Den litterære erkendelse

Søren Harnow Klausen i sin artikel, på hvilken måde litterære værker kan fungere som katalysatorer for filosofisk erkendelse, idet litteraturen er ”en uvurderlig kilde til erfaring, både af det faktisk forekommende […] og af de mulige måder tingene og livet kan være på”, som det hedder under henvisning, dels til Husserls begreb om den eidetiske variation, dels til hverdagslivets praksis; hvordan – og hvorfor – kan litteraturen levere en nuanceret, fordomsfri virkelighedsbeskrivelse? Det har Harnow Klausen et kvalificeret, og for vort aktuelle emne nærmest programmatisk bud på

Den litterære erkendelse

Søren Harnow Klausen i sin artikel, på hvilken måde litterære værker kan fungere som katalysatorer for filosofisk erkendelse, idet litteraturen er ”en uvurderlig kilde til erfaring, både af det faktisk forekommende […] og af de mulige måder tingene og livet kan være på”, som det hedder under henvisning, dels til Husserls begreb om den eidetiske variation, dels til hverdagslivets praksis; hvordan – og hvorfor – kan litteraturen levere en nuanceret, fordomsfri virkelighedsbeskrivelse? Det har Harnow Klausen et kvalificeret, og for vort aktuelle emne nærmest programmatisk bud på

Editorial

This special issue of Res Cogitans presents a selection of the papers presented at the conference Frontiers in the philosophy of literature, which was held at the University of Southern Denmark, Odense from 25-26th September 2015. The conference was funded by the Danish Research Council for Independence Research – Humanities and hosted by the Department for the Study of Culture. It focused three interrelated topics that are both more or less perennial questions in the philosophy of literature and at the same time have attracted renewed attention, and received important modifications, in light of recent developments in literature, philosophy and society at large

What is Historicity?

ABSTRACT: The article argues for a distinction between standard “historical thinking”, which aims at interpreting theories, views and concepts by considering them in their historical or cultural context, and a more sophisticated “thinking of historicity”, which attempts to uncover the historical nature of human understanding in general. The latter kind of thinking is exemplified, in different ways, by Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer, who all strongly opposed the trend to “historicize” ideas and knowledge. It is pointed out that the notion of historicity resembles the notion of path-dependence, which has gained prominence in contemporary philosophy of science. It is further argued that precisely because historicity turns out to be a generic and fundamental phenomenon, a part of the human condition, it does not by itself allow one to discriminate between more or less authentic or genuinely historical styles or genres of thinking or research

På sporet af videnssamfundet

På sporet af videnssamfunde

På sporet af videnssamfundet

På sporet af videnssamfunde

Erkendelsens former

This article explores various ways to distinguish different forms of knowledge. Such an investigation has an obvious practical relevance in light of the current popularity of the concept of knowledge in public discussions about education, business and politics. It is of particular importance to distinguish different “formats” of knowledge, like propositional knowledge, knowledge-how, phenomenal knowledge etc. The received distinctions in this field turn out to be insufficiently precise, and there is a problematic tendency to equate forms of knowledge which are not necessarily identical, e.g. practical knowledge, tacit knowledge and knowledge-how. The standard notions of reflexive knowledge are also in need of further clarification

Indledning til “Om spørgsmålet: Hvad er oplysning?” af Moses Mendelssohn

Indledning til “Om spørgsmålet: Hvad er oplysning?” af Moses Mendelssoh

Teoretisk erkendelse og læring

The value and function of theoretical knowledge is an important and disputed issue, which has received surprisingly little scholarly attention. I attempt to clarify the notion of theoretical knowledge and examine its general relationship to learning. Theoretical knowledge is not necessarily distinguished by any particular content; the adjective “theoretical” can just as well signify a particular methodological approach or a way of dealing with a topic, including the way it is conceptualized. I further argue that theoretical knowledge can be merely implicit and non-propositional. Though I reject a radical constructivist view, according to which knowledge acquisition consists in socialization, it must be admitted that socialization and the acquisition of theoretical knowledge do turn out to go closely hand in hand, inasmuch as theoretical knowledge is often a precondition of successful socialization. Concepts, principles, models and symbolic systems support the acquisition of both theoretical and other kinds of knowledge, but also help the learner to find her way about in an environment that is already formed by theories and conceptual understandings. Theoretical knowledge is both a learning instrument and a tool for navigatio