57 research outputs found
Selective-Opening Security in the Presence of Randomness Failures
We initiate the study of public-key encryption (PKE) secure against selective-opening attacks (SOA) in the presence of randomness failures, i.e., when the sender may (inadvertently) use low-quality randomness. In the SOA setting, an adversary can adaptively corrupt senders; this notion is natural to consider in tandem with randomness failures since an adversary may target senders by multiple means.
Concretely, we first treat SOA security of nonce-based PKE. After formulating an appropriate definition of SOA- secure nonce-based PKE,we provide efficient constructions in the non-programmable random-oracle model, based on lossy trapdoor functions.
We then lift our notion of security to the setting of hedged PKE, which ensures security as long as the sender\u27s seed, message, and nonce jointly have high entropy. This unifies the notions and strengthens the protection that nonce-based PKE provides against randomness failures even in the non-SOA setting.We lift our definitions and constructions of SOA-secure nonce-based PKE to the hedged setting as well
Upper and Lower Bounds for Continuous Non-Malleable Codes
Recently, Faust et al. (TCC\u2714) introduced the notion of continuous non-malleable codes (CNMC), which provides stronger security guarantees than standard non-malleable codes, by allowing an adversary to tamper with the codeword in continuous way instead of one-time tampering. They also showed that CNMC with information theoretic security cannot be constructed in 2-split-state tampering model, and
presented a construction of the same in CRS (common reference string) model using collision-resistant hash functions and non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs.
In this work, we ask if it is possible to construct CNMC from weaker assumptions. We answer this question by presenting lower as well as upper bounds. Specifically, we show that it is impossible to construct 2-split-state CNMC, with no CRS, for one-bit messages from any falsifiable assumption, thus establishing the lower bound. We additionally provide an upper bound by constructing 2-split-state CNMC for one-bit messages, assuming only the existence of a family of injective one way functions.
We also present a construction of 4-split-state CNMC for multi-bit messages in CRS model from the same assumptions. Additionally, we present definitions of the following new primitives: (1) One-to-one commitments, and (2) Continuous Non-Malleable Randomness Encoders, which may be of independent interest
On the Cryptographic Deniability of the Signal Protocol
Offline deniability is the ability to a-posteriori deny having participated in a particular communication session. This property has been widely assumed for the Signal messaging application, yet no formal proof has appeared in the literature. In this paper, we present what we believe is the first formal study of the offline deniability of the Signal protocol. Our analysis shows that building a deniability proof for Signal is non-trivial and requires strong assumptions on the underlying mathematical groups where the protocol is run.
To do so, we study various *implicitly authenticated* key exchange protocols including MQV, HMQV and 3DH/X3DH, the latter being the core key agreement protocol in Signal. We first present examples of mathematical groups where running MQV results in a provably non-deniable interaction. While the concrete attack applies only to MQV, it also exemplifies the problems in attempting to prove the deniability of other implicitly authenticated protocols, such as 3DH. In particular, it shows that the intuition that the minimal transcript produced by these protocols suffices for ensuring deniability does not hold. We then provide a characterization of the groups where deniability holds, defined in terms of a knowledge assumption that extends the Knowledge of Exponent Assumption (KEA).
We conclude the paper by showing two additional positive results. The first is a general theorem that links the deniability of a communication session to the deniability of the key agreement protocol starting the session. This allows us to extend our results on the deniability of 3DH/X3DH to the entire Signal communication session
Towards Non-Black-Box Separations of Public Key Encryption and One Way Function
Separating public key encryption from one way functions is one of the fundamental goals of complexity-based cryptography. Beginning with the seminal work of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC, 1989), a sequence of works have ruled out certain classes of reductions from public key encryption (PKE)---or even key agreement---to one way function. Unfortunately, known results---so called black-box separations---do not apply to settings where the construction and/or reduction are allowed to directly access the code, or circuit, of the one way function. In this work, we present a meaningful, non-black-box separation between public key encryption (PKE) and one way function.
Specifically, we introduce the notion of reductions (similar to the reductions of Baecher et al. (ASIACRYPT, 2013)), in which the construction accesses the underlying primitive in a black-box way, but wherein the universal reduction receives the efficient code/circuit of the underlying primitive as input and is allowed oracle access to the adversary . We additionally require that the number of oracle queries made to , and the success probability of are independent of the run-time/circuit size of the underlying primitive. We prove that there is no non-adaptive, reduction from PKE to one way function, under the assumption that certain types of strong one way functions exist. Specifically, we assume that there exists a regular one way function such that there is no Arthur-Merlin protocol proving that ``\u27\u27, where soundness holds with high probability over ``no instances,\u27\u27 , and Arthur may receive polynomial-sized, non-uniform advice. This assumption is related to the average-case analogue of the widely believed assumption
Limitations of the Meta-reduction Technique: The Case of Schnorr Signatures
We revisit the security of Fiat-Shamir signatures in the non-programmable random oracle model. The well-known proof by Pointcheval and Stern for such signature schemes (Journal of Cryptology, 2000) relies on the ability to re-program the random oracle, and it has been unknown if this property is inherent. Pailler and Vergnaud (Asiacrypt 2005) gave some first evidence of the hardness by showing via meta-reduction techniques that algebraic reductions cannot succeed in reducing key-only attacks against unforgeability to the discrete-log assumptions. We also use meta-reductions to show that the security of Schnorr signatures cannot be proven equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem without programming the random oracle. Our result also holds under the one-more discrete logarithm assumption but applies to a large class of reductions, we call *single-instance* reductions, subsuming those used in previous proofs of security in the (programmable) random oracle model. In contrast to algebraic reductions, our class allows arbitrary operations, but can only invoke a single resettable adversary instance, making our class incomparable to algebraic reductions.
Our main result, however, is about meta-reductions and the question if this technique can be used to further strengthen the separations above. Our answer is negative. We present, to the best of our knowledge for the first time, limitations of the meta-reduction technique in the sense that finding a meta-reduction for general reductions is most likely infeasible. In fact, we prove that finding a meta-reduction against a potential reduction is equivalent to finding a ``meta-meta-reduction\u27\u27 against the strong existential unforgeability of the signature scheme. This means that the existence of a meta-reduction implies that the scheme must be insecure (against a slightly stronger attack) in the first place
On Tightly Secure Non-Interactive Key Exchange
We consider the reduction loss of security reductions for non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) schemes. Currently, no tightly secure NIKE schemes exist, and in fact Bader et al. (EUROCRYPT 2016) provide a lower bound (of O(n^2), where n is the number of parties an adversary interacts with) on the reduction loss for a large class of NIKE schemes.
We offer two results: the first NIKE scheme with a reduction loss of n/2 that circumvents the lower bound of Bader et al., but is of course still far from tightly secure. Second, we provide a generalization of Bader et al.\u27s lower bound to a larger class of NIKE schemes (that also covers our NIKE scheme), with an adapted lower bound of n/2 on the reduction loss. Hence, in that sense, the reduction for our NIKE scheme is optimal
Tightly-Secure Signatures from Five-Move Identification Protocols
We carry out a concrete security analysis of signature schemes obtained from five-move identification protocols via the Fiat-Shamir transform. Concretely, we obtain tightly-secure signatures based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH), the short-exponent CDH, and the Factoring (FAC) assumptions. All our signature schemes have tight reductions to search problems, which is in stark contrast to all known signature schemes obtained from the classical Fiat-Shamir transform (based on three-move identification protocols), which either have a non-tight reduction to a search problem, or a tight reduction to a (potentially) stronger decisional problem. Surprisingly, our CDH-based scheme turns out to be (a slight simplification of) the Chevallier-Mames signature scheme (CRYPTO 05), thereby providing a theoretical explanation of its tight security proof via five-move identification protocols
Power photonics for Green Earth –strategic approach to the better life–
We have investigated the pathway to realize Laser Inertial Fusion Energy (LIFE) as the primary energy for society, which is vital for the Green Earth (environmentally sustainable economic growth and prosperity for all mankind). The next step toward the fusion power plant is the engineering development of the elements and the integrated system of the LIFE. An integrated system development will open new applications to sciences and industries in many fields such as high energy density physics, advanced manufacturing, nuclear material processing, space, and medical engineerings, with the deployment of high rep-rate, high-average and peak power lasers
Nonlinear AlGaAs waveguide for the generation of counterpropagating twin photons in the telecom range
We have designed and fabricated a set of AlGaAs multilayer waveguides, which can serve as a source of entangled photons at 1.55 mu m through parametric fluorescence. In our scheme two counterpropagating, orthogonally polarized signal/idler modes are nonlinearly generated by a pump wave impinging on the upper surface of the waveguide. To check the compliance with design specifications on phase-matching wavelength and parametric gain, we have systematically measured effective indices and surface-emitting second-harmonic generation, respectively. This characterization allowed us to single out a nominal sample with optimum performances, which we numerically modeled for counterpropagating parametric fluorescence. We predict a pair generation efficiency eta(PF)=4x10(-13) (signal photons per pump photon). For a 1 W (peak), 100 ns pump pulse at normal incidence, this corresponds to about 14 photons per dark count with state-of-the-art avalanche photodiodes
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