Committee-Based Sample Selection for Probabilistic Classifiers

In many real-world learning tasks, it is expensive to acquire a sufficient number of labeled examples for training. This paper investigates methods for reducing annotation cost by `sample selection'. In this approach, during training the learning program examines many unlabeled examples and selects for labeling only those that are most informative at each stage. This avoids redundantly labeling examples that contribute little new information. Our work follows on previous research on Query By Committee, extending the committee-based paradigm to the context of probabilistic classification. We describe a family of empirical methods for committee-based sample selection in probabilistic classification models, which evaluate the informativeness of an example by measuring the degree of disagreement between several model variants. These variants (the committee) are drawn randomly from a probability distribution conditioned by the training set labeled so far. The method was applied to the real-world natural language processing task of stochastic part-of-speech tagging. We find that all variants of the method achieve a significant reduction in annotation cost, although their computational efficiency differs. In particular, the simplest variant, a two member committee with no parameters to tune, gives excellent results. We also show that sample selection yields a significant reduction in the size of the model used by the tagger

The New Legal Criticism

Professors Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman’s article Just Relationships is a fundamental reinterpretation of the moral ideals of large swaths of private law. Its significance, however, may go beyond even that broad ambition. In this Response, I suggest that Just Relationships is also an exemplar—perhaps par excellence—of an emergent form of critical discourse, which may itself foreshadow a paradigm shift in contemporary critical legal scholarship. That new form of scholarship might usefully be dubbed “the new legal criticism.” The label serves partly as an echo of the “New Criticism” movement that emerged in literary criticism in the middle of the twentieth-century, which, in methodological ways, the new legal criticism very much resembles. But primarily, the label “new legal criticism” suggests that this ascendant group of legal scholars articulates a different point of departure for critical thinking about law—particularly for critical thinking about private law—from that which most immediately preceded it in twentieth century legal thought: the critical legal studies movement. Part I describes new legal criticism and compares it with the critical legal scholarship movements of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Part II further expands my claim that Just Relationships is a good exemplar of the new legal criticism by looking at the roles played by relational justice in Dagan and Dorfman’s explication of their jurisprudential claims. Part III looks at the limits of new legal criticism, again as exemplified by Just Relationships. I will explore whether the reliance of the new legal criticism on law itself in the development of the idea of justice limits its potency as a form of criticism by comparing the authors’ discussion of discrimination in housing with a subject they do not address, at-will employment. Finally, the conclusion explores possible avenues of further exploration within the authors’ chosen field—private law, largely understood—and within the parameters set by the new legal criticism’s premises

Defining Textual Entailment

Textual entailment is a relationship that obtains between fragments of text when one fragment in some sense implies the other fragment. The automation of textual entailment recognition supports a wide variety of text-based tasks, including information retrieval, information extraction, question answering, text summarization, and machine translation. Much ingenuity has been devoted to developing algorithms for identifying textual entailments, but relatively little to saying what textual entailment actually is. This article is a review of the logical and philosophical issues involved in providing an adequate definition of textual entailment. We show that many natural definitions of textual entailment are refuted by counterexamples, including the most widely cited definition of Dagan et al. We then articulate and defend the following revised definition: T textually entails H = df typically, a human reading T would be justified in inferring the proposition expressed by H from the proposition expressed by T. We also show that textual entailment is context-sensitive, nontransitive, and nonmonotonic

Some Pluralism About Pluralism: A Comment on Hanoch Dagan’s “Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law”

Hanoch Dagan is among “those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can,” in the phrase of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. His pluralism is a perfectionism for polytheists: There are many human goods, and each has its domain, including some portion of the law of property. Depending on where we stand on the property landscape at any time, we may be community-minded sharers, devoted romantics in marriage, or coolly rational market actors, and the local property law will smooth each of these paths for us. Property law is built on the design of the multifarious human heart, or, if you prefer, the many purposes we pursue in our projects and relationships. Each of these implies a way of regarding others – as arm’s length collaborators, joint venturers, or other halves whose purposes we have joined to ours; property’s default rules anticipate and confirm these various attitudes

Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choice

Scholars have to date paid relatively little attention to the rules for deciding when a writing is integrated. These integration rules, however, are as dark and full of subtle difficulties as are other parts of parol evidence rules. As a way of thinking about Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller’s The Choice Theory of Contracts, this Article suggests we would do better with tailored integration rules for two transaction types. In negotiated contracts between firms, courts should apply a hard express integration rule, requiring firms to say when they intend a writing to be integrated. In consumer contracts, standard terms should automatically be integrated against consumerside communications, and never integrated against a business’s communications. The argument for each rule rests on the ways parties make and express contractual choices in these types of transactions. Whereas Dagan and Heller emphasize the different values at stake in different spheres of contracting, differences among parties’ capacities for choice — or the “mechanics of choice” — are at least as important

A Survey of Paraphrasing and Textual Entailment Methods

Paraphrasing methods recognize, generate, or extract phrases, sentences, or longer natural language expressions that convey almost the same information. Textual entailment methods, on the other hand, recognize, generate, or extract pairs of natural language expressions, such that a human who reads (and trusts) the first element of a pair would most likely infer that the other element is also true. Paraphrasing can be seen as bidirectional textual entailment and methods from the two areas are often similar. Both kinds of methods are useful, at least in principle, in a wide range of natural language processing applications, including question answering, summarization, text generation, and machine translation. We summarize key ideas from the two areas by considering in turn recognition, generation, and extraction methods, also pointing to prominent articles and resources.Comment: Technical Report, Natural Language Processing Group, Department of Informatics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece, 201