51 research outputs found
“Almost” subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane, that faces a problem of locating public facilities to be used by its members. The cost of every facility is financed by its users, who also face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We assume that the facilities' cost is independent of location and access costs are linear with respect to the Euclidean distance. We show that an external intervention that covers 0.19% of the facility cost is sufficient to guarantee secession-proofness or no cross-subsidization, where no group of individuals is charged more than its stand alone cost incurred if it had acted on its own. Moreover, we demonstrate that in this case the Rawlsian access pricing is the only secession-proof allocation.secession-proofness, optimal jurisdictions, Rawlsian allocation, hexagonal partition, cross-subsidization
The Egalitarian Sharing Rule in Provision of Public Projects
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two principles, egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of the total cost for all agents in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the minimization of the aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to exist.Jurisdictions, Stable partitions, Public projects, Egalitarianism
The egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public projects
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint
jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation
scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their
costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two principles,
egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of the total cost for all agents
in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the minimization of the
aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles
always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to
exist.Comment: 7 page
The Egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public goods
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two principles, egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of the total cost for all agents in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the minimization of the aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to exist. We demonstrate moreover that stable partitions are not necessarily consecutive.
- …