Proposed tax and benefit changes: winners and losers in the next term

This Election Briefing Note shows how the tax and benefit reforms proposed by the three main UK parties would affect government revenues and the incomes of different groups in the population. It also shows how the changes to taxes and benefits already announced by the government and due to come into effect between May 2005 and April 2009 will affect household incomes

Take-up of family credit and working families' tax credit: final report

The current government has substantially increased the use of means-tested tax and benefit programmes to try to help people on low incomes. An important early example of this was the replacement in October 1999 of Family Credit (FC), a benefit providing support for low-income working parents, by Working Families' Tax Credit (WFTC). WFTC was delivered differently from FC, it was described as a tax credit rather than a benefit, and it was also much more generous than its predecessor. However, the efficacy of using means-testing to help people on low incomes is limited by the fact that many of the people eligible for means-tested programmes do not take them up. Because of this, one of the government's stated aims when introducing WFTC was to encourage take-up, arguing that as a tax credit rather than a welfare benefit, it will reduce the stigma associated with claiming in-work support, and encourage higher take-up. In this paper we try to answer the question of whether the replacement of FC by WFTC did indeed encourage take-up. We also try and identify more generally what factors are important in explaining non-take-up of FC and WFTC, in particular quantifying the effect of entitlement level and examining the effects of people's knowledge of, and attitudes towards, in-work support. Our approach is an econometric one, investigating the relationship between take-up of FC/WFTC and a variety of explanatory variables in two micro-data-sets, the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the Families and Children Survey (FACS)

Tax and benefit changes: who wins and who loses?

* Tax and benefit changes implemented by Labour since 1997 will have a net cost to the exchequer of around £2.2 billion in 2005-06. The average (mean) impact of this small net giveaway is to raise household disposable incomes by £1.69 a week or 0.4%. The biggest proportionate gains are in the 2nd poorest tenth of the population, whose disposable incomes are increased by 11.4%, while the richest tenth fare worst, with a cut in income of 3.7%. * Tax and benefit reforms since 1997 have clearly been progressive, benefiting the less well-off relative to the better-off. Reforms in the second term - while less generous on average - were more progressive than those in the first, with the poorest faring better. * Increases in council tax above inflation since 1997 will raise £5.8 billion in 2005-06, net of council tax benefit. This outweighs the giveaway by central government, and leaves households overall £2.85 a week worse off on average, equivalent to 0.6% of their disposable incomes. The increase in council tax is regressive, except for the poorest fifth of the population, who are partially protected from the rises by council tax benefit

The 10% tax rate: where next?

In Budget 2007, the Government announced the abolition of the 10% starting rate of income tax alongside a wider set of reforms to personal taxes and tax credits to take effect during the period April 2008 to April 2010. Further changes to tax credits and state benefits were announced in PBR 2007 and Budget 2008, some to take effect in 2008-09, some in 2009-10 and others in 2010-11. During April 2008, the Government said that it was looking at ways of compensating the net losers from these changes (in practice, those for whom the losses from the abolition of the 10% band exceeded the gains from the other measures). On 13 May it announced a £600 rise in the income tax personal allowance for 2008-09, with a corresponding cut in the higher-rate threshold. In the light of these changes, this note looks at: * To what extent the rise in the personal allowance, and other measures in Budget 2007, PBR 2007 and Budget 2008, compensate those who lost out from the abolition of the 10% rate of income tax; * To what extent the Government's pre-announced changes to personal taxes, tax credits and benefits for 2010-11 provide compensation for these losers over the medium term; * What options the Government has for 2009-10 and beyond

The benefits of parenting: Government financial support for families with children since 1975

This commentary describes the changes to the structure of child-contingent support through the tax and benefit system since 1975. It also presents new results, which were produced to quantify explicitly the amount of government support for families with children, using representative samples of families from over the past three decades. With these data, it is possible to examine whether child-contingent support has become more or less progressive, or more or less slanted towards large families, lone-parents families or families with young children

Does welfare reform affect fertility? Evidence from the UK

In 1999 the UK government made major reforms to the system of child-contingent benefits, including the introduction of Working Families’ Tax Credit and an increase in means-tested Income Support for families with children. Between 1999-2003 government spending per-child on these benefits rose by 50 per cent in real terms, a change that was unprecedented over a thirty year period. This paper examines whether there was a response in childbearing. To identify the effect of the reforms, we exploit the fact that the spending increases were targeted at low-income households and we use the (exogenously determined) education of the woman and her partner to define treatment and control groups. We argue that the reforms are most likely to have a positive fertility effect for women in couples and show that this is the case. We find that there was an increase in births (by around 15 per cent) among the group affected by the reforms

Financial work incentives in Britain: comparisons over time and between family types

This paper reviews various techniques for quantifying financial incentives to work, shows how financial work incentives have changed across the population since 1979, and estimates how much of these changes are due to changes in the tax and benefit system

The Yale-Potsdam Stellar Isochrones (YaPSI)

We introduce the Yale-Potsdam Stellar Isochrones (YaPSI), a new grid of stellar evolution tracks and isochrones of solar-scaled composition. In an effort to improve the Yonsei-Yale database, special emphasis is placed on the construction of accurate low-mass models (Mstar < 0.6 Msun), and in particular of their mass-luminosity and mass-radius relations, both crucial in characterizing exoplanet-host stars and, in turn, their planetary systems. The YaPSI models cover the mass range 0.15 to 5.0 Msun, densely enough to permit detailed interpolation in mass, and the metallicity and helium abundance ranges [Fe/H] = -1.5 to +0.3, and Y = 0.25 to 0.37, specified independently of each other (i.e., no fixed Delta Y/Delta Z relation is assumed). The evolutionary tracks are calculated from the pre-main sequence up to the tip of the red giant branch. The isochrones, with ages between 1 Myr and 20 Gyr, provide UBVRI colors in the Johnson-Cousins system, and JHK colors in the homogeneized Bessell & Brett system, derived from two different semi-empirical Teff-color calibrations from the literature. We also provide utility codes, such as an isochrone interpolator in age, metallicity, and helium content, and an interface of the tracks with an open-source Monte Carlo Markov-Chain tool for the analysis of individual stars. Finally, we present comparisons of the YaPSI models with the best empirical mass- luminosity and mass-radius relations available to date, as well as isochrone fitting of well-studied steComment: 17 pages, 14 figures; accepted for publication in the Astrophysical Journa

Antigen depot is not required for alum adjuvanticity

Alum adjuvants have been in continuous clinical use for more than 80 yr. While the prevailing theory has been that depot formation and the associated slow release of antigen and/or inflammation are responsible for alum enhancement of antigen presentation and subsequent T- and B-cell responses, this has never been formally proven. To examine antigen persistence, we used the chimeric fluorescent protein EαGFP, which allows assessment of antigen presentation in situ, using the Y-Ae antibody. We demonstrate that alum and/or CpG adjuvants induced similar uptake of antigen, and in all cases, GFP signal did not persist beyond 24 h in draining lymph node antigen-presenting cells. Antigen presentation was first detectable on B cells within 6–12 h of antigen administration, followed by conventional dendritic cells (DCs) at 12–24 h, then finally plasmacytoid DCs at 48 h or later. Again, alum and/or CpG adjuvants did not have an effect on the magnitude or sequence of this response; furthermore, they induced similar antigen-specific T-cell activation in vivo. Notably, removal of the injection site and associated alum depot, as early as 2 h after administration, had no appreciable effect on antigen-specific T- and B-cell responses. This study clearly rules out a role for depot formation in alum adjuvant activity