Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems

Abstract Elements of an economic theory of political institutions are introduced. A variety of electoral systems are reviewed. Cox's threshold is shown to measure incentives for diversity and specialization of candidates' positions, when the number of serious candidates is given. Duverger's law and its generalizations are discussed, to predict the number of serious candidates. Duverger's law is interpreted as a statement about electoral barriers to entry, and this idea is linked to the question of the effectiveness of democratic competition as a deterrent to political corruption. The impact of post-electoral bargaining on party structure in presidential and parliamentary systems is discussed. 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D72 Keywords: Electoral systems; Constitution; Election game; Incentives Invitation to political economics To honor Joseph Schumpeter, I should try to begin as he might, from a long view of the history of economic theory, observing that the scope of economics has changed. With an initial goal of explaining the production and allocation of material goods, economic theorists developed analytical tools to predict how changes in market structure may affect rational behavior of producers and consumers. As the principles of rational choice were first developed in this context of price-theoretic decision-making, it seemed sensible to separate the study of markets from the study of other great institutions of society, because 0014-2921/99/$ -see front matter 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 0 1 4 -2 9 2 1 ( 9 8 ) 0 0 0 8 9 -

Taking Blockchain Seriously

In the present techno-political moment it is clear that ignoring or dismissing the hype surrounding blockchain is unwise, and certainly for regulatory authorities and governments who must keep a grip on the technology and those promoting it, in order to ensure democratic accountability and regulatory legitimacy within the blockchain ecosystem and beyond. Blockchain is telling (and showing) us something very important about the evolution of capital and neoliberal economic reason, and the likely impact in the near future on forms and patterns of work, social organization, and, crucially, on communities and individuals who lack influence over the technologies and data that increasingly shape and control their lives. In this short essay I introduce some of the problems in the regulation of blockchain and offer counter-narratives aimed at cutting through the hype fuelling the ascendency of this most contemporary of technologies

Dream capitalism

John Tomasi’s Free Market Fairness represents an heroic attempt to bridge the gap between Rawlsian ‘high liberals’ and the advocates of classical liberalism/contemporary libertarianism. I argue that Tomasi’s project fails, above all because it cannot give a compelling account of contemporary (American) capitalism or of its capacity to deliver free market fairness

Kairós and Clinamen: revolutionary politics and the common good

This article sets out to offer a new reconceptualisation of the common good as the mechanism providing the temporal coordinates for revolutionary politics. The first section investigates the pairing of commonality and goodness, revealing its nature as a synthesis of apparently irreconcilable opposites. The second section examines how this irreconcilability is overcome, advancing the argument that to heal the divide, a double movement of definition and concealment is necessary, whereby the process of definition of what constitutes the common good is accompanied by an expropriation, or hollowing out, of meaning. The third section offers a proposal for overcoming this epistemological impasse about the nature of the common good, by contrasting chronos and kairós, chronological time and what in English can be translated as ‘opportune time’, and offering kairós as the chance to create, within the fissures of the totalitarianism of chronological time, the timescape for revolutionary politics. This proposal is carried on in the second part of this article, starting with ‘ Chronos and Kairós ’ section, where the concept of kairós is expanded upon and coupled with the Epicurean and Lucretian idea of the clinamen, the swerve of the atoms that introduces the element of chance against Democritean determinism. With the support of Antonio Negri’s reading of kairós and clinamen, the article argues in ‘Alma Venus: Love, Desire and Revolution’ section that these two concepts provide the spatial and temporal coordinates for revolutionary politics, in tension and critical engagement with Ackerman’s idea of constitutional moments, to conclude in ‘Conclusions: Kairós and Revolutionary Politics’ section, that the common good is to be defined as that which takes place and is identified/identifiable within these coordinates