Economic Integration

The results of international trade have generated a set of both winners and losers. On one side we have the big companies and big producers that stand out and on the other hand, there is a sector that has been affected such as groups of peasants, rural communities, cooperatives, amongst others that live in the poor southern countries. Therefore, the objective of this research article is the search and the design of mechanisms that will counteract the flaws of the current systems, and that will translate into social policies to give a solution to the more unprotected people. Fair trade is an alternative that is heading towards practices of a more social and solidary economy and through these mechanisms, that are funded in

General Framework for phase synchronization through localized sets

We present an approach which enables to identify phase synchronization in coupled chaotic oscillators without having to explicitly measure the phase. We show that if one defines a typical event in one oscillator and then observes another one whenever this event occurs, these observations give rise to a localized set. Our result provides a general and easy way to identify PS, which can also be used to oscillators that possess multiple time scales. We illustrate our approach in networks of chemically coupled neurons. We show that clusters of phase synchronous neurons may emerge before the onset of phase synchronization in the whole network, producing a suitable environment for information exchanging. Furthermore, we show the relation between the localized sets and the amount of information that coupled chaotic oscillator can exchange

The international synchronisation of business cycles: the role of animal spirits

Business cycles among industrial countries are highly correlated. We develop a two-country behavioral macroeconomic model where the synchronization of the business cycle is produced endogenously. The main channel of synchronization occurs through a propagation of “animal spirits”, i.e. waves of optimism and pessimism that become correlated internationally. We find that this propagation occurs with relatively low levels of trade integration. We do not need a correlation of exogenous shocks to generate synchronization. We also empirically test the main predictions of the model

Pairwise tests of purchasing power parity

Given nominal exchange rates and price data on N + 1 countries indexed by i = 0,1,2,…, N, the standard procedure for testing purchasing power parity (PPP) is to apply unit root or stationarity tests to N real exchange rates all measured relative to a base country, 0, often taken to be the U.S. Such a procedure is sensitive to the choice of base country, ignores the information in all the other cross-rates and is subject to a high degree of cross-section dependence which has adverse effects on estimation and inference. In this article, we conduct a variety of unit root tests on all possible N(N + 1)/2 real rates between pairs of the N + 1 countries and estimate the proportion of the pairs that are stationary. This proportion can be consistently estimated even in the presence of cross-section dependence. We estimate this proportion using quarterly data on the real exchange rate for 50 countries over the period 1957-2001. The main substantive conclusion is that to reject the null of no adjustment to PPP requires sufficiently large disequilibria to move the real rate out of the band of inaction set by trade costs. In such cases, one can reject the null of no adjustment to PPP up to 90% of the time as compared to around 40% in the whole sample using a linear alternative and almost 60% using a nonlinear alternative

Credibility and adjustment: gold standards versus currency boards

It is often maintained that currency boards (CBs) and gold standards (GSs) are alike in that they are stringent monetary rules, the two basic features of which are high credibility of monetary authorities and the existence of automatic adjustment (non discretionary) mechanism. This article includes a comparative analysis of these two types of regimes both from the perspective of the sources and mechanisms of generating confidence and credibility, and the elements of operation of the automatic adjustment mechanism. Confidence under the GS is endogenously driven, whereas it is exogenously determined under the CB. CB is a much more asymmetric regime than GS (the adjustment is much to the detriment of peripheral countries) although asymmetry is a typical feature of any monetary regime. The lack of credibility is typical for peripheral countries and cannot be overcome completely even by “hard” monetary regimes.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40078/3/wp692.pd

What difference does Euro membership make to stabilization? The political economy of international monetary systems revisited

For many political economists, the loss of monetary sovereignty is the major reason why the Southern periphery fared so badly in the Euro area crisis. Monetary sovereignty here means the ability of the central bank to devalue the exchange rate or to buy government debt by printing the domestic currency. We explore this diagnosis by comparing three countries - Hungary, Latvia and Greece – that received considerable amounts of external assistance under different monetary regimes. The evidence does not suggest that monetary sovereignty helped Hungary and Latvia to stabilize their economies. Rather, cooperation and external assistance made foreign banks share in the costs of stabilization. By contrast, the provision of liquidity by the ECB inadvertently facilitated the reduction of foreign banks’ exposure to Greece which left the Greek sovereign even more exposed. By viewing the Euro area as a monetary system rather than an incomplete state, we see that what is needed for Euro area stabilization is cooperation over banking union, rather than a fully-fledged federal budget

Currency Unions

A currency union is when several independent sovereign nations share a common currency. This has been a recurring phenomenon in monetary history. In this article I study the theoretical foundations of such unions, and discuss some important currency unions in history, most notably the case of the US. Finally I contrast the design of the EMU with economic theories and historical experiences of currency unions