5,375 research outputs found
Of layers and lawyers
How can the law be characterized in a theory of collective intentionality that treats collective intentionality as essentially layered and tries to understand these layers in terms of the structure and the format of the representations involved? And can such a theory of collective intentionality open up new perspectives on the law and shed new light on traditional questions of legal philosophy? As a philosopher of collective intentionality who is new to legal philosophy, I want to begin exploring these questions in this paper. I will try to characterize the law in terms of the layered account of collective intentionality that I have introduced in some earlier writings (Schmitz 2013; 2018). In the light of this account I will then discuss a traditional question in the philosophy of law: the relation between law and morality.
I begin by giving a brief sketch of the layered account in the next section. Collective intentionality should be understood in terms of experiencing and representing others as co-subjects, rather than as objects, of intentional states and acts on different layers or levels. I distinguish the nonconceptual layer of the joint sensory-motor-emotional intentionality of joint attention and joint bodily action, the conceptual level of shared we-mode beliefs, intentions, obligations, values, and so on, and the institutional level characterized through role differentiation, positions taken in role-mode, e.g. as a judge or attorney, and writing and other forms of documentation. In the third section I introduce a set of parameters for representations such as their degree of richness, of context-dependence, of density and differentiation of representational role and of durability and stability, which can be used to more precisely distinguish different layers. I also put forward the hypothesis that these properties are connected and tend to cluster, and that higher levels can only function and determine conditions of satisfaction against lower level ones. In the fourth and final section I critically discuss the sharp positivistic separation of morality and the law according to which whether something is a law is completely independent of its moral merits. I argue that this only seems plausible if we take an observational stance towards the law, but not towards morality. When we treat them the same way, it rather appears that the moral attitudes of the co-subjects of a society will determine whether and to what extent they will accept its legal order. I conclude by proposing to think of the law as being itself an institutionalized form of morality
Force, content and logic
The Frege point to the effect that e.g. the clauses of conditionals are not asserted and therefore cannot be assertions is often taken to establish a dichotomy between the content of a speech act, which is propositional and belongs to logic and semantics, and its force, which belongs to pragmatics. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks and Francois Recanati, who propose act-theoretic accounts of propositions, argue that we can’t account for propositional unity independently of the forceful acts of speakers, and respond to the Frege point by appealing to a notion of force cancellation. I argue that the notion of force cancellation is faced with a dilemma and offer an alternative response to the Frege point, which extends the act-theoretic account to logical acts such as conditionalizing or disjoining. Such higher-level acts allow us to present forceful acts while suspending commitment to them. In connecting them, a subject rather commits to an affirmation function of such acts. In contrast, the Frege point confuses a lack of commitment to what is put forward with a lack of commitment or force in what is put forward
The microstructure view of the brain-consciousness relation
How can consciousness, how can the mind be causally efficacious in a world
which seems—in some sense—to be thoroughly governed by physical causality?
Mental causation has been a nagging problem in philosophy since
the beginning of the modern age, when, inspired by the rise of physics, a
metaphysical picture became dominant according to which the manifest
macrophysical world of rocks, trees, colors, sounds etc. could be eliminated
in favor of, or identified with, the microconstituents of these entities
and their basic physical properties, plus their effects on human or animal
minds. Against the background of this ontology, the argument from causal
closure, or the causal completeness of physics, exerts strong pressure
to also identify consciousness with microphysical entities—or even to eliminate
it in favor of the latter—the only other options apparently being
either the denial of the causal closure of the physical level, epiphenomenalism
about the mind, or the view that its physical effects are generally
overdetermined. In this paper, however, I want to introduce what I call
the “microstructure view” (MV) of the brain-consciousness relation, and I
want to try to make plausible that the problem of mental causation can
also be solved, or perhaps rather dissolved, on the basis of this account. On
the MV, the minimal neuronal correlates of consciousness—of the global
state of consciousness, or specific states of consciousness such as pain—are
not identical with these states, but rather constitute their microstructure,
or, as I shall also say, equivalently, compose them
Questions, content and the varieties of force
In addition to the Frege point, Frege also argued for the force-content distinction from the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. I argue that this fact more readily supports the view that questions operate on and present assertions and other forceful acts themselves. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled as has recently been proposed. Rather higher level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed assertive or directive acts that are forceful and committal, while suspending commitment to them. The Frege point confounds different varieties of force and the question whether something is merely presented for consideration with the question what is so presented. Force is representational: through assertoric and directive force indicators subjects non-conceptually present positions of theoretical or practical knowledge, while interrogative acts indicate positions of wondering which strive for such knowledge
Force, content and the varieties of unity (old version)
[This is an old version which is superseded by the published version. I keep it here for the record, as it has been cited.]
A strict dichotomy between the force / mode of speech acts and intentional states and their propositional content has been a central feature of analytical philosophy of language and mind since the time of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks (2015, 2016) and Francois Recanati (2016), who argue that we can't account for propositional unity independently of the forceful acts of speakers and propose new ways of responding to the notorious 'Frege point' by appealing to a notion of force cancellation. In my paper I will offer some supplementary criticisms of the traditional view, but also a way of reconceptualizing the force-content distinction which allows us to preserve certain of its features, and an alternative response to the Frege point that rejects the notion of force cancellation in favor of an appeal to intentional acts that create additional forms of unity at higher levels of intentional organization: acts such as questioning a statement or order, or merely putting it forward or entertaining it; pretending to state or order; or conjoining or disjoining statements or orders. This allows us to understand how we can present a forceful act without being committed to it. In contrast, the Frege point confuses a lack of commitment to with a lack of commitment or force in what is put forward
DO DEVELOPED EXPORTING COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTE TO FOOD SECURITY? THE CASE OF THE EC
Food Security and Poverty,
THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHEMICAL USE RESTRICTIONS IN AGRICULTURE
Agricultural and Food Policy, Crop Production/Industries,
Preference erosion effects on the agricultural sector of the EU’s Mediterranean Partner Countries
This paper analyses preference erosion effects on the agricultural sector of the EU’s Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) with the partial equilibrium multi-commodity multi-region world trade model AGRISIM. Supposing that the preferences to the MPCs granted by the EU remain as of 2001 then the effects are evident for high protected markets like beef in Turkey, milk and rice in Morocco and olive oil in the MPCs. Supposing a free trade area between the EU and the MPCs, then the impacts are high for beef, milk and sugar. The farmers’ income decreases, but the consumers and the taxpayers benefit from lower prices and the overall welfare in all MPCs increases.preference erosion, multilateral liberalisation, Mediterranean Partner Countries, AGRISIM, Agricultural and Food Policy, Q17, Q18, Q13,
Weather Derivatives as an Instrument to Hedge Against the Risk of High Energy Cost in Greenhouse Production
In many areas agriculture is exposed to weather related risks. Weather derivatives that get more and more in the focus of interest can reduce these risks. In this study we develop a temperature based weather derivative and analyse how it can reduce the weather-related energy cost risk in greenhouse production. We base this study on a temperature index whose stochastic characteristics are analysed. Finally we simulate the heating demand for energy of a horticultural firm.Environmental Economics and Policy, Risk and Uncertainty, C22, D8, Q14,
Weather derivatives as an instrument to hedge against the risk of high energy cost in greenhouse production
In many areas agriculture is exposed to weather-related risks. Weather derivatives that get more and more in the focus of interest can reduce these risks. In this study we develop a temperature based weather derivative and analyse how it can reduce the weather-related energy cost risk in greenhouse production. We base this study on a temperature index whose stochastic characteristics are analysed. Finally we simulate the heating energy demand of a horticultural firm.Risk and Uncertainty,
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