Fluorescence antibunching microscopy

Breaking the diffraction limit in microscopy by utilizing quantum properties of light has been the goal of intense research in the recent years. We propose a quantum superresolution technique based on non-classical emission statistics of fluorescent markers, routinely used as contrast labels for bio-imaging. The technique can be readily implemented using standard fluorescence microscopy equipment

The Structure of Langevin's Memory Kernel From Lagrangian Dynamics

We obtain the memory kernel of the generalized Langevin equation, describing a particle interacting with longitudinal phonons in a liquid. The kernel is obtained analytically at T=0 Kelvin and numerically at T>0 Kelvin. We find that it shows some non-trivial structural features like negative correlations for some range of time separations. The system is shown to have three characteristic time scales, that control the shape of the kernel, and the transition between quadratic and linear behavior of the mean squared distance (MSD). Although the derivation of the structure in the memory kernel is obtained within a specific dynamical model, the phenomenon is shown to be quite generic.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures, latex, include europhys.sty and euromacr.te

Reinforcement of polymeric structures with asbestos fibrils

Investigation determines structural potential of asbestos fibrils. Methods are developed for dispersing macrofibers of the asbestos into colloidal-sized ultimate fibrils and incorporating these fibrils in matrices without causing reagglomeration

A study of digital techniques for signal processing Final status report, 1 Jul. 1968 - 31 Jan. 1969

Digital signal processing, data smoothing, and computer simulatio

\u3ci\u3eEldred\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eLochner\u3c/i\u3e: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property

Since the ratification of the constitution, intellectual property law in the United States has always been, in part, constitutional law. Among the enumerated powers that Article I of the Constitution vests in Congress is the power to create certain intellectual property rights. To a remarkable extent, scholars who have examined the Constitution\u27s Copyright Clause have reached a common position. With striking unanimity, these scholars have called for aggressive judicial review of the constitutionality of congressional legislation in this area. The champions of this position--we refer to them as the IP Restrictors--represent a remarkable array of constitutional and intellectual property scholars. In this terms\u27s Eldred v. Aschroft, leading IP Restrictor Lawrence Lessig, representing petitioner Eric Eldred, sought to convince the Supreme Court that the IP Restrictors\u27 view of the Copyright Clause was the correct one. By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court rejected Eldred\u27s claim and upheld the statute. But while the Court rejected the IP Restrictors\u27 vision, it did not offer a satisfactory competing conception of the Copyright Clause and how the courts should construe it. Critically, even though the standard of review was of central significance, the Court applied a deferential form of rational basis scrutiny without explaining why this was the appropriate standard. This paper develops the case for deferential review of congressional legislation in the area of intellectual property and, at a deeper level, offers a new paradigm for understanding the Copyright Clause. We propose that from the vantage point of constitutional law, intellectual property should be treated as a form of constitutional property. Deference to congressional judgments is warranted because congressional legislation affecting intellectual property is analytically similar to congressional legislation affecting other forms of property. Courts subject congressional legislation affecting traditional forms of property to deferential review because of concerns about institutional competence and respect for majoritarian decisionmaking. These two concerns in conjunction with proper regard for holistic constitutional interpretation should also lead courts to deferential review of congressional legislation affecting intellectual property.In developing our position, we draw on constitutional history and, in particular, the lessons of Lochner v. New York. In defense of their vision of the Constitution, the IP Restrictors and the dissenters in Eldred make claims about the original understanding that, to an astonishing extent, echo those made by proponents of Lochner-era jurisprudence. We argue, however, that these claims fail for two reasons. First, the IP Restrictors and the dissenters disregard the limited scope of judicial review at the time of the Founding. Additionally, the IP Restrictors and dissenters disregard the range of views among the Founders about monopolies