force to shape politics. The mobilization of national identities has often led to the emergence of nation states. In contrast, the lack of a European identity among citizens of the European Union has lead to the exit of a member state from the political community. As many studies have focused on the importance of identities for politics, this dissertation contributes to answering the question of how these political identities develop, highlighting the role of political actions and social interactions for identity development. In the first paper I show that voting in the Brexit referendum has increased Remainers’ European identity but not at the cost of national identity. This shows that actions matter, bringing the abstract into concrete actions habitualizes an identity, bringing it more to the forefront. Additionally, this case demonstrates that a European identity does not need to come at the cost of a national identity. Even in situations where European and national identities are most likely been seen as incompatible, European identity growth does not result in the reduced identification with the nation state. These compatibility of transnational and national identities shows that even people who subscribe to a more cosmopolitan values can still have an attachment to their nation. What really makes the difference is whether a person has a European identity or not. However, are actions or information gain the driver of identity change in the aftermath of such highly salient events? In the second paper I show that most likely social influences rather than cognitive factual information gain is the driver of identity change. In this paper, I have investigated whether the rejection of the EU Constitution in France in 2005 has led to an increase knowledge on the contents of the EU Constitution in the European public. I show that even though all context conditions were in place for information gain to happen and the European public was relatively interested in the referendum the European public did not know more about the Constitution after the rejection than before. Even the Dutch, who had the most to gain by informing themselves, as they voted immediately after the French, did not increase their issue-specific knowledge. The same is true for the French, even though their own country has been the one who first rejected the Constitution. This paper demonstrates that even the rejection of a government backed proposal for an EU Constitution does not motivate people to get the facts right. This study renders an informational effect for the change in identities after the Brexit vote less likely. As a referendum unveils who is, from a socio-demographic perspective, the “typical” European or not. In paper 3, I investigate how the identification with the “typical” European is associated with a person‘s own European identity. To show that the more a person identifies with the social groups she perceives to support the EU, the more European the person feels herself, I introduce a new survey measures — the Group Closeness Score — that captures the social identities for the socio-demographic groups who sort into political camps. And in fact, my empirical findings suggest a strong empirical association between identification with the “typical” European and a person‘s own Europeanness. Therefore, my findings provide a mechanism for how the transnational-nationalist cleavage, the dividing line between more cosmopolitan orientated citizens and people who oppose further transnational integration, becomes contagious and might spread through society. People do not only care about the policy but also which fellow citizens are supporting (or opposing) the policy. However, as big, salient referenda are not a regular event, Dominik Schraff I show in the fourth paper co-authored with Dominik Schraff how the local context is positively associated with a person’s European identity. We argue that in neighborhoods in which there is a large share of a more mixed immigrant population, natives become much more likely to hold a more inclusive European identity next to national identity. We test this hypothesis with geo-coded survey data in the Netherlands. We find empirical evidence that natives in more diverse neighborhoods hold more stronger inclusive identities than people who live in less diverse neighborhoods. This pattern is driven by people having higher European identities rather than weaker their national identities. This paper shows that not only big events have a huge impact but daily small interactions also influence the boundaries and degrees of identities

Who are the Cosmopolitans? How Perceived Social Sorting and Social Identities Relate to European and National Identities

Transnational European identities influence public debates and electoral dynamics across Europe, with sociodemographic factors strongly associated with these identities. Meanwhile, little attention has been paid to how people’s perceptions of a political group’s sociodemographic profile relate to their identification with Europe. I argue that such perceptions, in combination with social identities, are significantly associated with the strength of individuals’ identification with political groups. An individual is more likely to have a robust European identity if they perceive that social groups they like share the same pro-European opinion. In contrast, if they perceive that groups they like align with the anti-European camp, they are likely to have a weaker European identity. By employing novel survey data from Italy and Austria, I find empirical support for my argument. This paper contributes to the debate on the mechanisms that connect social and political identities and explains how cleavages emerge in the mass public.ISSN:0010-414

European by Action: How Voting Re-Shapes European and national identities

Although recent research has questioned the stability of political identities, we know little about when and why identities change. I examine one of the main drivers of identity change: critical junctures. Focusing on the critical juncture of the Brexit vote in 2016, I argue that voting impacts weak identities. Specifically, I contend that the act of voting, that is, choosing between two options, boosts the European and British identity underlying the vote choice. Concentrating on nested identities, I test whether the increased identification with Europe or Britain comes with a reduction in the other identity. Using British Election Study (BES) panel data in a Difference-in-Differences model, I compare the identity change of non-voters to that of Remain and Leave voters. I show that voting Remain substantially increases identification with Europe. In contrast, I do not find robust support for a deepening identification with Britain for Leavers. However, voting has no impact on how Remainers identify with Britain or on how Leavers identify with Europe. The results contribute to a growing literature about the drivers of political identity change

United or divided in diversity? The heterogeneous effects of ethnic diversity on European and national identities

In this article, we argue that the size and cultural proximity of immigrant populations in people's residential surroundings shape national and European identities. This means that the type of migrant population activates cultural threat perceptions and opportunities for contact to varying degrees. Geocoded survey data from the Netherlands suggests that large non-Western immigrant shares are associated with more exclusive national identities, while mixed contexts with Western and non-Western populations show more inclusive identities. These results suggest that highly diverse areas with mixed immigrant populations hold a potential for more tolerance. In contrast, exclusive national identities become strongly pronounced under the presence of sizeable culturally distant immigrant groups.ISSN:1465-1165ISSN:1741-275