Intrinsic variability in the human response to pain is assembled from multiple, dynamic brain processes

The stimulus-evoked response is the principle measure used to elucidate the timing and spatial location of human brain activity. Brain and behavioural responses to pain are influenced by multiple intrinsic and extrinsic factors and display considerable, natural trial-by-trial variability. However, because the neuronal sources of this variability are poorly understood the functional information it contains is under-exploited for understanding the relationship between brain function and behaviour. We recorded simultaneous EEG-fMRI during rest and noxious thermal stimulation to characterise the relationship between natural fluctuations in behavioural pain-ratings, the spatiotemporal dynamics of brain network responses and intrinsic connectivity. We demonstrate that fMRI response variability in the pain network is: dependent upon its resting-state functional connectivity; modulated by behaviour; and correlated with EEG evoked-potential amplitude. The pre-stimulus default-mode network (DMN) fMRI signal predicts the subsequent magnitude of pain ratings, evoked-potentials and pain network BOLD responses. Additionally, the power of the ongoing EEG alpha oscillation, an index of cortical excitability, modulates the DMN fMRI response to pain. The complex interaction between alpha-power, DMN activity and both the behavioural report of pain and the brain's response to pain demonstrates the neurobiological significance of trial-by-trial variability. Furthermore, we show that multiple, interconnected factors contribute to both the brain's response to stimulation and the psychophysiological emergence of the subjective experience of pain. © 2013 Elsevier Inc

Distinct BOLD fMRI responses of capsaicin-induced thermal sensation reveal pain-related brain activation in nonhuman primates

10.1371/journal.pone.0156805PLoS ONE116e015680

Hypnose et conscience

L’hypnotisme et les techniques de l’hypnose sont connus depuis l’Antiquité. Mesmer était le premier à avoir entrepris une étude expérimentale de la relation psychothérapeutique jusqu’alors noyée dans les pratiques magiques. Il proposait une théorie qu’il croyait physiologique, rationaliste, et posait l’existence d’un fluide, aussi réel et matériel que l’action exercée par l’aimant. Une lutte opposa d’abord les « fluidistes » et les « animistes » dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle. Ensuite, elle prit la forme d’une opposition entre les partisans de l’explication physiologique et ceux de l’explication psychologique. L’école de la Salpetrière, avec Charcot, voyait dans l’hypnose un état pathologique, une névrose hystérique artificielle. A l’opposé, l’école de Nancy, représentée par Bernheim, Liébault et Liégeois, soutenait que c’était un phénomène psychologique normal. La lutte entre les deux écoles fut très âpre. D’autres théories inspirées d’abord par l’école pavlovienne virent le jour, celle-ci fut remplacée par celle inspirée de la psychologie expérimentale et une troisième d’inspiration psychanalytique prit le relais. Une objectivation de l’état hypnotique permettrait de sortir des querelles qui s’éternisent sur la réalité et la non-réalité de l’état hypnotique. Cette tentative d’objectivation a été conduite entre autres à partir des techniques de neuroimagerie fonctionnelle révolutionnant actuellement notre connaissance sur le fonctionnement cérébral et les recherches dans le domaine des neurosciences cognitives permettent d’aborder les questions sur la conscience et son substrat neurobiologique. La recherche sur l’hypnose nécessite de faire des distinctions entre « l’état de conscience » et « contenu conscient ». Différentes études en neuro-imagerie fonctionnelle sont rapportées explorant le domaine de la « neurophénoménologie » du processus hypnotique.Hypnotic-like behavior has been reported from the dawn of history. The early origins are shrouded in mystery and magic; but Franz Anton Mesmer, an Austrian physician, conducted his therapeutic sessions under the name of ‘‘animal magnestism’’. He proposed a theory that the ‘‘magnetic’’ influence could be transfered by iron bars. However a committee of leading scientists of the day showed that the ‘‘magnetic’’ influence could be transfered as well by wooden rods as by iron bars and that influence upon the patient was a result of imagination. Mesmer was obviously wrong in his theory, but he was the first attempting to use modern physical science to replace some of the superstition of his day. This in turn became opposition between supporters of physiological theories and those of psychological theories. Salpetriere, with Charcot, saw a pathological state in hypnosis, an artificial hysterical neurosis. On the other hand, the Nancy school of thought, represented by Bernheim, Liebault and Liegeois, suggested that it was a normal psychological phenomenon. The fight between the two schools was very bitter. Other theories initially inspired by the Pavlov school of thought came to light; these were replaced by those inspired by experimental psychology and a third psychoanalytic theory became predominant. A description of the hypnotic state revealed the reality and non-reality of the hypnotic state. This was the outcome of functional neuro-imaging techniques that are currently revolutionising our knowledge of cerebral functioning and research in the area of cognitive neuroscience allows questions about consciousness and its neurobiological substrate to be asked. Research into hypnosis requires a distinction to be made between ‘‘the state of consciousness’’ and ‘‘conscious content’’. Various functional neuro-imaging studies are reported investigating the area of ‘‘neurophenomenology’’ in the hypnotic process

Interpretative phenomenological analysis and embodied, active, situated cognition

We describe here some of the developing conversations between “third phase” cognitive science and phenomenological philosophy. Contributors to these conversations treat cognition as an embodied, active, and situated phenomenon. We argue that, despite much promise, proper engagement with the foundational phenomenological concept of a situated, meaning-making person has yet to be fully reflected in these conversations. We note that the outcomes of this dialogue have important implications for the field of phenomenological psychology. In particular, we demonstrate that one qualitative method, interpretative phenomenological analysis, can make a useful contribution to the ongoing developments in this field. We suggest that it can provide a valuable hermeneutic counterpoint to the primacy of empiricist methods. Through reference to sustained examples from research participants’ accounts of chronic pain, we show how qualitative phenomenological approaches, such as interpretative phenomenological analysis, can illuminate the importance of situating embodied personal experience in the context of meaning, relationships, and the lived world